TWO BATTLES AND TWO BILLS:
MARATHON AND THE ATHENIAN FLEET

Johan Henrik Schreiner

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Preface

This little book was written by an indignant lifelong oarsman who started rowing in his schooldays. Indignant because the rowers in the fleet have not been credited with any role in Athens’ victory over the Persians in 490 BC. Nor have light-armed troops been given their due share in the glory. It has all been usurped in favour of the heavy-armed hoplites at Marathon.

Ancient history is an offspring of classical philology. At school and university we concentrate on great writers like Herodotus and Thukydides, too easily assuming that great literature spells reliable historiography, much above the standard of the late 'secondary’ sources. This book is a defence of those ‘less respectable’ sources, and pays homage to several 19th-century German scholars who are not much read these days.

I am indebted to friends and colleagues who have commented on larger and smaller part of my manuscript, or checked my home-made English, or aided me in my war with the computer: Peter Bilton, Vincent Gabrielsen, Jon W. Iddeng, Signe Isager, Tomasz Kozysa, Stig Oppedal and Hans van Wees. Also thanks to my wife Nätten for illustrations and lay-out and to Tomasz for the cover design.

I offer my sincere thanks to the Norwegian Institute at Athens for accepting the thing for a monograph and for meeting much of the cost of publication, and likewise the Department of History at the University of Oslo for financial support.

Oslo in August 2004  

Johan Henrik Schreiner
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Arkhaiologika Analecta ex Athenon</td>
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<td>AAntiHung</td>
<td>Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</td>
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<td>AC</td>
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<td>AJA</td>
<td>American Journal of Archaeology</td>
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<td>AJPh</td>
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<td>BCH</td>
<td>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Annual of the British School at Athens</td>
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<td>CAH</td>
<td>The Cambridge Ancient History</td>
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<td>ClassAnt</td>
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<td>CSCA</td>
<td>University of California Studies in Classical Archaeology</td>
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<td>GRBS</td>
<td>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</td>
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<td>JHS</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies</td>
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<td>ML</td>
<td>R. Meiggs &amp; D.M. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. Oxford 1969</td>
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<td>Mnem</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>La Parola del Passato</td>
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<td>RFIC</td>
<td>Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica</td>
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<td>REA</td>
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<td>RStA</td>
<td>Rivista di storia antica</td>
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<td>SEG</td>
<td>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</td>
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<td>SO</td>
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CHAPTER I

**Herodotos and the hoplites of Marathon**

In 490 BC the Persian king Dareios sent an army and navy overseas to Greece in order to punish Athens and Eretria for their aid to the Ionian revolt (499-494). The Persians, guided by the exiled Athenian tyrant Hippias, swiftly conquered Eretria in the island of Euboia. Their next move was to cross over to the mainland at Marathon in order to march on Athens; facing them on the other side of the plain was a contingent of Athenians and their allies from Plataiai, intent on blocking the Persians' route. The ensuing battle of Marathon was almost immediately enshrouded in myth and legend, an epic battle of gods and heroes and men. It remains a major historical challenge to reconstruct what exactly took place on that venerable battleground. Physical remains are few and far between, nor have any contemporary historical accounts survived into posterity. The unfortunate result is that most historians rely on the earliest narrative source, the often dubious *Histories* of Herodotos. 'Everyone knows that Herodotos' narrative of Marathon will not do,' wrote Gomme many years ago, but, he adds, 'there is very little additional evidence' to his narrative, the 'oldest and best account of the battle.' Gomme's verdict, expressing what is still not far from *communis opinio*, hardly gives a ringing endorsement to the Greek historian.

We must therefore ask ourselves: is it possible, based on archaeology and later literary sources, to reconstruct a more plausible account of the battle than the one we find in Herodotos? And who exactly were the Greeks who fought at Marathon? In Herodotos and in much modern literature, Marathon ranks as a pure hoplitic victory, with no role being assigned to either light
infantry or navy, the arms of mainly the unprivileged free and
unfree who played a most important role during the Persian in-
vansion of 480/79. It is my intent in this book to claim a substantial
role for these arms. I leave a discussion of the literary sources,
mostly of Herodotos versus Ephoros and writers depending on
him, to the last chapter, preferring now to go in medias res.

Let us briefly recapitulate Herodotos' narrative of the Persian
expedition and the battle (6.102-120), to which we shall return in
Chapter III. In preparation for his punitive expedition against
Athens and Eretria with 600 triremes, king Dareios had required
earth and water from Aigina, the enemy of Athens, and a number
of other islands, so that the Athenians feared a joint frontal attack
on their city by the Aiginetans and the Persians (6.49). Possessing
no more than 50 ships of their own, the Athenians had to borrow
20 ships from the Korinthians for their preventive war with the
Aiginetans, whom they defeated first at sea and then on land (89-
92). If the Aiginetans seemed neutralised for the moment, they
soon retaliated by winning a victory in which they captured four
Athenian ships with their crews, probably after the Athenians had
returned the loan of the ships to Korinth (93). But despite this
success against Athens, in 490 the Aiginetans of Herodotos failed
to bring any aid to the Persians during their invasion. And the
Persians, after subduing hostile Naxos, put to sea again to attack
the other islands - states which had previously given them earth
and water (6.49, 96)! For some reason that we would have liked to
learn, they wasted precious time by putting in at these presumably
friendly islands, pressing troops for service and taking children as
hostages for good conduct (99). And before eventually turning
against Athens, their main enemy, they dealt with weaker Karystos
and Eretria in Euboia, waiving any opportunity to catch the Athe­
nians unprepared.

Herodotos, if unable to tell what the dream was that the
Persian commander Datis had at Mykonos on his return to Asia
HERODOTUS AND THE HOPLITES OF MARATHON

(6.188.1), does report that the night before Hippias led the Persians to land from Eretria at Marathon he dreamt that he slept with his own mother, which he took to mean that he was about to regain his position in Athens. But on the following day when he had disembarked he sneezed with such force that he lost a tooth in the sand, which he took to signify that the tooth had taken possession of what belonged to him. The motive of the Persians for choosing Marathon for landing was that it was near to Eretria and offered good ground for cavalry (102). When the news of the landing reached Athens, the strateges sent the messenger Philippides for help to Sparta, where he arrived already on the next day. The Spartans, though willing to help, declared that they had to await the full moon before marching out. The Athenians - led by the strateges, not Kallimakhos the polemarch - almost immediately marched to Marathon, without a delaying debate in the assembly. At Plataiai in 479, the Athenians mustered 8,000 hoplites plus an unspecified number of archers and other light-armed warriors (9.22.1, 28-29, 60.3). Our historian does not specify that 'the Athenians' who marched out to Marathon in 490 were all close combat fighting hoplites, perhaps numbering some 8,000; but this is the impression, no word being uttered about other kinds of warriors in his narrative of this battle. Out at Marathon they encamped at a sanctuary of Herakles, and while arrayed there they were joined by the Plataians who again, although they came 'in full force,' seem all to be hoplites. The Persians, after disembarking their men and horses at Eretria, had straight away started their attack upon the city walls; and having waited a few days after their victory they crossed to Attika pressing hard, confident that they would treat Athens in the same way. But we do not hear that they promptly upon their landing at Marathon, in an attempt to force their way out of the plain and through towards Athens, assailed the Greeks who were drawn up in their defensive position. Instead there was a delay. Then the Greeks were arrayed again, not, however, to ward off an onslaught by the Persians but to deliver the attack them-
selves out in the plain. As Herodotos' Mardonios will later explain to Xerxes (7.9.2b), the Greek way of war was to find the best and most even plain, to descend to it, and fight.

In the meantime a council of war had convened in which there was a division among the strateges, five arguing against giving battle, five, including Miltiades, being for it. Next, Miltiades in an eloquent speech appealed to Kallimakhos the polemarch. Accordingly this officer, who had only been appointed by lot and was no commander-in-chief, gave his casting vote in favour of fighting. After the decision had been taken a delay of several days ensued, since each of the strateges in favour of fighting surrendered his day-of-command to Miltiades. He accepted it, but would not engage till his own day came round. Then the Athenians, without waiting for their Spartan reinforcements, ran no less than eight stades or a 1500 m race against the enemy. 'The Persians thought that the Athenians were mad and bent upon their own destruction when they saw that they were few and came running with no support from either horsemen or archers.' The Athenians were furthermore 'the first Greeks we know of to proceed at a run, and the first to endure the sight of Persian dress and men clad in that fashion. Until that day even the name of the Persians had been a terror to hear among the Greeks.' Lacking the support of cavalry and archery, the Athenians were evidently all hoplites in heavy armour, in contrast to the Persians. True, Herodotos makes no mention of Persian cavalry in the fighting, but Persian children were taught three things only, riding, archery and truth-telling (1.136) and the preparations for the campaign in Kilikia had included special transport vessels for cavalry, and Marathon had been chosen as a landing place because it was good ground for cavalry. Nor is he explicit about the presence of bowmen at Marathon, but the Persians and the Sakai are presented as bowmen ten years later on the invasion of Xerxes (7.61.1, 64.2). And the astonishment of the Persians at the absence of Athenian bowmen at Marathon implies the presence of these forces on their side. The
Marathon of Herodotos is thus a contest of brave Greek hoplites against barbarian cavalry and archery. Greek bowmen and stone casters who unmanly fight at a distance have no share in the glory of Herodotos' battle of Marathon.

The heavy hoplites were not too exhausted after the 1500 m charge to engage in battle straight on, and fighting for a long time they defeated the far more numerous enemy. Fighting gallantly, Epizelos was blinded by the mere apparition of the only Persian hoplite attested in the battle, a giant whose beard covered his shield - 'I heard that he himself told the story about what happened to him.' Having defeated the enemy in the plain, the Greeks pursued him to the sea where they captured seven ships in the fighting. The surviving Persians managed to escape by a remarkably hasty reembarkation on their remaining ships, after the loss of about 6,400 men in the battle. The Athenian losses amounted to 192 men. Without resting after the 1500 m race and the hard-fought battle in the plain and at the ships, the surviving hoplites started on, if not a true Marathon race of 42 kms, then at least a march as fast as their legs could carry them back to Athens. (Their amazing speed is reminiscent of the Athenians who in the year 506 first defeated the Boiotians in battle on the continental side of the Euripos, killing as many as 700, and then on the same day set over to Euboia to defeat the Khalkidians, 5.77.2.) Arriving at the city after the quasi Marathon race, the warriors pitched camp in the sanctuary of Herakles at Kynosarges outside the walls.

As for the fleeing Persians, we do not hear what plans they harboured once they were safe on board the ships, but then they received a shield signal given, according to some, by collaborating Athenians. Upon this signal the fleet headed around Cape Sounion to Phaleron in order to make a frontal attack on Athens, wishing to get ahead of the Athenians to the city and probably hoping that traitors in Athens might be able to betray it. Now they allowed themselves time for a detour to the island of Aigilia to pick up Eretrian prisoners who had been placed there, and so the Athe-
nians managed to rush back to the city before the arrival of the Persians off Phaleron. There the Persian fleet stood at sea - and then put off, vanishing in the direction of Asia. Herodotos is not crystal clear about the cause of their withdrawal, but seemingly his Persians were in no mood for another battle against the fast Athenian hoplites who, in their camp up at some 4 kms distant Kynosarges, apparently were visible to Argus-eyed Persians. Two battles were thus won by the rapid heavy spearmen, first a long and tough one at Marathon following a 1500 m race, and then a walk-over victory near Athens, after a prompt return resembling an actual Marathon race. In the year after Marathon, Miltiades took a fleet of 70 ships on his expedition against Paros (6.132), but no role is assigned to that fleet in either neutralising Persia's ally Aigina before Marathon or in causing the Persian fleet to turn back from Phaleron after Marathon. The Athenian hoplites were not the only rapid walkers: a Spartan force of 2,000 which left in haste for Attika after the full moon, arrived already on the third day out from Sparta - but alas, too late for the battle. Before tramping home again, they marched to Marathon in order to inspect the battlefield.

Gomme is certainly right: Herodotos' narrative of Marathon will not do. He holds that the discussion about whether or not to charge against the enemy took place in Athens, not at Marathon, and that Miltiades cannot have used the words Herodotos ascribes to him. He is inclined to think that Kallimakhos was in fact commander-in-chief, not only a kind of president of the board of strateges. The delay before the battle is maintained by Gomme, but not the reason Herodotos gives for it,³ and the attack, he asserts, was delivered by the Persians, not the Greeks. Other scholars more confidently make the polemarch the commander-in-chief in 490,⁴ contesting that he was appointed by lot. And few will subscribe to such items as a Persian armada of no less than 600 triremes, or to the fanciful omens ascribed to Hippias, the 1500 m race in full armour,⁵ the run of the hoplites from Marathon to
Kynosarges, the idea that no Greeks had earlier endured the sight of Persian dress, the blinding of Epizelos, or the ratio of Athenian to Persian casualties.

If Herodotus' narrative fails to convince, what do we miss before and after the Persian landing at Marathon? Something must have intervened to explain why the Persians received no aid from Aigina, and why in other islands that had given earth and water they had to press troops into service and take children as hostages. The landing at Marathon with many men and horses was not a matter of a few hours, but once they had disembarked, we expect the Persians - far from intending to deploy their cavalry in a suitable battlefield - would lose no time before letting Hippias lead them towards Athens by the coastal road and Pallene. At least since the first Persian operations in Euboia were reported, a Persian landing in Attika was imminent, most likely one at Marathon where Hippias and his father Peisistratos had successfully put in from Eretria in 546. So the Athenians will have called for aid from other states, soliciting them to send aid to Athens, be it to help in defence of the walls or to march out together with the Athenians once the location of the impending Persian landing became known. Since the Spartans, unlike the Plataians, had yet to arrive by the time the news of the landing at Marathon was reported, the options were to continue waiting for them in the city, risking to have to stand a siege, or to march out to Marathon and wait for them there, in the meantime blocking the enemy's way and enclosing him on the plain. The lesson of the year 546 was that Hippias and the enemy should not be allowed to slip out towards the city through the narrow exit between the eastern slopes of Mt Agrieliki and the sea. So we expect the Athenians and Plataians to hurry out and take a defensive position, either close to the southern exit from the plain or in a favourable location further inland, from where they could attack the enemy in the flank in case he attempted a march towards the city. In either case, the Persians would first have to deal with the Greeks in their defensive posi-
tion. For the defence of such a position, we surmise that all possible sources of manpower were significant, both rich and poor, free and unfree, citizen and metic. Unskilled stonecasters and javelin-men, as well as specialist archers and slingers, would be of no less use than heavy infantry. In 480, the Athenians mustered light-armed infantry and numerous seamen during the invasion of Xerxes. We doubt that they only ten years before, in the year of Marathon, could solicit other states for aid if they would use no more of their manpower for the defence than their less than 10,000 hoplites.

As before at Eretria, we expect the Persian commander Datis to take immediate action after the landing. Having observed to his disappointment that the Greek army had already come out from Athens to block his advance towards the city, he will have chosen to launch an assault on its defensive position before the arrival of the Spartan aid. If repelled, we expect him to reembark on the ships with the main force and skip round to Phaleron for a frontal attack on Athens, while leaving his rear guard at Marathon to keep the Greek army amused. The embarkation of men and horses cannot have been effected in the twinkling of an eye, under the pressure of a pursuing enemy. On the contrary, some time must be allowed to pass between the unsuccessful attack on the Greek defensive position and the - orderly - reembarkation. Being in a hurry now to reach the city in advance of the Athenian army, Datis is unlikely to have wasted time in picking up prisoners from Aigilia, a cumbersome cargo with a view to a landing at Phaleron. When he arrived at Phaleron and attempted to land, it is hard to believe that he caught the Athenian fleet of at least 70 ships napping. And despite the silence of Herodotos, it is unbelievable that this fleet had been totally passive before Marathon. A successful preemptive war against Aigina and the other islands that had given earth and water will best account for why no aid was given to the Persian invaders by Aigina, and why they had to take children as hostages from other islands. In short, there is a marked discre-
pancy between what we might reasonably expect of the battle and Herodotos' account of it.

In the following, I shall first, in Ch. II, demonstrate that later sources in fact chronicle the battle we miss in Herodotos, when shortly after their landing at Marathon the Persians attacked the Greek defensive position in an attempt to get through towards Athens. The assault was warded off by the Greeks under the command of Kallimakhos, the polemarch. The object of Ch. III is the subsequent battle when the Greeks led by the stratege Miltiades were on the offensive, defeating in the open plain those Persians who remained at Marathon after the reembarkation of the main force for a frontal attack on Athens from the opposite coast. The chapter will contain a discussion of the famous Marathon painting in the Stoa Poikile and Herodotos' dependence upon it as a source. In that context I shall call in question the idea of Marathon as an all-hoplite achievement, no role being assigned to light-armed infantry and irregular fighters. In Ch. VI, I shall claim a considerable role for the Athenian navy both before and in the year 490. Before that I shall argue, in Ch. IV, that Athens did possess a substantial fleet at that time, by dating the famous naval bill of Themistokles to the late 490s (rather than 483/2), during the pre-Marathon preventive war with Persia's ally Aigina. I shall search for evidence for my assumption that the new triremes were actually employed both for neutralising Aigina before the battle of Marathon, and against the Persian fleet off Phaleron after Marathon. The same way I claim two battles of Marathon, I also maintain that two naval bills were moved by Themistokles: first the famous one before Marathon, and then a second bill before Salamis. The second bill will be the object of Ch. V, in which I shall demonstrate that a misinterpretation of a passage in Aristotle's Athenaiion politeia is at the root of much scholarly confusion in our day. For a better treatment of Themistokles' naval policy and the war with Aigina, we are advised to turn to scholars who wrote
before the recovery of Aristotle's curious treatise more than a hundred years ago. In the concluding Ch. VII, I shall have a word to say about Herodotos versus the so-called secondary sources, and a short history of the 490s and 480s will be attempted. As an appendix, I quote some less used sources. In the text, reference to them is marked with an asterisk.

NOTES

1. Gomme 1958: 28, 33. Swoboda 1884: 5 dubs it 'Abirrungen der Forschung' to take Nepos seriously. 'Gegenüber diesen Abirrungen der Forschung - der Ausdruck ist nicht zu hart - ist es Pflicht, immer wieder auf Herodot zurückzuweisen.' Meyer 1954: 311 n. 2 'Alle anderen Berichte haben keinen selbständigen Wert, sondern sind Modifikationen der bei Herodot erhaltenen Tradition.' How & Wells 1912: 353-354 'H.'s account of Marathon is beyond dispute our principal authority' ... but 'in many points defective and in some positively misleading.' Maurice 1932: 13 'almost our sole authority.' Hignett 1963: 24 is worried because 'in some recent writings, especially those of Labarbe, there has been an alarming tendency to re-examine the secondary sources, even the least trustworthy of them, for fresh illumination.' Whatley 1964: 128 has it that 'the chances that the earliest account of a Greek war that we possess is the best seem to me very great indeed,' and Hignett 1963: vi subscribes to his statement that Herodotos' account of Marathon 'is the only one which is worth anything at all.' Ehrenberg 1973: 411 n. 16 'Hdt. bk. 6 is almost the only source'; Lazenby 1993: 5 'Apart from Herodotos, there is not much evidence to consider.' Lazenby dubs Herodotos a 'basically sober' historian, p. 72 n. 63. V.d. Veer 1982: 310 'It is generally accepted now that Herodotus is our best authority on the battle of Marathon.' Evans 1984: 2 'our earliest and best account, and any effort to reconstruct the battle must start with it... What he says is probably accurate as far as it goes.' Doenges 1998: 1 'Only the brief account of the battle (6.111-114) inspires confidence.' More to
my taste is Bury 1896: 95 'Any one who reads critically the Herno-
dotcan account must see that Herodorus had not the smallest idea
why the battle was fought, and had a very inadequate notion of how
it was fought. He has collected a number of details, some true,
others absurd; which, as he relates them, are without any inner con-
nection.' Cf. Green 1996: xxii 'these much despised 'late sources' ...
may also contain valuable material along with the rubbish.' Labarbe
1957: 24 'la seule méthode possible est d'analyser les textes anciens
pour son compte, et sans idée préconçue.' Also the great Delbrück,
Busolt, and Beloch are generally more critical of Herodotos, pre-
senting a battle of Marathon rather different from his. They are dis-
missed by the devoted Herodotcan Pritchett, 1960: 168. Griffiths
1989: 52 would probably include Pritchett among those who 'make
ritual genuflections towards the altar.'

2. In Hdt. 7.61.1 the arms of the Persians in 480 are listed as wicker
shields, short spears, daggers, bows and arrows, and in 5.97.1 Arist-
agoras in 499 explains that the Persians used neither shields nor
spears; in 9.62.3 they are called unopoi, 'without arms,' the only true
weapons being the arms of the hoplite. Hartog 1988: 46 'in Greece,
the Persians are regarded as barbarians, that is to say, as anti-hop-
lites.' Hartog unfortunately thinks that the Persian cavalry was absent
at Marathon.

3. So also Bury 1896: 97, although he is very critical of Herodotos' ac-
count of Marathon, cf. n. 1 above; Maurice 1932: 13. Wecklein
1876: 274-275 has a delay when the Persian after their landing waited
to see the reaction of the Athenians. When Miltiades and the Athe-
nians came marching out to Marathon, they reembarked for a frontal
assault on Athens from Phaleron, leaving a rear guard to protect the
embarkation. The Athenians defeated the guard shortly after their
arrival.

4. e.g. Bicknell 1970: 427 with reference to literature in n. 6.

5. Delbrück 1920: 54 'eine physische Unmöglichkeit.' Even the great
Herodotcan Hignett 1963: 62 rejects both the 1500 m race and the
election of the polemarch by lot.

6. Calabi Limentani 1964: 23 'si tratta di bellimento della tradizione
culminante nella leggenda dell' oplita corridore.'

8. Delbrück 1921: 228 'nur mit Hilfe der Sachkritik kann die Quellenkritik richtig gehandhabt und von jener Willkür befreit werden.'


10. Cf. Hunt 1998: 26 'The Greeks used every resource, including their own slaves, to counter the threat to their lives and freedom presented by the Persian invasion.' Even so, Hunt p. 27 curiously thinks that no thetes were armed to fight against the Persians. Immerwahr 1966: 251 speaks of 'the tradition that correctly pictured Marathon as a great hoplite victory' and Vidal-Naquet 1986: 90 sees Marathon as the ideal hoplite battle, and states (p. 92) that albeit there were more than 30,000 potential combatants in 490, 'faced with a formidable danger threatening the very existence of the city, the young democracy managed to 'mobilize' less than a third of its available manpower: the profligacy has something appalling about it.' But the Athenians did not march to Marathon for fighting a regular hoplite battle against other Greeks in the plain; their object was to stop a foreign invasion, like the Spartans who came to Thermopylae in 480. Just as light-armed helots were of use to the Spartans at Thermopylae, so were non-hoplite warriors to the Athenians at Marathon. Archers and slingers were useful against cavalry according to Nikias in Thuk. 6.22.
On the famous Chigi vase of about 650 BC, two hoplite armies coming to grips are represented. A young flute player takes part, but archers or other light-armed troops are totally missing. I surmise that the painting gives us more of hoplite ideology than of actual Greek warfare in the late Archaic Age.

On the next page we have first a vase painting of the half-naked hoplite Thorakion arming himself to go to war. He figures between two archers in Skythian dress who are clearly about to accompany him in the battle. Real archers would no more wear this Skythian outfit than real hoplites would fight half-naked. It is only a matter of iconography.

Next we have the sad outcome of battle, a gravestone from the graveyard of Olbia, dating from the time of the battle of Marathon. On side A of the battered stele figures the half-naked hoplite Leoxos, and on side B his accompanying archer in Skythian dress is shown. The bowman has apparently fought together with Leoxos in a battle and fallen with him. We are sometimes told that the archer is not Leoxos' light-armed comrade but either an Amazon or Leoxos' barbarian slayer. But such figures are unlikely to have been honoured with representation on noble Leoxos' gravestone in Olbia.
Lissarrague 1990: 48

Reconstruction by Famakovskij, photo by Pia Guldager Bilde, composition by Erik Hallager, SFINX
CHAPTER II

The First Marathon: the Battle of Kallimakhos

It is normal to speak of the military encounter between Greeks and Persians at Marathon as the battle of Marathon in the singular even though there is evidence for two different battles (cf. the battle of Philippi in 42 BC). The normal practice is to my mind the result of a too narrow and too reverent reading of Herodotos. I have previously argued for taking not only Herodotos, but the whole bulk of relevant ancient material seriously, which inevitably leads to recognizing two battles at Marathon. In the first battle (hereafter battle A), which mostly appears in late sources, the Persians, attempting to force their way through towards Athens, unsuccessfully attacked the Athenians and Plataians right after these had jointly marched out from Athens to Marathon and had taken a position in a location suitable for defence. The second battle (battle B), that of the early source Herodotos, took place several days later, when the Athenians set out from their defensive position and attacked the enemy out in the open plain. We thus have an early battle and a later one; one attack launched by the Persians and another by the Greeks; one battle in a rugged terrain and another in the open plain. Rather than accept two successive battles, scholars tend to combine them into one, thereby encountering a host of problems, e.g. whether or not the Persian cavalry took part in the battle and why the Persians tarried at Marathon instead of immediately marching towards the city, as they had previously done in Eretria. My grounds for reopening the discussion about the enigmatic events at Marathon is that I now think I understand more of the Stoa Poikile in the Agora of Athens with its paintings of Marathon and other warlike achievements of the Athenians.
The victor of the second battle was the stratege Miltiades, who, not least due to the Stoa Poikile and the propaganda genius of his son Kimon, came in the tradition to rank as the hero of Marathon. The polemarch Kallimakhos, who commanded the whole host and led in the first battle, was thus ousted from his rightful position. He fell at Marathon and apparently lacked a mighty son to promote his case.

Turning now to the evidence, we notice that the latest source, the tenth-century Byzantine Suda lexicon, is the only one to clearly record two battles of Marathon. The first battle, battle 4, is met with in the entry Hippias (2):

When one of the ten advised to wait for the Spartans to arrive but when Miltiades and Kallimakhos would take the field, the Athenians marched out numbering 9,000, together with 1,000 Plataians. And they conquered on the same day.

Before the Persians had landed at Marathon, whether before or during their operations in Euboia, the Athenians had called for help from Sparta, Plataiai and possibly from other states. But only the Plataians had arrived in Athens by the time it was reported that the enemy had landed at Marathon. Now, even if the circuit wall of Athens had been adequate, the danger implied in withstanding a siege had been demonstrated by the fate of Eretria, where the gates had been opened by traitors. So after the arrival of only the Plataians in Athens, the Athenians of the Suda, on the motion of Miltiades and Kallimakhos, decided to quit their walls and take the field together with the Plataians without waiting for the Spartans. They had no time to lose. In 546, Hippias and his father Peisistratos, marching towards Athens after landing at Marathon from Eretria, had managed to advance as far as Pallene before encountering their enemies coming out from Athens, and at Pallene they won an easy victory. The landing from Eretria of a great army in
In the fourth century an inscription recorded the decision 'to take provisions and set out' to Marathon and 'meet the enemy at once,' rather than wait for the Spartans (Aristot. Rhet. 1411a 10, schol. Dem. 19.303, Plut. Mor. 628e, schol. Aristeides 2.219). It is interesting, since it is constantly referred to as the decree of Miltiades, that in the Suda, Miltiades has to share with Kallimakhos, the polemarch, the glory for moving the decree in Athens and possibly also for winning the victory 'on the same day'. The decision of the people, on the proposal of Miltiades, to free slaves before Marathon (Paus. 7.15.7) was probably part of the same decree. But unlike Pausanias (10.20.2), the Suda fails to record that the 9,000 Athenians included liberated slaves as well as citizens above military age. Nor do we learn how many of the 9,000 were hoplites and how many light-armed troops, or whether any of the hoplites rode their mounts out to the battlefield, or whether the warriors were accompanied by slave armour-bearers.

The second battle, battle B, is recorded in the brief Suda entry *khôris hippeis*:

> When Datis invaded Attika they say that the Ionians, after he had withdrawn, went up to the trees, and signalled to the Athenians that the cavalry were apart. Miltiades, learning of their departure (*apoxôfrôsis*), thus attacked and conquered. Hence the proverb is applied to those who break ranks.

We shall deal further with this entry in the next chapter. Here we only note that the Athenians, apparently after having repelled the Persian attack in battle A, lay encamped for some days at Marathon. We hear nothing more of Kallimakhos in the Suda, but
Miltiades, after learning that Datis had withdrawn with the cavalry, launched an assault on the remaining enemies without waiting for the Spartans and without any discussion having taken place in the camp. We are not told the destination of Datis but the *apokhoreisis* smacks of a departure by sea more than a ravaging of the immediate locality (like in Ps.-Dem. 59.94, Plut. *Arist.* 5.1, *Mor.* 305b), probably for a voyage around Cape Sounion to Phaleron and a frontal attack on Athens, after the failed attempt in battle A to get through towards the city. While Miltiades was engaging the Persians remaining at Marathon in battle B, the Suda's Datis may have had time to attempt a landing in Phaleron. Summarizing the two Suda entries, we note that Miltiades had to share with Kallimakhos the glory of moving the decree to charge out, and possibly also for winning victory A, and that he only conquered in battle B after substantial Persian forces had withdrawn.

Since Kallimakhos has been ousted by Miltiades in the tradition and since no biographer has left us his vita, we turn with great expectations to Polemon, 'the Phrygian Demosthenes'. This distinguished rhetor was chosen to deliver an oration at the inauguration of the temple for the Olympian Zeus in Athens in 131 AD, and so highly was he esteemed that on one occasion he could charge 250,000 drachmas for a lecture. But Polemon was not only an outstanding orator, he also wrote an historical work that has not survived. The pair of declamations preserved from Polemon's golden pen ought therefore to be sources of high value. In the declamations the fathers of the fallen Marathon heroes Kynegiros and Kallimakhos present their son's claims for the prize of valour, the law allegedly providing that the father of the bravest should deliver the funeral oration. The first oration is on behalf of Kynegiros, the second of Kallimakhos.

We learn (2.5-6) that after the army of Dareios had landed at Marathon, the Athenians did not wait for the Spartans to arrive. The stratege Miltiades decided instead to charge out immediately,
with Kallimakhos as polemarch and *hegemon* leading the whole army out to Marathon (1.5, 2.6). While the other polemarchs inspired the people with cowardice, the battle came about thanks to the vote of Kallimakhos (2.49), the scene of the debate thus being the assembly at Athens. The Persians delivered the attack in the battle, which seems to have followed shortly upon the arrival of the Greek army at Marathon (1.28, 2.7). In the battle, Kallimakhos withstood the whole of Dareios' army (2.7-8), and his was the hegemony (2.2, 6). He died in the first or middle part of the battle (1.21). "The battle" would suggest no more than one battle, but panic-stricken after the earlier battle of Kallimakhos, the enemy turned their backs and made the pursuit easy for those who attacked them next (*authis*) (2.28). Kyngeiros started a second battle (2.40), and Aiskhylos is asked to praise the battles of Marathon (1.49). The fathers of the two heroes agree in dating the deeds and death of Kallimakhos before those of Kyngeiros; but they do not say how long before, and we would have liked them to be clearer on the question of one battle in two phases, or two separate battles.

'Effekte und Pointe' in Polemon's two declamations 'wirken fast komisch für uns,' and the total loss of his historical work is hardly among the saddest losses of Greek literature. But we notice that Athens, not Marathon, is the scene of the debate about whether or not to march out without waiting for the Spartans; that it is Kallimakhos who leads the army; that the attack in Kallimakhos' battle is delivered by the Persians; and that Kallimakhos' death occurs in an early phase of the fighting. As Jüttner puts it, 'unusquisque cognoscit haec non congruere cum Herodoti verbis.'

Our principal source, however, for the first battle of Marathon is neither the Suda nor Polemon but *Cornelius Nepos Miltiades* 4.3-5.5. After the Persian capture of Eretria and the landing at Marathon,
the Athenians, though greatly alarmed by this hostile demonstration (hoc tumultu), so near and so threatening, asked help only from the Spartans, sending Pheidippos, a courier of the class known as 'all-day runners', to report how pressing was their need of aid. But at home they appointed ten generals to command the army, including Miltiades; among these there was great difference of opinion, whether it was better to take refuge within their walls or go to meet the enemy and fight a decisive battle. Miltiades alone persistently urged them to take the field at the earliest possible moment; stating that if they did so, not only would the citizens take heart, when they saw that their courage was not distrusted, but for the same reason the enemy would be slower to act, if they realized that the Athenians dared to engage them with so small a force.

5. In that crisis no city gave help to the Athenians except the Plataians. They sent 1,000 soldiers, whose arrival raised the number of combatants (armatorum) to 10,000. It was a band inflamed with a marvellous desire for battle, and their ardour gave Miltiades' advice preference over that of his colleagues. Accordingly, through his influence the Athenians were induced to lead their forces from the city and encamp in a favourable position. Then, the next day, the army was drawn up at the foot of a mountain in an area that was not fully open (sub montis radicibus acie regione instructa non apertissima) - for there were trees scattered about (arbores rarae) in many places - and they joined battle (proelium commiserunt). The purpose was to protect themselves by the high mountains and at the same time prevent the enemy's cavalry, hampered by the scattered trees, from surrounding them with their superior numbers (hoc consilio, ut et montium altitudine tegerentur et arborum tractu equitatus hostium impediretur ne multitudine clauderentur).

Although Oatis saw that the position was not favourable to his men, he was eager to engage, trusting the number of his troops; and the more so because he thought it to his advantage to give battle before the Spartan reinforcements arrived. Therefore he led his 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse and began the battle (proeliumque commisit). In
the contest that ensued the Athenians were so superior in valour that they routed a foe of tenfold their own number and filled them with such fear that the Persians fled, not to their camp, but to their ships. (Adapted Loeb transl.)

There are a host of problems here, apart from the impossible number of 110,000 enemies, more so in ch. 4 than in ch. 5. The threatening nearby tumulus, which caused the Athenians to call for outside help, suits the siege and capture of Eretria, but tumulus is a queer word to use about the subsequent Persian landing at Marathon. It could be that in Nepos' source (as implied in the Suda but unlike Plato *Laws* 698d-e), the call for aid was made before the Persians had crossed over from Euboea to Marathon. It is also odd that the Spartans are presented as the only ones who were asked for help, since the Plataians actually did arrive in Athens. More likely, the Athenians will have called for aid from both Sparta and Plataiai, and possibly other states, urging the troops to come to Athens as soon as possible. Like the Suda, Nepos has the 1,000 Plataians joining the Athenians in Athens, not out at Marathon, and encouraged by the presence of these outstanding warriors, the Athenians decided to take the field with 9,000 men without waiting for the arrival of their Spartan reinforcements. The 9,000 armati were probably all hoplites, constituting a tiny part of the total manpower of Athens. The people made this decision on the advice of Miltiades only, and it is small wonder that Nepos, in a biography of Miltiades, fails to have his hero sharing the glory with Kallimakhos, as in the Suda. Nor does he, like Polemon, allow the polemarch to lead the army out to Marathon: Nepos is able (like Plutarch in the *Aristides*) to account for the battle of Marathon without mentioning Kallimakhos! The day after their arrival at Marathon the Greeks drew up their battle-line in their strong defensive position in a mountainous and wooded area and proelium commiserunt. Datis saw that the battle-ground was unfavourable, but he preferred to
act before the Spartans arrived and so he, too, proeliumque commisit. Nepos is a bit unclear here, but not so much that 'è difficile stabilire se Cornelio Nepote e la sua fonte intendessero veramente dire che erano stati i Persiani ad attacare.' He undoubtedly has the battle on the next day, with the Persians delivering the attack; an attack, that is, against an acies, a phalanx of hoplites, not against a defensive position also manned by light-armed infantry, as we would expect. It is also surprising that the Greeks, after warding off the attack in a hard-fought battle, had the energy to throw the enemy back to their ships instead of resting in the camp while waiting for the Spartans. This pursuit of the enemy to the ships was more likely a feature of battle B, which is otherwise missing in Nepos.

There was no time for the Greeks of Nepos, between their hasty march from Athens to Marathon the one day and the battle the next (already the next morning?), to fell trees or build a stockade or an abattis, so by arborum tractu Nepos cannot mean 'pulling of trees' but 'wooded tract', 'die Ausdehnung der (einzeln stehenden) Bäume,' 'die lange Reihe der Bäume.' The trees must be identical with the standing arbores ... rarae above, any construction of an abattis or a wooden breastwork thus being a modern misreading of Nepos. Like the Suda, Nepos fails to inform us about freed slaves, light-armed infantry, or armurbearers. It is all a matter of hoplites.

Iustinus (2.9.9-10)* agrees with Nepos and the Suda that the Plataians arrived at Athens before the army marched out, Miltiades being et dux belli et auctor non expectandi auxilii from Sparta. And like Nepos, Plutarch (Mor. 349e) dates the battle the day after the Athenians had set out for Marathon, whereas Isokrates (4.87) and Lysias (2.26) both point out how promptly the Athenians took the field and defeated the Persians. Unlike Polemon and Nepos, these sources fail to specify that the attack was delivered by the Persians, not the Greeks, but this is what Diodoros (10.27) implies in Book Ten which has only survived in
fragments: after his landing at Marathon, Datis demanded that the Athenians should concede him sovereignty, or they would suffer a worse fate than had the Eretrians. The demand was obviously made after the Athenians had marched out to Marathon, for Miltiades rejected it on behalf of the ten strateges, not of the demos in Athens. Now Datis made ready for battle, clearly as the offensive party. Here the Diodoros fragment unfortunately breaks off, but the Persian attack is more likely to have come the next day, in Diodoros as in Nepos and Plutarch, than already the very day the Athenians and Plataians had come out to Marathon, as in the Suda.

Nepos, Diodoros, Iustinus, Plutarch, Poinemon and the Suda all belong to the same tradition, which is likely to derive from the universal historian Ephoros who wrote about 340 BC. He in his turn may have followed one of the early Arthidographers, Hellanikos at the end of the fifth century whom he is known to have utilised rather than Kleidemos who wrote about 350 BC. Well before Hellanikos' *Aithis*, the first battle of Marathon appears in *Aristophanes* *Wasps*, produced in 422 BC. The chorus is of elderly Athenians dressed as wasps to symbolise the sting they had as soldiers in their younger days. In lines 1075-90 they declare:

We who have this kind of rump on us are the only genuine autochthonic Athenians, a most manly breed and one that aided this city very greatly in battles at the time when the barbarian came, blowing smoke over all the city and putting it to the flames, striving to destroy our hives by force. For we charged out and fought against them straight away "with spear, with shield" (εὐθὲς γὰρ ἐκδραμόμενος ξῖν δορὶ ξῖν ὀσπίδα ἐμαχόμεθα· οὕτωσι) after drinking a draught of sharp, bitter spirit; each man stood beside the next, biting his lip with anger. Because of their arrows one could not see the sky, but still, with the gods' help, towards the evening we pushed them back; for an owl had flown across our troops before the battle. Then we pursued them, harpooning their baggy pants, and
they fled, stung in the jaws and the eyebrows. And so everywhere among the barbarians it is said even now that there is nothing more manly than an Attic wasp. (Adapted Sommerstein transl.)

The note of the scholiast on 'when the barbarian came' is 'he speaks of the victory at Marathon over Dareios,' and most scholars concur with him that the battle is at Marathon. Like ten years later at Thermopylai, there will have been a rain of Persian arrows at Marathon, and if it is too much to say that the barbarians actually managed to blow smoke over all the city in 490, they at least 'wished to burn the sea-girt city' according to an epigram which we below, in Ch. VI, refer to that year.\(^{21}\) Eutheos is to be taken with \textit{emakhomesth}' rather than with \textit{ekdramontes},\(^{24}\) unless the wasps, being less philologically sophisticated, stress their haste in both running out to Marathon and encountering the enemy there - by no means after a delay of several days, but rather in \(A\), the first battle of Marathon. (Cf. Himerios 6.20*: 'No sooner did they learn of the landing of the barbarians before they ran out in arms; no sooner did they encounter those who had disembarked before they put them to flight.') Towards the evening the wasps pushed the Persians back, repelling the enemy attack. We have thus traced the defensive first battle of Marathon back to the 420s,\(^{25}\) and the last step is to Aiskhylos who in his epitaph of the year 456 calls upon the Marathonian holy grove (\textit{alsos}) to bear witness to his valour. He showed his valour not in battle \(B\) out in the open plain, regarded as a holy place,\(^{26}\) or together with his brother Kynigeiros at the ships, but in a holy grove which recalls the \textit{arbores rarae} of Nepos and the trees of Suda's \textit{khoris hippeis} - the scene of the first, defensive, battle \(A\).

Having warded off the attack of the barbarian towards the evening, the wasps of Aristophanes pursued the enemy, 'harp­pooning them through their baggy trousers.' The impression is that the pursuit of the brave wasps followed straight upon the battle that ended towards the evening, the way the Athenians of Nepos
pursued the defeated Persians as they fled to their ships. But the danger is that Nepos and the wasps of Aristophanes are telescoping the events, in that human hoplites would scarcely have given themselves immediately to an exhausting pursuit of the enemy after a hard day’s fight. The pursuit of the enemy is more appropriate to battle B. The hoplite wasps of Aristophanes do the job all by themselves, with spear and shield, shoulder by shoulder. Not a word here of archers or other light-armed wasps — the arrows in the sky were all Persian. Nor do we hear of ships, for by the 420s the battle of Marathon had long been established as the hoplite battle, no one but hoplites contributing to the defence.

The location of Kallimakhos’ camp and battlefield A
The Athenians must have expected that Hippias intended to lead the Persians towards Athens by the same route he and his father Peisistratos had taken in 546, when they landed from Eretria and marched towards the city. This was the easy and level route along the coast, through Pallene and over the low pass between Pente­likon and Hymetos. The route could be blocked to the Persians in two ways: either by an encampment near the sea in the locality of Valaria, in the narrow strip of land between Agrieliki and the sea, or from an inland camp near Vrana in the valley between Agrieliki and Kotroni, the Greeks could attack the Persians in their unprotected flank in case they attempted an advance on Athens along the coastal road.

A Greek encampment at Valaria, while waiting for the Spartan reinforcements to arrive, implies a march out from Athens to Marathon by the main road of about 40 kms through Pallene. Its last part near the coast would be dangerously exposed to seaborne Persian landings, and a camp between Agrieliki and the sea would leave the defenders open to the danger of enemy troops being landed in their rear. An inland position near Vrana, with a supply of water from the stream, would be safer, the army having taken the rugged and toilsome, but some 4 kms shorter and less
exposed route via Kefisia/Stamata/Oinoe, or rather the one via Kefisia/Dionysos/Rapentosa, which descends right to the Vrana area. In either case, whether the Greek defensive position was near the sea at Valaria or inland at Vrana, the Persians could only leave the plain and head for Athens after sustaining and winning a battle.²⁸

Nepos and the Suda both speak in favour of the Vrana option; the former by positing the Greek encampment in a favourable position where the defensive battle was fought the next day in a wooded and montainous area; the latter by having the Ionians coming up to the trees to inform Miltiades that Datis had withdrawn with the cavalry. From a Valaria camp near the sea, Miltiades would have seen this with his own eyes and would not have needed others to tell him.

Failing to record Kallimakhos' battle A, Herodotos locates the camp of Miltiades at a sanctuary of Herakles, from which he and his hoplites charged at the double to encounter the enemy out in the open plain. In the Valaria area two fifth-century inscriptions mentioning the games of Herakles have been found. Although foundations of a temple have yet to be traced there, Valaria is the most likely location of the Marathonian Herakleion, since the idea of two stones having come wandering from somewhere else is too impossible to be accepted.²⁹ Leaving for the next chapter Herodotos' account of the offensive battle of Miltiades and of the camp at the Herakleion, I shall presently call the Tomb of the Plataians and the Memorial of Kallimakhos to witness in favour of a Vrana area position for Kallimakhos' camp and his battle A.

The Tomb of the Plataians
After the battle of Plataiai in 479, the Athenians buried all their fallen in the same grave, unlike the Spartans who buried their light-armed helots in a communal tomb of their own, separate from that of the hoplites (Hdt. 9.85.2). Not so at Marathon according to Pausanias (1.32.3): 'On the plain is the grave of the Athenians.'
Apparently the fallen citizens, both hoplites or light-armed infantry, from battles A and B were buried at the scene of battle B, where the Soros mound was later thrown up over their graves. ‘And there is another grave for the Boiotian Plataians and for the slaves, for also slaves fought then for the first time,’ Pausanias adds, though he fails to specify the location of this grave. One school of scholars follows Marinatos in identifying it with the tumulus excavated by him in the necropolis near Vrana in 1970. The tumulus contains the remains of one boy aged ten, nine men in the twenties (two of them with head injuries) and one man aged about 40 whose marker stone was inscribed with the name ARKHIA in Attic script. The human remains are accompanied by pottery from the early fifth century, a date corresponding with the dating of finds from the Soros. As an all-male burial it ought to be one for warriors fallen in battle. The fallen Plataians and Athenian slaves (perhaps men freed by the people on the motion of Miltiades as well as slave armour- and provision-bearers) from 490 BC are obvious candidates, this area below Agrieliki and Afrosismos being the scene of battle A, at the foot of mountains, as Nepos says, and with scattered trees in those days. The Plataians and the ‘slaves’, who may not have taken part in the later, offensive, battle B, were buried close to the camp where they fell in battle A in flattering proximity to the awe-inspiring Middle Hellenic tombs of great heroes of the past. The existence of two tumuli in different locations, the one of Marinatos in a mountainous area and the Soros out on the open plain, is thus an argument for two battlefields and two battles.

On the other hand, travellers of the early nineteenth century noticed an elevation on the surface at a short distance from the Soros, suggesting that it represented the remains of the tumulus of the Plataians and the ‘slaves’. The elevation has since disappeared and the place has not been excavated in search of pottery and fallen men of military age. But the early travellers have been followed by several modern scholars, who however have yet
to come up with a plausible explanation of the all-male graves underneath the tumulus of Marinatos.\textsuperscript{33}

The Memorial of Kallimakhos

This monument was buried in the ground of the Akropolis after the Persian sack, only to be recovered by modern archaeology between 1840 and 1888. It is a column supporting a female figure, probably Nike. The battered inscription on the column (IG I\textsuperscript{1} 784) has been restored in various ways. I refrain from adding to the guesswork and merely cite what is reasonably certain:

[Kallimakhos] of Aphidna dedicated [me] to Athena messenger of the immortals who dwell in [Olympian homes... polemarch of the Athenians the battle of Marathon... to the sons of the Athenians [...]

The polemarch from the deme Aphidna must be Kallimakhos. When he was polemarch in the year of Marathon, he dedicated (\textalpha\nu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\nu) to Athena a memorial of his victory, apparently one won in τ\textomicron\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\acute{\alpha}\acute{\omicron}\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\, which looks remarkably like the battle of Marathon in which he is known to have taken part. According to the scholiast to Aristophanes Knights 660, Kallimakhos is said to have made a vow (λεγεται ε\acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\ tau\omicron\) to Artemis before the battle, pledging as many cows as he slew men at Marathon (though because many were killed, he was unable to sacrifice so many cows and sacrificed goats instead).\textsuperscript{34} Our memorial of Kallimakhos, however, was a monument he actually dedicated (\textalpha\nu\epsilon\theta\kappa\epsilon) after his victory (as he, according to the scholiast, sacrificed goats); it was not one he vowed (ε\acute{\epsilon}\xi\alpha\tau\omicron\) beforehand.\textsuperscript{35} Such victory memorials are quite common, and ours would have caused no scholarly headache if only Kallimakhos had not fallen at Marathon, for as a dead man he is not supposed to make a dedication to Athena (or to sacrifice goats to Artemis). So scholars, ignoring the Suda and accepting only one battle of Marathon - the one of Miltiades - are faced with a problem. Various
ways out are taken, as attested by the lengthy bibliography. We are
told e.g. that Kallimakhos’ victory was not the one of Marathon
but an otherwise unattested one, won earlier in the year in the
stadion or hippodrome, or that the memorial was set up not by
Kallimakhos but by his deme Aphidna or by an individual demes-
man. But just as our latest source, the Suda, records two battles
of Marathon, so this earliest evidence, the memorial of
Kallimakhos, presupposes a battle in which he held the supreme
command when the assault of the Persians was warded off. Before
dying from wounds inflicted in the battle, he had time to order a
thanks-giving to be dedicated to Athena on the Akropolis at his
cost (and a sacrifice to be made to Artemis). If Kallimakhos’
memorial thus attests the historicity of the Suda’s battle A, the
next question is if it also favours an inland Vrana location of the
Greek camp.

In the Vrana district, a few hundred meters east of Mar-
natros’ tumulus, the foundations of a temple have been uncovered,
and to judge from a marble stone bearing the inscription ‘boundary
of the temenos of Athena,’ the sanctuary belonged to that goddess.
The fact that Kallimakhos thanked Athena for his victory with a
monument on the Akropolis is possibly an argument for locating
battle A in this area, a victory won near her sanctuary obviously
being a gift from the goddess. The holy grove on which Aiskhylos
called to bear witness to his valour, may have belonged to the
temenos of Athena near Vrana. He showed his valour in battle A
near that grove, not in battle B out in the open plain or on the
Skhoinia beach, ‘that shore where the Mediterranean pines still
grow.’

NOTES

1. Schreiner 1970. The theory is ‘abwegig’ according to Welwei 2000:
136 n. 24 and ‘does violence to some of our most respectable
sourcés' according to Harrison 1971: 12 n. 21, though Harrison un­
fortunately fails to define which sources are respectable and which
not. Cf. Wallinga 1993: 158 who accepts 'explicit statements by re­
spectable sources.'

2. The one who comes closest to two battles is probably Delbrück
1920: 65 'längere Pause zwischen dem Treffen im Vranatal und dem
Kampf an den Schiffen, da nur dadurch das Eintkommen des Restes
der Perser und der meisten Schiffe erklärt wird.' Wycherley 1972 is
not unwilling to accept two battles. Ehrenberg 1973: 139 'there may
have been some earlier fighting, in which the Persians displayed
cavalry as well as infantry, but were beaten.' But he prefers 'to speak
of two phases of the same battle,' 421 n. 25.

3. Macan 1895: 162 'perhaps the most obvious of all the difficulties in
Herodotus' account of the battle.' Waters 1985: 82 does not seem to
see difficulties: 'A perfectly plausible reconstruction of the tactics
and course of the battle is not difficult.'

4. Ignoring a couple of sources, Delbrück 1921: 226 states that the
delay 'von keiner Seite angezweifelt wird,' and Schachermeyr 1974:
104 has it that it is 'durch die gesamte Überlieferung versichert' that
the Athenians, not the Persians, were the ones who attacked. Some
explanations of the alleged delay: Munro 1899: 192 'The Athenian
general awaited the separation of the Persian forces, the Persians
awaited the signal.' Beloch 1914: 22 the Persians tarried because they
had few horsemen, and the rowers were useless for war; but Datis
attacked before the Spartans arrived. Hammond 1973: 208 'the
Persian commanders waited in the hope that the Athenians would be
tempted into the plain, where the cavalry would destroy them.'
Doenges 1998: 9 Datis lacked sufficient numerical superiority.
Lazenby 1993: 56 the Persians 'may have felt the need for a period
of rest and recuperation after the operations at Eretria.' But why not
take the needed rest in Euboea before crossing over to Marathon?
Several scholars: Datis hoped for an uprising in Athens, which
would undercut the army at Marathon. Against Nepos, Berthold
1976/7: 93 holds that Datis 'never intended to attack the
encampment itself.'

5. Against Hammond 1973: 200 'the battle itself does not pose any
problems.' Swoboda 1884: 1 noted that already by his time the battle
had been 'zum Überdruss behandelt.' Wheeler 1991: 156 n. 18 'the tradition about Marathon (despite detailed topographical investigations and the publication of at least one article on the battle nearly every year) is so steeped in Athenian propaganda as to be of questionable credibility.'

6. Cf. Paus. 4.4.7 'there are but few wars that have been made more illustrious by the exceptional valour of one man, in the way Akhilles shed lustre on the Trojan war and Miltiades on the engagement at Marathon.' Schachermeyr 1974: 112 'Der Erfolg von Marathon war in seinem gesamten schier systematisch anmutenden Aufbau sein geistiges Eigentum.' Justinus 2.9* states somewhat differently that 'in eo proelio tanta virtus singulorum fuit ut cuius laus prima esset, difficile iudicium videtur.' And Plut. Kim. 8.1 has it that when Miltiades in the Assembly requested a crown of olive for himself, one Sophanes objected, 'when you have fought and defeated the barbarians by yourself, Miltiades, then you may ask to be honoured by yourself.'

7. Jacoby 1956: 115 'for the contemporaries the battle of Marathon was a victory not so much, if at all, of Miltiades ... but of the polemarch Kallimachos.' Waters 1985: 82 'A tradition favourable to the Philaid house has made Miltiades the real commander, and demoted Kallimachos to a merely honorary position.' Macan 1895: 177 wonders how after his expedition against Paros, the Athenians could have sentenced Miltiades to pay a fine of 50 talents if indeed his achievement at Marathon was so unique.

8. pantakhose according to Plat. Laws 698c.

9. Spurious or genuine decree? Discussion in Podlecki 1975: 160-161. A decision to take provisions could imply that the army was to spend several days at Marathon, waiting for the Spartan aid. I doubt that the hoplites would carry the provisions themselves.

10. I fail to see how this could be battle A, as Nenci 1998: 288 seems to suggest. He thinks that Suda refers to the end of a single battle, p. 291.

11. Hammond 1997: 516 thinks that Kallimakhos as hegemon led the army to Marathon, 'leading, not commanding.' Also in Plato Laws 628e, it is Kallimakhos who led the army out to battle.


14. Ultimately from Ephoros according to most scholars, e.g. Busolt 1895: 558; How & Wells 1912: 355; Casson 1914/5; Delbrück 1920: 53. Against Meyer 1954: 312 n. Hammond 1973: 236-242 prefers the Attidographem Damon, and ultimately Hellanikos. How & Wells 1912: 355 Nepos has 'no independent value, although historic rationalisation has made it comparatively plausible and coherent.' A further warning by How, 1919: 48 'It may seem a waste of time to examine minutely an account of the battle of Marathon and the Parian expedition so late as that contained in the brief life of Miltiades ascribed to Cornelius Nepos.' Nepos' source 'Ephorus gives us little more than a plausible but shallow attempt to rationalize the biased and defective tradition in Herodotus' (p. 60). Hignett 1963: 15 subscribes to Macan's verdict that 'Ephoros probably did as much as any one man ever did to corrupt history in the name of history.' Should we like what Nepos says, then we declare with Lehmann-Haupt 1923: 333 that it derives 'durch Ephoros via Nepos aus älterer vorherodotischer Überlieferung.' For Nepos versus Herodotos, cf. Ch. VII below.

15. Text as OCT, the mss reading is uncertain.

16. Burn 1969: 119 'It was too soon for the Athenians to march, until they knew where the sea-borne enemy would land next; but it was not too soon to call for help.'


18. Hammond 1973: 212 is odd in charging Nepos with misunderstanding a source who only said that the Greeks drew up their battleline the next day, not that the battle followed immediately.

19. Georges, Handwörterbuch, s.v. tractus, cf. Busolt 1895: 586 n. 4 'die sich daselbst hinziehenden Baumreihen.'

Felling trees on the hillsides and bringing them down to the plain each night they extended their abattis farther out into the plain.' To which Burn 1969: 118 Hammond's 'account of the Athenians gradually advancing their position behind barriers of felled trees goes a long way beyond what is stated by Nepos (Milt. 5), our poor but only (and, I hope, correct) evidence that they used trees at all.' Shrimpton 1980: 21; v.d. Veer 1982: 314-315; Green 1996: 32. The idea of a stockade is aptly rejected by Busolt 1895: 586; Cary 1920; Evans 1984: 10; Lazenby 1993: 56.

21. Needless to say, scholars dislike the chronology of Isokrates and Lysias, according to Loraux 1973: 22 'non seulement un raccourci rhetorique, mais un inversion de la tradition.' In Lazenby 1993: 59 this chronology 'is probably due to the rhetorical tradition which came to affect so much ancient historical writing.' Lazenby's Herodotus was apparently not tainted by such rhetoric.

22. Nepos Milt. 7.1-4 follows Ephoros F 63 on the Paros campaign of Miltiades, cf. Ch. VII below.


25. In l. 1078 the wasps claim to have aided the city en makhaisin, but the plural hardly refers to two battles of Marathon. Lazenby 1993: 80 n. 87 is not impressed by 'evidence like this.' Cf. p. 5 'Apart from Herodotus, there is not much evidence to consider.'

26. so LSJ s.v. alsus.

27. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.162, has Miltiades launching a night attack. Hammond, a remarkably fast walker in his younger days, has the Athenians meeting in the Assembly and marching out to Marathon on the very day of the Persian landing, and later on he has them hurrying back to Athens on the day of their victory. His Plataians are informed the same day of the Persian landing at Marathon, and they are able to join the Athenians at Marathon.
already the next day. Also the Persian voyage from Marathon round Sounion to Phaleron is performed at a most remarkable speed, 1973: 221-226. Cf. the speed he assigns to the runner Pheidippides/Philippides, n. 40 in Ch. III below.


29. Against Müller 1982: 656 and Doenges 1998: 8 who states that the two inscriptions 'almost certainly have traveled since antiquity.'


31. In Herodotos 6.112, it is the Athenians, not the Athenians and Plataians, who charge against the Persians in the plain.

32. Marinatos as quoted by Berthold 1976/7: 89 who disagrees.


34. This was to be usurped for Miltiades, Allianos Var. Hist. 2.25, Plut. Mor. 862b-c.


36. Harrison 1971. In his basic article, Shefton 1950: 143 declares that 'the dedication, and not only the vow, must have been made by Callimachus before his death.'


39. Raubitschek 1965: 512 plausibly states that Kallimakhos 'entweder die Schlacht doch überlebte, um die Weihung dazubringen, oder tot war als sie in seinem Namen gemacht wurde.'

CHAPTER III

The Second Marathon: the Battle of Miltiades

Let us return to the Suda entry *kharios bipeis*, quoted in the beginning of Ch. II as evidence for the second battle of Marathon, battle B:

When Datis invaded Attika they say that the Ionians, after he had withdrawn, went up to the trees, and signalled to the Athenians that the cavalry were apart. Miltiades, learning of their departure (*upoxorismois*), thus attacked and conquered. Hence the proverb is applied to those who break ranks.

Having repelled the Persian attack in battle A, the Athenians of the Suda seemingly lay encamped for some days in their defensive position. After his vain attempt to get through towards Athens in battle A, Datis made another try, taking the cavalry along a route not blocked by the Athenians. *Apokboresis* smacks of a departure by the same way he had come, by sea, for a voyage around Cape Sounion to Phaleron and a front attack on Athens. Learning that Datis had departed with some of his best forces, Miltiades launched an assault upon those remaining, without waiting for the Spartans and apparently without any discussion having taken place in the camp. The Suda does not specify whether Miltiades took the enemy by surprise in a night attack, like in Clement of Alexandria (*Strom*. 1.162), or in daylight.¹

The Suda's Miltiades had to share with Kallimakhos the glory of persuading the people to encounter the Persians out at Marathon, and he only won his victory there after Datis had departed with the cavalry.² The Byzantine lexicon thus bestows less glory on Miltiades than does Herodotos, our principal source
for battle B. Before turning to Herodotos, however, we shall have a word to say about two monuments in which Kimon propagated the role played by his father Miltiades at Marathon: a group of bronzes in Delphi and a painting in the Stoa Poikile in Athens.

**Bronzes in Delphi and on the Akropolis of Athens**

In the late 460s, the achievement of Marathon was commemorated in Delphi by a group of thirteen statues erected on the first lap of the Sacred Way. This was an area first of all for monuments of victories won over Sparta or by Sparta, not for the Persian Wars, and the thirteen bronzes were not one of two Athenian monuments for the victory at Marathon, as Pausanias (10.10.1-2) erroneously states and as many scholars agree. The actual Marathon memorial from the early 480s was constructed higher up along the Sacred Way: the Athenian treasury with the sculptures erected on the triangular balustrade against the front of its south wall. The original inscription on the base of the sculptures says: 'The Athenians to Apollo [from the Medes as first fruits of the battle of Marathon.' The thirteen bronzes near the entrance to the holy precinct, on the other hand, were erected in commemoration of the battle of Oinoe in Argolis in the mid 460s, a joint victory of the Athenians and Argives over the Spartans. The monument did not show warriors from the actual battle of Oinoe, but rather Miltiades accompanied by such dignitaries as Athena, Apollo, seven of the Attic phyle heroes, Kodros, Theseus and Neleus, but unaccompanied by any mortal being, Kallimakhos the polemarch thus being conspicuously absent. The nearby monument of the Argives for the same Oinoe victory was made up of fourteen bronzes (one better than the Athenians), again not Oinoe warriors but splendid heroes from what we call the mythical past, the Seven against Thebes plus their seven Epigone sons. The monument of the Athenians was no better a source for the actual battle of Marathon than the Argive one was for a historical war between Argos and Thebes. But if the lost Athenian monument fails to give infor-
mation about the actual battle of Marathon, it bears eloquent witness, by elevating Miltiades up into the sphere of gods and heroes, of the propaganda genius of Kimon in his effort to re­habilitate his father's memory after his ill-starred campaign against Paros and his subsequent condemnation in a lawsuit in Athens.

Many generations after Kimon's bronzes in Delphi, king Attalos of Pergamon immortalized his victory over the Celts with a lavish bronze monument on the Akropolis of Athens (Paus. 1.25.2):

By the south wall are represented the legendary war with the Giants, who once dwelt about Thrakia and on the isthmus of Pallene, the battle of the Athenians and the Amazons, the engagement with the Persians at Marathon and the destruction of the Celts in Mysia. Each is about two cubits and all were dedicated by Attalos.

The Attalid monument was a huge one of possibly more than 100 bronzes of less than life size. They are all lost, but a few marble copies from later ages exist. But even if Attalos' Marathon bronzes had survived to our day we would hardly have learned more about the actual battle than from the thirteen Kimonian bronzes in Delphi, and there is no knowing if Kallimakhos was allowed his due credit in Attalos' monument. However, the monument is illustrative in two other respects. First, the Gigantomachy, a cherished motive with the Pergamene kings, was the mythical parallel to their own victory over the barbarian Celtic invaders. The other two groups, the Battle of Marathon and its prefiguration the Amazonomachy, were compliments paid to the Athenian hosts of the monument. The message is that in the days of Marathon, the Athenians were the protagonists of Hellenism; now the kings of Pergamon have taken over the role of defenders of Hellenic civilization. Secondly, a contemporary achievement, in this case the victory over the Celts, is elevated to the higher sphere of three
earlier immortal deeds. The same was done in an earlier age down in the Athenian Agora, in the Kimonian Stoa Poikile.

Stoa Poikile
Like the Argives, the Athenians erected a memorial for Oinoe not only at Delphi but also in the Agora of their own city, namely the Stoa Poikile, built in the late 460s like their Oinoe monument at Delphi. The building was first called Peisianakteios as it was commissioned by Kimon’s brother-in-law Peisianax (after whom Kimon may have named one of his sons), possibly the commander of the Athenian troops at Oinoe in the mid 460s, at the time when Kimon himself was occupied in the war against Thasos. (Before Oinoe, Peisianax may have taken part in Kimon’s Skyros campaign when he defeated the Dolopian pirates and brought back ‘the bones of Theseus’ to Athens, to be buried in the Theseion. The source for this is an Attic bell-krater of c. 440, thought to depend on the Amazonomachy painting in the Theseion, or rather in the Stoa Poikile. One of the Amazons depicted on the vase is inscribed as ‘Peisianassa’, which seems to refer to Peisianax, whereas another is ‘Dolope’. The names were obviously attached in the wall painting too.) Just as the Attalid monument consisted of four bronze groups, the Stoa Poikile was decorated with four paintings, as Pausanias explains, seemingly starting with the most important picture (1.15.1):

This stoa contains, first, the Athenians arrayed at Oinoe in the Argive territory against the Lakedaimonians. What is depicted is not the moment at which the struggle has reached its height and the action has advanced to the display of deeds of daring, but the beginning of the battle with the combatants still coming to grips.

The scene resembles the famous seventh-century Chigi vase: two armies of hoplites about to come to grips, unsupported by cavalry or light-armed troops (p. 21). And although the recent Oinoe
victory (which sadly fails to figure in Thukydides and consequently in many modern accounts of the period) was won by the Athenians jointly with the Argives (Paus. 10.10.4), no Argives were apparently shown in the picture: an over-patriotic version of Oinone as the exclusive triumph of the Athenians, and solely of their hoplites. The painting thus a questionable source for the actual battle of Oinone, which was represented on a par with the greatest deeds of the Athenians:

On the middle part of the walls are the Athenians and Theseus fighting with the Amazons. So, it seems, only the women did not lose through their defeats their reckless courage in the face of danger; Themiskyra was taken by Herakles, and afterwards the army which they dispatched to Athens was destroyed, but nevertheless they came to Troy to fight all the Greeks as well as the Athenians themselves.

Unfortunately Pausanias, rather than giving more information about the painting, prefers to reflect on the extraordinary courage of the Amazons who had not been annihilated on their unsuccessful invasion of Attika, as some held, but later on came to Troy to fight the Greeks. But Aristophanes supplies a bit of information by referring to 'the Amazons whom Mikon painted fighting on horseback with the men' (Lys. 678). Mikon's Amazons recall those of Herodotos (4.114.3) who declare that they practice the bow and javelin and ride horses, and in the picture they will have figured with their names attached, with the distinctive headgear and trousers well known from sculpture and vase-painting. Like the Parthenos shield, the painting will have represented the Amazonian siege of the Akropolis, Kimon's alter ego Theseus leading Athenian warriors characterised by hoplite shield and spear, greaves and helmet. Athenian horsemen, bowmen or skirmishers were as absent as in the Oinone painting.
After the Amazons are the Greeks when they have taken Troy, and the kings assembled on account of the reckless behaviour of Ajax towards Kassandra; the picture includes Ajax himself and Kassandra and other captive women.

The Athenians of Herodotos refer to their former deeds when claiming the privilege of holding the left wing in the Greek line at Plataiai in 479. After mentioning their war against the invading Amazons, they claim to have been inferior to none in the Trojan War (9.27.4). Although in the actual fighting of the Iliad the Athenians play at best a marginal role, the Eion epigrams of ca. 470 claim the heroes who fought at Troy as the antecedents of contemporary heroes, and the men emerging from the belly of a bronze statue of the Wooden Horse dedicated on the Akropolis ca. 420 were Menestheus, Teuker and Theseus’ sons Akamas and Demophon (Paus. 1.23.8). This deed of local heroes would have been an obvious object for Polygnotos’ painting in the Stoa Poikile. Pausanias fails, however, to record the deed in his detailed account of Polygnotos’ Ilioupersis painting at Delphi, in the lesche of the Knidians, unlike the discussion of the Greek warlords in the joint council after Lokrian Ajax’ rape of Kassandra (10.25-27). But this council is merely one of many themes in the painting at Delphi. Unfortunately, Pausanias is much less communicative about the painter’s Ilioupersis in the Stoa Poikile than about the one at Delphi, and one wonders whether Ajax’ swearing was so predominant in the Stoa as the impression is from Pausanias’ brief report. The only additional information about the Amazonomachy painting in any other source is that one of the ‘other captive women’ was Priam’s daughter Laodike, whom Polygnotos gave the features of Kimon’s sister Elpinike ‘when he painted the Trojan women in what was then called the Peisianakteion, but is now the Stoa Poikile’ (Plutarch Kimon 4.6). Laodike had earlier had a love affair with Theseus’ son Akamas and secretly borne him a son named Mounitos. Theseus’ mother Aithra, as a slave-woman in
Troy, had reared Mousitos for Laodike, and now she fled with him to the Greek camp, where Akamas and Demophon recognised her as their long-lost grandmother. Approaching Agamemnon they received his approval for her rescue. Aithra, Akamas and Demophon were all shown in the painting at Delphi and probably also in the Stoa Poikile. Could it be that, against the impression given by Pausanias, the family story of Kimon's alter ego Theseus was a rather more conspicuous theme in the Stoa than the oath of Little Ajax? In both the Attalid monument on the Akropolis and the Stoa Poikile, the Amazonomachy was the mythical antetype of Marathon, as the Gigantomachy was the parallel to the victory over the Celts. Was there a similar link between the Stoa's Ilioupersis and Battle of Oinoe, that joint undertaking of the Athenians and the Argives? Was the agreement between Agamemnon of Argos and the sons of Theseus a mythical antecedent of their joint action at Oinoe? If preserved, the Ilioupersis metopes of the Parthenon might have given a clue to the Ilioupersis painting in the Stoa, but only two of the 32 north metopes are reasonably well preserved. Together with number 27, the lost number 26 may have formed a two-metope sequence of the rescue of Aithra, but that does not help us much towards a reconstruction of the painting.

It is a moot question why the sack of Troy, a paradigm of sacrilege and excess, was the chosen object for a Stoa Poikile painting and for the north metopes of the Parthenon. It is easier to grasp why after Herodotos the Trojan War disappears from the standard catalogue of the deeds of the Athenians, at least from the extant funerary orations.

After the Battle of Oinoe, the Amazonomachy and the Sack of Troy, Pausanias turns to our main concern, the Marathon painting, done by either Mikon, Panaios or Polygnotos:

The Boeotians of Plataiai and the Attic contingent are coming to grips with the barbarians. At this point the action is evenly balanced between both sides. In the inner part of the fight are the barbarians
fleeing and pushing one another into the marsh. At the extreme end of the painting are the Phoinikian ships and the Greeks killing the barbarians who are tumbling into them. In this picture is also shown Marathon, the hero after whom the plain is named, Theseus, represented as coming up from the earth, Athena and Herakles - the Marathonians, according to their own account, were the first to recognise Herakles as a god. Of the combatants the most conspicuous (ὅστις) in the picture are Kallimakhos, who was chosen by the Athenians to be polemarch, and of the strateges Miltiades, and a hero called Ekhetlos, whom I shall mention later.

It is somewhat misleading to dub this a historical painting like the battle of Oinoe, as against the mythical Amazonomachy and Sack of Troy. For by the late 460s, Marathon has already become a myth, with gods and heroes participating. Athena herself was of course present, not together with the archer Apollo as in the ‘Marathon monument’ at Delphi, but with the close combat fighter Herakles, who enjoyed a particular position at Marathon. Pan was well-known to have fought on the Greek side, striking the barbarians with panic, and he was duly thanked with a statue in his cave beyond the Akropolis, but no source attests his presence in the painting.12 The national hero Theseus who had performed his earliest deeds at Marathon, came up from the earth (although ‘his bones’ were only buried some twenty years later by Kimon, and in Athens, not at Marathon). The local hero Marathon was not missing; the plough hero Ekhetlos killed many barbarians wielding his ploughshare.

Unlike the contemporaneous bronze monument at Delphi, the picture did show other mortals besides Miltiades. Pausanias mentions Kallimakhos, but the victory of the polemarch in battle A was conspicuously absent from the painting, and it is queer reading that his role ‘was fully recognized in the wall-paintings in the Stoa Poikile.’13 The writer Herodotos, who like the painting only knows of one battle of Marathon, could without problems
first present Kallimakhos as the commander of the right wing
(6.111.1), and then (114) give the impression that he was killed in
the battle at the ships. But unlike a writer, the painter could not
show Kallimakhos more than once: not as commander-in-chief
but as a dying hero. This is stated most clearly by Himerios (59.2),
pointing out to visiting Ionians in Athens the representation of
Kallimakhos, who ‘looks in the painting rather like one fighting
than like one dead.’ Ps.-Plutarch (Parallela 1) is likely to have the
painting in mind when stating, ‘Polyzelos, having seen a super-
human apparition, lost his sight and became blind; Kallimakhos
stood upright though pierced with many spears (dorasi) and
already dead; Kyngeiros had his hand cut off while grasping a
Persian ship which was putting out to sea.’ Kyngeiros’ death was
depicted at the ships at the end of the battle, and arranging his
matter more according to theme than to chronology, the painter
seems to have shown all the deaths of the leading men in that part
of the painting. The role of leader in the battle was played not by
Kallimakhos but by Miltiades, as we learn from Aiskhines 3.186,
Nepos Milt. 6.3, and Aristeides 46.174. Pausanias (4.4.7) could
hardly have stated that the battle of Marathon had been made
illustrious by the exceptional valour of one man if indeed the part
of Kallimakhos in the battle had been ‘fully recognized’ in the Stoa
Poikile painting.

Also represented in the painting were Aiskhylos, Butes,
Datis and Artaphernes. The Greeks were shown pursuing the
Persians to the coast and killing them as they were tumbling into
the ships, whereas Datis seems to have escaped and was already
safe on board. This was in stark contrast with the Suda entry
kboris bippeis, in which Datis, apparently after the unsuccessful
battle A, will have managed an orderly embarkation with the
cavalry for an attack on Athens from Phaleron. And it was only
after Datis’ departure that the Suda’s Miltiades attacked the
remaining Persians in the plain in battle B.
We notice from Ps.-Demosthenes (59.94) that the Plataians ‘are depicted coming to your aid promptly, each with such speed as he can - they are the men who wear the Boiotian helmets.’ The Plataians were distinguished from the Athenians by their helmets,\(^\text{17}\) while the headgear of the Persians, the ‘trousered Medes’ of Persius (3.53), was obviously the same as that of their Amazon prefigurations in the Amazonomachy.\(^\text{18}\)

Aelianos (*De nat. animalium* 7.38) records that a dog was depicted together with his master (just as hoplites often have their dogs with them on vase-paintings), but no literary source mentions any horses on the Greek side in the painting. On the Persian side, Himerios (6.20) records horsemen in flight, and the Roman Brescia sarcophagus, probably a copy of the right extremity of the Stoa Poikile picture, shows a rider being killed and unhorsed: a Persian fighting against Greek hoplites. The south frieze of the Nike temple on the Akropolis may also somehow be indebted to the Stoa Poikile picture. The relief shows Athenian hoplites fighting without the support of archers or cavalry, against Persians, who have both archers on foot and cavalry. And Athenian vase-paintings of the fifth century frequently depict Greek hoplites fighting against Persian bowmen.\(^\text{19}\) On the Brescia sarcophagus, a Persian seems to hack off the hand of Kyngeiros with an axe, not a sword, and Kallimakhos was more probably depicted as pierced with Persian arrows and javelins (*toxeumata* and *blemata*, Polemon 1.7) than with spears (the *dorasi* of Ps.-Plutarch). The chances are that the Athenians depicted in the four paintings of the Stoa were all heavy infantrymen, characterised with hoplite helmet, round shield, spear, sword and greaves; cavalry and archery were left to Amazons and Persians.\(^\text{20}\)

As Pausanias informs us, the paintings of the battle of Oinoe and the Trojan War both showed a single moment only, the former the moment immediately before the Athenian and Spartan armies came to blows, and the latter the aftermath of the Trojan War. The Amazonomachy, on the other hand, will have shown a
developing sequence of fighting scenes, and the same is true of its parallel, the tainted Marathon picture: three successive phases of the struggle were combined into a seemingly contemporaneous whole. There was no place in the painting for the decision taken in Athens to charge against the Persians, and the defensive battle A led by Kallimakhos was also omitted. The first phase of the battle was a parallel to the Oinoc painting, showing the moment when Miltiades exhorted his hoplites to attack and when the two armies came to blows. The second phase was when the Athenian assault put the enemy to flight, the third being the fight at the Persian ships and the heroic deaths sustained there. Unlike a writer, the painter was unable to develop the entire story step by step from the decision of the Athenians to march out from Athens to Marathon, to the fight at the Persian ships, to say nothing of the subsequent events at Phaleron. In the picture, the scene was restricted to Marathon proper, covering an unspecified period of time from the arrival of the Plataians to the left, to the fight at the ships and the flight of the Persian ships to the right. As against the Oinoc picture, which failed to show any Argives taking part, the Marathon painting refrained from the we-did-it-alone boast²¹ by actually showing the aid coming in from Plataiai. Being a monument to the recent victory over Sparta, the Stoa showed, in contrast to the tardy Spartans who arrived too late for the battle of Marathon, the Plataians who did arrive in time to play their heroic role. The point of the painter was the fact that the Plataians did join the Athenians, not that they did so out at Marathon rather than in Athens, as they do in Nepos et al. (Unlike the Athenians of the Suda and Nepos, those of the painting did not need the encouraging arrival of the Plataians in Athens to make their heroic decision to march out and confront the Persians at Marathon.) In fact, the Plataians may have left for home after the repulse of the Persians in battle A and after burying their dead. But their participation at Marathon was required in the painting, and so they were depicted in its tainted version of Miltiades' battle B.²²
What about the painting and actual history? According to Pausanias, its first part showed a phase when 'the action is evenly balanced between both sides.' This may be the hard-fought first phase of battle B, in which the Athenians sustained their heaviest losses. The fallen citizens from both battles A and B were apparently all buried in battlefield B, where the Soros mound was later thrown up over their graves. Then 'in the inner part of the fight are the barbarians fleeing and pushing one another into the marsh.' This may refer to a second phase of fighting some 3.5 kms further northeast, near the Great Marsh. In this place, Kimon later replaced an impromptu trophy set up right after the battle by a permanent one. This monument of white marble is mentioned by Pausanias (1.32.5) and parts of it have been recovered near the church of Panaghia Mesosporitissa: an Ionic column bearing a marble statue. ‘At the extreme end of the painting are the Phoenician ships and the Greeks killing the barbarians who are tumbling into them.’ It may well be that fighting ensued on the Skhoinia beach, at Persian ships that remained after the departure of the main force; Aiskhylos’ brother Kynegeiros was probably wounded there, and a handful of enemy ships were captured. But the Datis of the Suda’s khoris hippeis, who was probably identical with the Datis of history, was far off by that time, not fleeing but rounding Cape Sounion for an attack on the city. The late lexicon is therefore a better source than the early painting. But if the painting gave a most tainted version of the events at Marathon by omitting Kallimakhos’ battle A, so the Soros and the monument of white marble can possibly be taken to testify that the depicted version was more than pure fantasy. But what about its apparent representation of all the Greek marathonomakhoi as hoplites, no role being played by other arms? We shall turn to that question below.

In the Marathon narrative of Herodotos, the gods and heroes of the Marathon painting are all absent. No Athena here and no
Theseus, the national hero and Kimon’s alter ego; not the local hero Marathon or the plough-hero Ekhetlos. Herakles, whom the Marathontians were the first to recognise as a god, fails to fulfil an active role in the narrative of the historian, but the hard-won triumph at Marathon and the walk-over victory on the opposite coast were both won after the Athenians had been encamped in a Herakleion. But despite the absence of gods and heroes in the narration of the historian, it seems established, against the view of a few scholars,²⁵ that the painting in the Stoa was an influential source for Herodotos’ account of Marathon,³⁶ whether or not he ever visited the battlefield himself. In addition to the exaggerated role of Kimon’s father, we note such extraordinary features as the hacking off of the hand of Kynegeiros with an axe and the blinding of Epizelos.

Also from the painting probably derives Herodotos’ statement that the Plataians arrived not in Athens, as in Nepos and other sources, but at Marathon, joining the Athenians as they were arrayed in the temenos of Herakles (6.108.1). No source mentions a Herakleion in the painting, but at its left end where the Plataians joined the Athenians, Herakles was probably shown as the proprietor of his sanctuary. In fact the Plataians are more likely to have come to Athens, like the Spartans when they belatedly did come to the aid of the Athenians (6.120). As stated by Casson,²⁷ ‘there is no direct communication between Plataea and Marathon. The road from Plataea to Athens is straightforward enough, but the only way to reach Marathon without first going to Athens would be by going first to Thebes and thence to Eleon and Oropus and across the spurs of Mt. Parnes to Aphidna and so to the northern end of the plain of Marathon, and this would be a considerably longer march and a much more difficult road than if they went direct to Athens and then to Marathon by the coast route.’ The call of the Athenians to the Plataians and Spartans and possibly other states must have been an earlier one to Athens, not one to Marathon only after the Persians had landed there.
In both the Nepos et al. version and that of Herodotos, the arrival of the Plataians is followed by a discussion, some being in favour of waiting for the Spartan reinforcements and Miltiades urging a hasty move. In the plausible version of Nepos and the Miltiades decree, the discussion takes place in Athens and the move is one out to Marathon. Herodotos, on the other hand (6.109-10), locates his curious discussion out at Marathon, the move being from the defensive position in, as it seems, a hoplite attack upon the enemy out in the open plain. Next we get the notorious 1500 m race of the Athenians in full armour (112.1) - probably Herodotos' own invention. No ancient source claims two discussions, one in Athens and another out at Marathon. Two discussions are an invention of modern scholarship, Nepos allegedly having 'fused into one two occasions when Miltiades gained his way and established his authority, one at Athens and the other at the Heracleum.' And the discussion at Marathon which reappears in a host of modern scholars is 'both unlikely and undesirable,' as Casson aptly puts it.

The right end of the picture showed the battle at the ships in which Kynegeiros had his hand hacked off with an axe. Most likely the heroic deaths of the leading Athenians were all shown in this part, wherefore Herodotos locates the deaths of the polemarch Kallimakhos and the stratege Stesilaos in this area (114). In actual fact, Kallimakhos will not have fallen in Miltiades' battle B, the object of the painting; he will have died after his own battle A, from wounds inflicted there. Also from the painting, in which the fleeing Persians were shown tumbling into their ships, must come Herodotos' odd idea that immediately after suffering defeat in the plain, most of the Persians managed to escape their pursuers by going on board their ships and sailing off. It could also be that Herodotos' report of seven captured enemy ships was derived from the painting.

In the Stoa painting, the Greek warriors at Marathon were evidently all hoplites, fighting against (but for one giant hoplite)
trousered archers, mounted or not. As stated in Ch. I, Herodotos does not say in so many words that his marathonomakhoi were all hoplites, but he gives that impression by having them attacking the enemy unsupported by cavalry or archers (6.112.2). He cannot, however, have had it from the painting that they were the first to endure the sight of Persian dress (112.3). This must be his own odd idea; or should we blame it upon his guide to the Stoa, if indeed he did employ one?

The painting of Miltiades' victory cannot, however, have been Herodotos' sole source for Marathon. Although Herodotos follows the Stoa painting in omitting Kallimakhos' battle A, in which the attack was delivered by the Persians with foot and horse, he does leave some traces of it, whoever his source was. After suppressing the role of Kallimakhos by saying that it was the ten strateges who led the Athenians out to Marathon (103.1), he goes on to state, contrary to the painting, that in the battle the right wing was commanded by the polemarch (111.1), which would normally mean that he was in supreme command. The Greeks were not only drawn up for battle B which did come about (111-112) but also several days earlier (108.1), apparently for the missing battle A. The Persians were also arrayed for this missing battle, for it was while Hippias upon landing at Marathon was arraying (etasse) the barbarians that he lost a tooth in the sand - drawing them up for the offensive battle A which fails to ensue in Herodotos' narrative. When Herodotos' battle after several days did come about, the Greeks had thinned out their line to make it equal that of the Persians in length (111.3), which means that the Persians had already formed their line and were on the offensive - battle A, not B.

The Athenian-biter Theopompos rightly complained (FGrHist 115 F 153, 154) of the habit of magnifying Marathon and other accomplishments of Athenian history, but the two fragments sadly do not indicate which version of Marathon it was he objected to. But Plutarch (Mor. 862d) might have Theopompos in mind when referring with indignation to 'those' who dubbed Marathon
no real agon but only a brief obstacle for the barbarians when they landed. Is it Miltiades' battle \( B \) rather than Kallimakhos' battle \( A \) that is dismissed in this way?

Today we may follow in the footsteps of Theopompos, questioning the notion of the Marathon accomplishment as being due to the hoplites only. Herodotos may be right in that in the offensive battle \( B \) in the open plain, the Athenians - \( \nu i \zeta \), the Athenian hoplites - fought without the support of bowmen, the typical Persian arm. But the defensive battle \( A \) was an altogether different matter. As stated in Ch. I, for warding off an assault on their defensive position, not only hoplites but all possible sources of manpower must have been significant, skilled and unskilled men, citizens and metics, free and unfree; unskilled stonecasters and javelin-men as well as specialist archers and slingers. And we doubt that the Athenians who mustered numerous light-armed warriors and ship crews against the Persian invaders in 480-479, could in 490 ask other states to send troops if they would only use a fraction of their own manpower. But what is the evidence for the existence and participation of non-hoplites?

As for archers in about 490, Athenian vase-paintings of the sixth century depict hoplites and bowmen side by side, the hoplites being accompanied by archers whether they are arming themselves at home or leaving for battle.\(^{32}\) The Themistokles decree of 480, whatever its value for early fifth-century events, speaks of four bowmen on each of 200 ships. And Herodotos' own 8,000 Athenian hoplites at Plataiai in 479 were attended by a group of archers, Masistios' horse being felled by an Athenian arrow \((9.22.1, 60.3)\). And though proof is unattainable, it seems likely that archers participated in 490 too. In the battle of Plataiai, each hoplite was accompanied by a light-armed attendant, whatever their actual armament \((9.29.2)\), and it is hard to see why it should have been otherwise at Marathon. Now Pausanias states that the Athenian army of 9,000 at Marathon included both citizens above regular military age and slaves \((10.20.2)\), and in the battlefield of Marathon
he records two grave mounds. On the plain he saw the mound of the Athenians, with stelai giving the names of the killed according to their tribes. (He does not say whether those buried under the Soros and listed on the stelai were hoplites only, or also citizen light-armed infantry.) "And there is another grave for the Boiotians from Plataiai and for the slaves, for slaves fought then for the first time" (Paus. 1.32.3). The slaves, whether those set free by Miltiades and the Athenians before the battle (Paus. 7.15.7) or private armour-bearers, are more likely to have served as bowmen or other light infantry than as hoplites. The absence of bowmen in Herodotos' narrative is hardly due to the archery force first being organised after 490, and other light-armed warriors are scarcely missing from his text because they failed to participate at Marathon. Their absence in Herodotos is rather sheer hoplite ideology, Marathon being presented as the triumph of sturdy, hand-to-hand fighting, speedy, and respectable hoplites. As for Pausanias' mention of citizens above military age, there is no knowing how they were armed, only that they may have been useful for defensive fighting in battle. They were of questionable use for a hoplite battle in the plain - even should some of them have been physically fit for a Herodotean old boys 1500 m in heavy hoplite armour. Some of those below and above military age must have been left behind in the city as a home-guard when the army marched out to Marathon, but in 490 Herodotos has room for no one but fast hoplites.

Also lacking from the Marathon narrative of Herodotos were horsemen, and a cavalry corps would hardly have been of much use in blocking the route towards Athens to the Persians. On the battlefield of Plataiai in 479, an Athenian on horseback was sent as a messenger (9.54), but using horses for soliciting aid from far distant Sparta would have required a regular system of staging posts where one could change horses. We may therefore accept Herodotos' statement that the runner Philippides (or Pheidippides) relied on his own feet, having a horse in his name only; but it is
harder to swallow his idea that he covered the distance Athens-Sparta, some 240 km, in two days, with time for a conversation with the god Pan on Mt. Parthenion near Tegea (6.105.1, 106.1). In Herodotus, we have to do without the first runner of a 42 kms Marathon race, the man who announced in Athens the news of the victory only to fall dead to the ground. He only figures in later sources, whether his name was Philippides (Lukianos, pro lapsu 3), Thersippus (Herakleides of Pontos) or Eukles ‘who ran in his armour, hot from the battle’ (so most writers according to Plut. Mor. 347c), not one single horse apparently being available out at Marathon. It is acceptable that a genuine cavalry corps was lacking at Marathon but hardly that no individual had a horse on offer, no officer like Kallimakhos or Miltiades, not Kallias who dedicated the statue of a horse to Apollo in Delphi after the battle (Paus. 10.18.1), none of the wealthy citizens who took part in the Panathenaic and other games with their horses, and no hoplite who had ridden his horse from Athens to Marathon, to dismount there and fight on foot. Thus later writers follow in the footsteps of Herodotus, presenting Marathon as a pure hoplitic achievement.

Nor was the Stoa Poikile painting or Herodotus the first to enhance the role of the hoplites in the Persian Wars. In his Persians of 472 BC, Aiskhylos has Atossa ask the chorus of Persian elders about the Athenians (ll. 239-240), ‘Do they fight with bow and arrow?’ The answer is ‘Not at all. Spears for close combat and shield-bearing armour.’ And indeed in the tragedy the victory in the battle of Salamis is due to a large extent to the hoplites, who fought on Psyttaleia ‘with well-made arms of bronze.’ Unlike Herodotus at Marathon, however, Aiskhylos concedes that in the island, the Persians were also struck by rocks and arrows - obviously sent by stone-throwers and archers (ll. 447-464). After Herodotus, Marathon is praised again and again as a hoplitic achievement, in Aristophanes (Ach. 181, Clouds 986, Wasps 1075-1090), in funerary orations, in Plato (Rep. 347b-d,
Laws 707a-d), in Aristotle (Pol. 1326a). If the victory at Salamis belonged mostly to the poorer citizens manning the fleet (apart from the fictitious hoplite engagement at Psytaleia in Aiskhylos and Hdt. 8.95), Marathon was viewed as the triumph of the land-owning Athenian hoplites.44

Also absent from the Herodotean account of Marathon is the Athenian navy. The motive he gives to the Persians for landing at Marathon is that it was near Eretria and the most suitable place for deploying cavalry - as if they came to Marathon to fight a battle there, not for a straight march towards Athens (6.102). And having lost at Marathon and headed round Cape Sounion to Phaleron, the cause of their surprising retreat was apparently the presence of the rapid Athenian hoplites (at inland Kynosarges, not on the beach of Phaleron). No word is uttered about the fleet of 70 ships that Miltiades would take the next year on his expedition against Paros (6.132): the navy is non-existent in Herodotos’ report of the year 490, having no say when the Persians preferred Marathon for Phaleron as an undisturbed place of landing,45 or when they later decided to sail off from Phaleron. When soliciting Spartan aid before Marathon, it might have been an idea to send the messenger by a fast vessel to Thyrea, modern Astros, and let him run from there to Sparta. But there was no more room for ships than for horses in the year 490. In the next two chapters I shall deal with the fleet.

Herodotos and the Camp at the Herakleion

As argued in Ch. II, the encampment of the Greeks in battle A was most likely in the inland Vrana area. Herodotos, omitting battle A, locates the camp of the Athenians in which they were allegedly joined by the Plataians, at a Herakleion (6.108.1); and after the hard-fought battle they, ‘coming from the Herakleion in Marathon, encamped in another Herakleion, the one in Kynosarges,’ before winning their walk-over victory (116) - a supernatural coincidence in the eyes of the historian.46 As attested
by the two inscribed stones, the Herakleion was located at Valaria, not inland near Vrana. There are two options here. First, Herodotos may be right about camp at the the Herakleion, for when Miltiades after battle A and the death of Kallimakhos was informed of the withdrawal of Datis with a substantial part of his troops, he may have moved the camp from the Vrana area to the locality of Valaria. And charging out from the encampment he defeated the remaining enemies out in the open plain.

Alternatively, Herodotos has misunderstood an oral source. The Marathonian Herakles bore the epithet Empylios, 'he who is at the gates', and the narrow strip of dry land between Agrieliki and the sea was apparently called Pylai. After their victory in battle B, the Athenians will have left the plain by this gateway, hastening across Attika by the main road. And according to Herodotos they did not only take up a position at the Kynosarges Herakleion outside the city walls but even pitched camp (estratopedensanto) there. But the idea of the warriors pitching camp right outside the city walls rather than seeking protection inside is very odd. Herodotos may have heard of the hasty return of the army from the Herakleion at Marathon to the one at Kynosarges, meaning from the gateway of Marathon to the gates of Athens. The historian took this to mean that the army had been encamped at the Marathon sanctuary and that they pitched camp at Kynosarges. Now Herodotos must be mistaken in stating that the Plataians joined the Athenians not in Athens but at the Marathonian Herakleion, and so we may be entitled to reject the alleged camp at the Marathonian Herakleion no less than the one at Kynosarges. If so, there was no more than one Greek camp at Marathon, pitched by the Athenians and Plataians in the Vrana area after their joint march out from Athens.
NOTES

1. Schachermeyr 1974: 98, 105, 108 thinks that the Suda's source was a Hellenistic paroimiograph who in his turn depended on a logograph or an author of a Persika or an Atthis, 'etwa an die des Hellanikos,' rather than on Ephoros.

2. How 1919: 55, noting that in Nepos Milt. 5.4, the Persians in the battle only used 100,000 of the 200,000 foot soldiers they had in 4.1, suggests a faint trace of the tradition that half their force had taken ship again for Phaleron. Munro 1899: 195 'if we suppose that the brigade for Athens, including the cavalry, was already embarked and under way when the Athenians assumed the offensive, we avoid the most serious difficulties.' Cf. Wecklein 1876: 274, following Curtius, and Lehmann-Haupt 1922.

3. e.g. Gauer 1968: 25, 51-64; Raubitschek 1974. Pomptow 1924: 1216-1217 is an exception, denying that the monument was a dekate from Marathon.

4. The treasury is dated after Marathon by Pausanias 10.11.5. Scholarly opinion is sharply divided. In my view, Ambrany 1998 and Østby 2003: 45-48 argue persuasively for the 480s. Francis 1990: 101 even opts for the 470s. Like most literature in German, Gauer 1980: 130 says pre-Marathon, placing the Amazonomachy shown in the six front metopes in Amazonland, not in Attika. Cf. Boardman 1982.


6. Against Stähler 1991: 197 who takes 'das Fehlen des als Polemarch massgeblichen Kallimakhos' in the monument as an argument that the Miltiades depicted was not the hero of Marathon but his uncle.

7. For Oinoc literature cf. Schreiner 1997: 24. Add Taylor 1998 who replaces Argive Oinoc with the Attic border fortress Oinoc. The author makes 'no attempt to survey all the scholarly literature on Oinoc' (p. 223, n. 1). Throughout antiquity the Oinoc painting will have been admired, and the battle discussed, by thousands of visitors to the Stoa. It is food for thought that but for two mentions in Pausanias, the battle would have passed into the oblivion to which several scholars in fact condemn it.


10. Herodotos implies that in 479, the Athenians prevailed with such arguments, unlike in 88 BC when their envoys to Sulla talked in lofty strains about Theseus and Eumolpos and the Persian Wars. Sulla had not, however, been sent to Athens to learn its history, but to subdue its rebels, Plut. Sulla 13.4.


12. Harrison 1972a: 366 thinks that also Pan, Demeter, and Kore were shown. Herodotos 6.105 attests that Pan promised his aid to Philippides/Pheidippides, and Simonides (fr. 133 Bgk.) that in the battle, the god struck the Persians with panic. According to Lukianos Philop. 3, the Athenians insisted that Pan had come from Arkadia to Marathon to take hand in the battle. Hermes subscribes to this in Bis accus. 9-10, as does Pan himself, complaining that the Athenians thank him with no more than two or three sacrifices a year of a stinking he-goat.

13. OCD s.v. Callimachus. Cf. Evans 1993: 306 'The Stoa Poikile promoted non-partisan pride in the victory.' Harrison 1972a: 369 the painting 'may have presented history in a slanted or propagandistic manner which would have emphasized certain aspects of the battle at the expense of others, but it cannot simply have invented history.' Hammond 1973: 190 'it is certain that this record of the battle was correct in its facts.' Kinzl 1977: 214 n. 85 'The painting in the Stoa poikile is the prime and ultimate source of the literary tradition ... a distorted one from the outset.' Prost 1997: 32 'La peinture de Marathon n’est pas au service exclusif de la famille de Cimon: elle sert l’aristocratie et ses valeurs en général.'

14. Against Massaro 1978: 461-468 who argues for no less than three panels. Wycherley 1972: 78 and Hölscher 1973: 242 n. 11 put right my theory of two panels, Schreiner 1970: 102. As against continuous compositions in which each figure is represented only once, in Massaro’s three-panel Marathon picture certain individuals would need to appear more than once, among them Kallimakhos, allegedly displayed in the first panel as commander-in-chief and in the third as fighting although mortally wounded. Hölscher 1973: 54 'Jede Figur
erschien nur einmal im Bild, jede an dem Ort ihrer persönlichen Aufgabe oder ihres charakteristischen Schicksals.'

15. Against Harrison 1971, 1972 who, referring to Polemon, argues that the painting showed the dying Kallimakhos in the centre of the battle. Hölscher 1973: 67 'Das Ende war geprägt von den Einzelthaten des Kallimachos, Kynegeiros, Epizelos.'


17. Already in the Oinoc painting of the late 460s, the Spartans may have been shown with a lambda in their shields and with helmets no more made of metal (Tyrtaios fr. 8, 1.31), but of stiffened felt, cf. Thuk. 4.34.2, the year 425. The Spartans had no helmets according to Philostratos, Gymn. 9.

18. Lissarrague 1990: 32 'L'armée perse est représentée sur le modèle de celle des Amazones. Les mêmes types guerriers se retrouvent chez ces deux “peuples”, et il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister sur le sens métaphorique de bon nombre d'amazonomachies du Ve siècle.' It has been discussed whether the battered west metopes of the Parthenon showed Amazons or Persians. Only a female breast speaks in favour of Amazons.

19. Lissarrague 1990: 29-30 'A. Bovon et, après elle, T. Hölscher ont montré comment les peintres avaient construit une image du Perse qui permet de l'opposer en tous points à celle de l'hoplite.'

20. Miller 1997: 6 may be too optimistic in stating that 'very probably, careful attention was paid to details of Persian armour and equipment.'

21. Cf. e.g. Plato, Laws 699.

22. An epigram quoted by Lykourgos Leocr. 19 fails to mention the Plataians as joint victors of Marathon with the Athenians. It is quoted in Suda s.v. Poikile with the impression that it stood beneath the painting, but there is no knowing that it was an original from the late 460s.


27. Casson 1914/5: 73, against Burn 1977: 91 'there was no need for them to march by way of Athens.'


31. Schilling 1895: 265 is right in stating that the number of ships captured by the Athenians would have been much greater than seven if Herodotos' version of the battle had been correct. Embarkation of a great army is not feasible right after a defeat.


33. One of the stelai has reportedly been found in the villa of Herodes Atticus at Astros.

34. Evans 1984: 16, against Hunt 1998: 27, 34-37 who also has the 35,000 Spartan helots at Plataiai serving as hoplites. Labarbe 1957: 170 oddly thinks that the slaves were freed and equipped with hoplite armour out at Marathon. So also Vidal-Naquet 1986: 91.

35. So Wardman 1959: 55; Bugh 1988: 13. Against the Herodotean Pritchett 1965: 91 'the passage in 6.112.2 must be taken to prove that the Athenians did not have archers and horsemen.'

36. Curtius 1874: 20 has 9,000 citizens accompanied by their slaves 'welche ihnen als Schildknappen dienten und als Leichtbewaffnete mitfechten konnten.' Duncker 1888: 126 estimates more than 9,000 hoplites and 'eben so viele leichtbewaffnete,' since 'auf jeden Hoplit einen Leichtbewaffneten zu rechnen ist.' Beloch 1914: 21 assumes 6-7,000 Athenian hoplites and 'mindestens die gleiche Zahl leichter Truppen.' Burn 1962: 248 plausibly asserts that light-armed were present 'but for the kind of battle which Miltiades meant to fight, they were useless.' They were far from useless, however, for Kallimakhos' battle A, which of course is as missing in Burn as in Herodotos. Berthold 1976/7: 86 thinks that Athens had no regular light infantry at the time. Vidal-Naquet 1986: 91 is faithful to the
tradition that presents Marathon as an exemplary hoplite battle. 'The battle itself conforms in the strictest sense to the rules of archaic and classical combat.' So we are asked to believe that the Athenians who employed at least 34,000 seamen at Artemision in 480, and who ventured to ask other states for aid in 490, used their own manpower most incompletely at Marathon (p. 92)! Some apt statements by van Wees 1995 are worth quoting: 'It would be a truly remarkable example of the power of ideology if hoplites went so far as to deprive themselves of the support of a group of men at least as numerous as they, unencumbered by heavy armour, more mobile and better able to cope with mountainous terrain. There is, in fact, some evidence to suggest that light infantry was considerably less marginal in actual battle than it was in ancient perceptions and accounts of battle' (p. 162). Herodotos and Thukydides, 'in attributing military success and failure almost exclusively to the heavy infantry, are reflecting the hoplite ideology that the well-off deservedly enjoy political power because no one but they contributed decisively to the defence of the state' (p. 165). 'Political bias thus pervades ancient accounts, not only of constitutional and political history, but also of warfare, and the modern historian should treat these with caution' (p. 170).

37. Hanson 2000: 211 'Herodotos wrote more about the ideology of the hoplite than any other Greek historian.'

38. It is contested whether Athens had a regular cavalry corps in about 500, as Pollux Onom. 8.108 states and as appears from black-figured Athenian vases, e.g. those showing tryouts for entrance to the cavalry. For the existence of cavalry, e.g. Alföldi 1967; Evans 1984: 98; against e.g. Rosivach 2000: 41.

39. As kindly pointed out to me by H. van Wees.

40. Hammond, that brisk walker, back in 1973: 224 had wretched Philippides reaching Sparta in two days and starting immediately on the return. In 1997: 507 he allowed Philippides a day's rest in Sparta before speeding back to Athens on the 11th of Boedromion, his news being relayed to Marathon the same day! Lazenby 1993: 52 states that in the 1980s, some Englishmen showed that it is perfectly feasible to run to Sparta in two days. As if Philippides in 490 BC ran on modern roads with modern footwear. The journey to Sparta in two days is accepted e.g. by Frost 1979, 160.

42. Burn 1962: 242 ‘Men of the ‘equestrian class’ may have ridden to the front, though once there they would dismount to fight in the ‘modern’ manner.’

43. Loraux 1986: 37 ‘the epitaphioi have no other subject than “the Athenians,” that homogenous body of warriors whose mentality is implicitly hoplitic.’ Strauss 2000b: 262 ‘The seamen were under-represented in the funeral oration.’


45. Lazenby 1993: 50 states that ‘the Persians probably did not fear that a landing there (at Phaleron) would be contested,’ for like his hero, Herodotos, he fails to ask what the Athenian navy was up to in 490. Hunt 1998: 27 ‘The Athenians had no significant navy at this time and so the thetes ... were playing no role in the war.’ Doenges 1998: 3 ‘A landing at Phaleron with a superior cavalry force putting immediate pressure on the city had every prospect of success. Athens’ preemptive war with Aigina eliminated that option.’ Correct, but he might have asked what the victorious fleet from that preventive war was up to in the year of Marathon. Cf. p. 5 ‘As it turned out, the campaign involved no naval action.’


47. Pindar Pyth. 8.79 is of little help in locating the Herakleion in ‘the nook of Marathon’ which thus suits both the Vrana and the Valaria area. Nor is there any help in Lukianos Theon ekklesia 7, who locates the Herakleion near the grave of Eurystheus.
CHAPTER IV

The First Naval Bill of Themistokles

Just as our sources present two battles of Marathon, they also give two naval bills moved by Themistokles. After quelling the Ionian revolt in 494, the Persians, in preparation for a punitive expedition against Eretria and Athens, concluded an alliance with Aigina, the enemy of Athens. In the first place, the Athenians enlarged their fleet for a preventive war against Aigina. After Marathon, when another retaliatory invasion by the Persians was imminent, a second shipbuilding programme was voted for, this time against the Persians themselves. In Themistokles’ archonship, 493/2, the Athenians initiated the fortification of Piraeus as an up-to-date harbour for the fleet that was being strengthened by the first naval bill (hereafter bill A). The fortification of Piraeus was only completed after the Persian Wars, so that evacuation within solid Piraean circuit walls was not an option in 480 and 479. But thanks to Themistokles’ second naval bill (bill B), the fleet of Athens was sufficiently increased to render possible the victory in the battle of Salamis.

In 1874, Curtius found it likely that the construction of new shipyards and new ships was concomitant with Themistokles’ fortification of Piraeus in the late 490s, and in 1884 one Themistoklean naval bill before and another after Marathon were plausibly claimed by Holzapfel, whereas Duncker in 1888 dated the first bill in 487 and the second in 483. After the publication of Aristotle’s Athenaión politeia in 1891, the only spokesmen for two bills seem to be Garland and van Wees. The former unfortunately fails to follow up his observation, whereas the latter in a note plausibly
claims a major shipbuilding programme carried out in the 490s, to be associated with the early career of Themistokles; then in 483 he increased the number of ships. Two bills are likewise asserted by Labarbe, one financed with silver from Laurion and the other with silver from Maroneia. But in his most valuable book Labarbe unfortunately dates both bills in 483. Just as scholars believe in just one battle of Marathon in 490, they regularly claim only one naval bill, not in 493 but in 483. This would mean that Athens had only a negligible fleet in the year of Marathon, in spite of the fact that in 489, they were able to send 70 ships against Paros. We are told that this was their full fleet, no ships being left behind to guard the coasts of Attica against the Aiginetans. The start of the Piraeus fortifications in 493/2 is accepted by most scholars, and we are asked to believe that ten years were to pass between the harbour fortification and the building of triremes. Themistokles is known to have persuaded the people to use the new-found silver from the mines to construct a navy of 100 ships or more. After Marathon, it was only a matter of time before the Persians would mount a new invasion to exact vengeance for their defeat. But we are told that in the late 480s it was Aigina, not Persia, Themistokles held up as the threatening enemy for his fellow citizens, the war with Persia's friend Aigina allegedly going on until the very eve of Xerxes' invasion in 480. Then all of a sudden Aigina and Athens would collaborate very closely against the common enemy. And the alleged shipbuilding activity - apparently inexperienced shipwrights in new-built dockyards - from 483 to 480 when the Athenians mustered no less than 200 ships at the battle of Salamis, calls for our gaping admiration. The shipwrights outdid, if not Odysseus who single-handedly felled the trees and built a ship in four days (Od. 5.262), then perhaps Caesar's men in Arles who needed a month to construct and equip 12 ships (Bell. Civ. 1.36). Odysseus and Caesar's men were apparently lucky to have trees for ship-timber ready at hand, whereas the Athenian shipwrights were at work at a time when Macedonia was con-
trolled by Persia and the supply of ship-timber and straight beams for at least 34,000 oars cannot have been easy. The alleged shipbuilding of the late 480s was to appear even more impressive after the 1980s, when it took experienced shipwrights, working with modern tools and not having to worry about the supply of building materials, about two years to build the modern trireme Olympias.

Some scholars, disliking the idea of ten years passing from Themistokles' fortification of Piraeus during his archonship to his shipbuilding programme in 483, prefer to move his archonship down from 493 to the final years of the 480s. I shall do the opposite, following Curtius, Schmidt, Bauer and Holzapfel in assigning both the inception of harbour fortifications and a naval bill (bill A) to the late 490s.

In the beginning of Ch. II we quoted Suda as the clearest evidence for both a battle A and a battle B at Marathon, whereas Nepos only knows of battle A. In the present case, no source is clearer than Cornelius Nepos in recording both a naval bill A and a naval bill B of Themistokles (Themistocles 2):

The first step in his public career came in connection with the war with Korkyra; chosen praetor by the people to carry on that contest, he inspired the Athenians with greater courage, not only at that time, but also for the future. For while the public funds which came in from the mines every year were being squandered by the magistrates in largess, he persuaded the people to use the money to build a fleet of 100 ships. The fleet was quickly built, and with it he first humbled the Korkyrens, and then made the sea safe by ridding it of pirates. In that way he made the Athenians not only rich, but highly skilled also in naval warfare. How much this meant to the safety of all Greece became evident during the Persian invasion. ... After the news of Xerxes' coming had reached Greece ... the people sent to Delphi to inquire what measures they ought to take. The Pythia replied to the envoys that they must defend themselves with wooden walls. When
Stesimbrotos of Thasos who wrote in the 420s is an early source for bill A. Plutarch quotes him from one of his lost works as saying that Themistokles carried through his shipbuilding programme against the opposition of Miltiades (Them. 4.3 = FGrHist 107 F 2). Being unlikely to have questioned 489 as the year of Miltiades’ death, Stesimbrotos will have put bill A in the latter 490s, after Miltiades’ return to Athens from Thrakian Khersonesos. Stesimbrotos is also the likely source for Plutarch’s statement (Them. 4.1-2) that the revenue came from the silver mines at Laureion and that Themistokles persuaded his fellow citizens to use it for shipbuilding ‘not by shaking Dareios and the Persians before them as a threat, for they were a long way off and offered no firm fear that they would attack, but by making opportune use of their anger and rivalry against the Aiginetans in order to secure the armament.’ This seems to date Themistokles’ naval bill before the ill-starred expedition of Mardonios which stranded at Athos in 492, after which it was only a matter of time before Dareios would make another attempt at taking vengeance on Eretria and Athens for the aid they had brought in the early 490s to the Ionian revolt. This must have been clear to all with eyes to see and ears to hear, and most of all to a Thasian like Stesimbrotos, whose city was first captured on Mardonios’ campaign and was later ordered to destroy her circuit wall and hand over her fleet (Hdt. 6.44.1, 46.1, 48.1). At least after Mardonios’ campaign, the Persians must indeed have ‘offered firm fear that they would attack.’ In advance of most of his fellow Athenians, the Themistokles of Stesimbrotos may have foreseen that the Persians would indeed come to take revenge once they had free hands after suppressing the Ionian rising. But he found it more tactical to hold up Aigina as the enemy - during the Aiginetan war, which is well attested for the 490s.

Plutarch’s statement in the same ch. 4, that the number of triremes built by the Athenians on this occasion was 100, is also likely to derive from Stesimbrotos. Now Plutarch has it that at the battle of Salamis, the Athenians mustered some 200 triremes
(Them. 11.4, 14.1) without indicating that Stesimbrotos held another opinion, and so our Thasian is likely to have included bill B which gave 100 more ships in the late 480s. But unfortunately, Plutarch fails to record a second building programme or to account for the origin of the remaining 100 vessels at Salamis, and so we miss a quotation of Stesimbrotos on this score.

We do not know what Stesimbrotos had to say about that other part of Themistokles' naval policy, the fortification of Piraeus. But in the 490s his own state had used the profit from the mines both to strengthen the city wall and to build a fleet of long vessels (Hdt. 6.46.2), and he may well have stated that the Athenians, too, in the late 490s started fortifications and shipbuilding as parts of the same scheme.

My point is one of chronology, that Stesimbrotos clearly recorded bill A of the 490s, and probably also bill B of the next decennium. Before Miltiades sailed against Paros in 489 with 70 ships, he had captured Lemnos with his fleet and had come from his principality in Thrakia to Athens in 493 with four triremes, after the fifth, which was commanded by his son Metiokhos, had been captured by the Phoinikians (Hdt. 6.41.2). He must have been the personal owner of the ships, like Kleinias who distinguished himself at the battle of Artemision in 480 with 200 men, whom he provided from his own means, and on his own ship (Hdt. 8.17, cf. Plut. Alkib. 1). Stesimbrotos was therefore mistaken if he presented Miltiades as a spokesman of pure hoplite ideology, on principle opposed to any shipbuilding scheme. The Thasian was probably in the right if he opined that Miltiades had opposed Themistokles more as a personal rival than on account of his naval policy.

Next we turn to Herodotos, the contemporary of Stesimbrotos. His account of the mostly naval war with Aigina ends with the brief ch. 6.93. Thereafter Herodotos is heading for the battlefield of Marathon. In his narrative, the triumph of Marathon is the feat of Miltiades and his hoplites alone, and in 6.103 Miltiades is
introduced with his noble ancestry (cf. 6.35 where the hero Aiakos is introduced as the remote ancestor of the family). In this setting, our historian has no time for the archonship in 493/2 of Themistokles, the spokesman of a naval policy; no word is uttered about his fortification of Piraeus or his naval bill A, to say nothing of a defeat of the Aiginetans and other medizers with the new fleet between the loss of four ships and the battle of Marathon, or a role for that fleet at Phaleron after battle A. On the contrary, as we shall presently see, Herodotos expressly denies that the new fleet was used for the war with Aigina for which it had been built. It is only after the year of Marathon, in 6.132, that the navy comes into the narrative, when Herodotos ends his Miltiades story with the ill-starred expedition against Paros with 70 triremes.21 Themistokles and his naval policy are not allowed to enter the narrative until 7.143, when our esteemed author, after the land battle of Marathon, is heading for the sea battle of Salamis. In Themistokles’ case, no noble ancestry is given, and we are asked to believe that in the 480s, he had only recently come to the fore, which means that he could hardly have been archon in 493/2 (cf. the surprising chronological information that king Kleomenes of Sparta reigned for only a short period, 5.48). After reporting the mission of the Athenians to Delphi in the 480s, the Wooden Wall oracle of the god, and the adoption of Themistokles’ interpretation of it, Herodotos goes on (7.144):

On a previous occasion Themistokles had given another counsel which prevailed seasonably, when the Athenians had collected from the mines at Laureion a large sum of money and were about to share it among themselves at a rate of ten drachmas a man. Then Themistokles persuaded them to give up this idea and build with the money 200 ships for use in the war, meaning the war with Aigina. This war, by the fact of its having arisen (οὕτως γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συμπέτως), was what saved Greece at that time, by forcing Athens to become a maritime power. The ships were not used for the purpose for which
they had been built and were consequently a help to Greece in her hour of need. The Athenians possessed these ships, which were already built, and there was need to build more. And they resolved to obey the god, and to withstand in their ships with all their forces the barbarian invader, together with any other Greeks who chose to join them. These were the oracles that had come to the Athenians.

Instead of pursuing a chronological narrative, Herodotos prefers to deal with the entire naval policy of Themistokles in this post-Marathon chapter. Having wondered how the 70 ships taken by Miltiades against Paros in 489 had come into existence, we are now informed by the presentation of shipbuilding in two phases, like in Nepos. The 70 ships obviously resulted from the first naval bill which was recorded also by Stesimbrotos, namely Themistokles' famous bill $A$ from the pre-Marathon Aiginetan war (although the whereabouts of the ships in 490 are untold). Later there was 'need to build more ships' before the battle of Salamis, which obviously refers to bill $B$. We shall return to Herodotos and his version of bill $B$ in the next chapter. For the present, let us consider the Aiginetan war during which Herodotos, like Stesimbrotos, dates the first bill.

The Aiginetan war

In Pausanias, Aelius Aristeides and Polyainos, the war was still in progress in the 480s. Scholars agree. Pausanias states that Marathon was the first battle in which Athenian slaves took part (1.32.4) and he records the grave of the Athenians and slaves who fell in the Aiginetan war 'before the Persian invasion' (1.29.7). This would make the slaves fall in war with Aigina after Marathon. Aristeides speaks of a bill, carried during the war with Aigina, when Themistokles stopped the distribution of silver from the mines. He used the Aiginetan war as a prophasis for spending the silver on shipbuilding, foreseeing that Marathon was only a prooimion for more war (3.236-7). In the next chapter, we shall
deal with Aristotle who, without speaking of the Aiginetan war, assigns a naval bill (evidently bill B) to the year 483/2. Now Polyainos (1.30.6), without indicating the exact year, puts this bill during the war with Aigina (1.30.6). And so it seems that Polyainos, like Pausanias and Aristeides, imagined that the war was still going on in the 480s. I shall argue that the three ancient sources and modern scholars are equally wrong, whereas Herodotos plausibly implies a termination of the war before Marathon.

Herodotos states that the Aiginetans had hated the Athenians for a long time, and when in about 505 they were asked by the Thebans for aid in the war against the Athenians, they (dubbed \textit{thalassokratores} at 5.83.2) inflicted grave losses in an unheralded war against Athens by harrying Phaleron and the coasts of Attika (5.81). When the Athenians prepared themselves for revenge they were advised by the oracle in Delphi to wait for thirty years; if they attacked Aigina forthwith they would ultimately be victorious, but only after suffering as much loss as they inflicted. Against the advice, they began preparations for attack but were hindered by the Spartans (5.89). After this no more is heard of the conflict until heralds from king Dareios appeared in Greece to request the Zoroastrian symbols of earth and water. After the suppression of the Ionian revolt, Dareios matured plans not only to punish Eretria and Athens for their part in the uprising but also to subdue as many Greek states as possible (6.43.4). We expect Dareios to prepare the ground by requesting earth and water from many Greek states before his first attempt, the ill-starred expedition led by Mardonios in 492. But for some reason, in Herodotos' narrative Dareios will only send his heralds, 'some in one direction, others in another,' in 491, after the failure of Mardonios' campaign (6.48-49). Herodotos states, unfortunately without identifying them, that many of the continental Greeks responded to the request. (What about Thebes, Argos, and the Messenians who according to Plato \textit{Laws} 698 were in revolt against Sparta in 490?) He also says that all the island states gave what the king put forward as a demand,
but the Aiginetans are the only ones he names before returning to Atheno-Aiginetan relations. A remarkable sequence of events is now crammed into the narrative before Datis and the Persian fleet set out for Greece and Marathon in 490 (6.49-93):

At the outset, the Athenians tried negotiation, not war. At their request, king Kleomenes of Sparta went to Aigina, where he demanded that those responsible for yielding to Dareios be handed over. But Kríos, a principal citizen of the polis, pointed out that Kleomenes did not speak for the whole of Sparta since Demaratos, the other king, was absent. (Kríos thought of Dem­aratos as less anti-Persian than Kleomenes.) Before returning to Sparta and deposing Demaratos, Kleomenes warned Kríos that he would ram into great harm in the future. Reverting from Sparta to Aigina in company with the new and more anti-Persian king Leotykhidas (the brother of Demaratos), Kleomenes arrested Kríos with nine other pro-Persian Aiginetan oligarchs and delivered them for custody at Athens, obviously to prevent any medizing behaviour by Aigina. After the death of their foe Kleomenes, the Aiginetans sent ambassadors to Sparta where the friends of pro-Persian Aigina now had more influence. They demanded that Leotykhidas should intercede in Athens for the release of the hostages. But the intercession of Leotykhidas with Athens was unsuccessful. Apparently in retribution for Athens’ refusal, the Aiginetans lost no time before they tit-for-tat ambushed the sacred vessel full of leading Athenians on its way to the festival at Sounion, obviously in order to trade them for their hostages.

When negotiations had failed, the Athenians went to war. In the first place, the people decided to support a democratic, anti-Persian revolution in Aigina led by Nikodromos. Herodotos fails to tell us who moved, or spoke for the bill, or who was in command of the expedition, but this policy will have had the support of Themistokles. Possessing no more than 50 ships of their own, the Athenians had to hire 20 from the Korinthians for a nominal fee. But this took time, and the aid to Nikodromos arrived too
late. When the plot miscarried, Nikodromos and the other Aiginetan leaders escaped to Attika, whereas their followers became victims of a sacrilegious punishment by the oligarchs. 'This was how they treated their own citizens,' writes Herodotos, but he fails to describe what the pro-Persian oligarchs did to their Athenian captives. Nor do we learn what happened to the Aiginetan hostages in Athens, and so it could be that Herodotos implies that an exchange took place before Nikodromos' attempted revolution. Next the Athenians, with the 50 plus 20 ships, first defeated the Aiginetan fleet, and thereupon the Aiginetan land forces who were aided by Argive volunteers, obviously men of the anti-Spartan and pro-Persian party at Argos. For the moment medizing Aigina seemed neutralised.

Herodotos seems to imply that after their victory, the Athenians returned the loan of 20 ships to Korinth. The oracle in Delphi had foretold as much loss for the Athenians as they inflicted on the Aiginetans if they did not wait for thirty years before attacking them, and after their initial success at sea and on land the reverse of fortune came: the Aiginetans caught the Athenian fleet in disorder and captured four ships, crews and all (6.93). As the need of a good harbour had been pressing since the harrying of Phaleron by the Aiginetans in about 505, so the lack of an adequate fleet became obvious enough when the Athenians had to withdraw their 20 ships sent to the aid of the Ionians in their rising, and when they had to borrow 20 from Korinth for the war with Aigina. The lack became even more obvious now after the loss of four ships, and as suggested above, the apparently incomplete chapter 6.93 would be the appropriate place to account for Themistokles' archonship, harbour fortification and bill A. The oracle had also told the Athenians that they would ultimately, after suffering losses, be victorious if they attacked Aigina against its advice. We are accordingly prepared for the ultimate victory - and surprised by Herodotos' express statement that the new fleet was not used for its original purpose, war against Aigina. With Poly-
ainos (cf. p. 106 below) and Nikolaos of Myra (prosgymn. 8.7)* he would have done better to record the use of the new ships in the second phase of the preventive war against the island state and other islands that had given earth and water to the Great King. (Nepos oddly says war with Korkyra and the pirates.) Herodotos would thus have accounted for the mysterious absence of aid to the Persians from the Aiginetans in 490. This would also have explained why the expedition of Datis did not sail directly to Phaleron for a surprise attack on Athens, rather than cruising around to the islands and taking hostages.30 But as it is, ch. 6.93 ends abruptly without the slightest trace of these feats of Themistokles. After the oracle which foretold grave sufferings before final victory, Herodotos' only hint of the second phase of the preemptive war is his obscure reference to the penalty paid by the Aiginetans, some time after their capture of the sacred Athenian ship, for the high-handed wrong they had done the Athenians to please the Thebans (6.87).31 After 6.93, Herodotos has no word to say about war with Aigina until the late 480s in 7.145, to which we shall presently recur.

Though he suppresses the defeat of Aigina and other medizing states before Marathon, Herodotos has packed an impossible number of events into his narrative between the arrival of the Persian heralds to demand earth and water in, seemingly, 491 and the campaign of Datis in 490. Some scholars think that Herodotos has told more or less the full story, but consider him mistaken in placing it all before Marathon. They divide his narrative in two; dissenting about where to put the dividing line, they date the first part before Marathon and, against Herodotos, the other in the 480s until the eve of Xerxes' invasion.32 Others claim that Herodotos only tells half the story: what he does report belongs before Marathon, whether they follow him in cramming it all between 491 and Marathon,33 or whether they ignore the upper limit of his account and date the Persian's demand for earth and water well before the campaign of Mardonios in 492.34 The latter
view is plausible, since Herodotos states that after the suppression of the Ionian revolt in 494, Dareios matured plans to punish Eretria and Athens for their part in the uprising and the burning of Sardis (6.43-44). The time right after the suppression of the revolt would be the obvious one for seeking allies in Greece; it is hard to see why Dareios should have tarried until 491 before sending heralds to win allies in preparation of his punitive expedition. These scholars agree with the other school in letting the Aiginetan war break out again at some (disputed) time in the 480s and continue until the eve of Xerxes' invasion, but they charge Herodotos with having almost totally omitted this crucial part of the war when Themistokles, so they say, referred to it when proposing his naval bill. For my own part, I believe that Herodotos tells nearly the full story, rightly placing it before Marathon but erroneously dating the Persian demand for earth and water as late as 491. He only omits the second phase of the preventive campaign against Persia's friend Aigina before Marathon, after the loss of four ships and then the shipbuilding scheme launched by bill A. Along with Themistokles' archonship, Piraean fortification and bill A, his defeat of Aigina with the new fleet ought to have figured in a rather longish ch. 6.93.

No scholar known to me postulates that Herodotos has the Aiginetan war in progress in the year 489 when his Miltiades sailed with 70 ships against Paros. The alleged Herodotean evidence of a new outbreak of the war after 489 is twofold. First 6.90-91: after his abortive attempt at a democratic revolution in Aigina in the 490s, Nikodromos with his men were given Sounion in Attika. From there they harried Aigina. 'This happened later,' Herodotos writes, possibly a flash-forward to the 480s, but we do not hear that any Athenians took part in these raids. Alternatively, the harrying took place before Marathon and before the preventive war that is likely to have resulted in an anti-Persian regime being set up in Aigina. Second 7.145: in 481 (?) the Greeks agreed to terminate all enmities and wars between themselves
(καταλλάσσεσθαι τάς τε ἔχθρας καὶ τοὺς κατ’ ἄλληλους ἔντας πολέμους), the greatest war being the one between the Athenians and the Aiginetans. This is frequently taken to mean that hostilities broke out again some time after Marathon, but the ekphræi and eontes polemoi that were terminated in 481 could refer mainly to the ekphribe palata of the Aiginetans against the Athenians and the polemos akerykta which they had started against them in 505 BC, an unheralded war which had never been ended by the conclusion of a formal peace (5.81.2). The meaning of 7.145 is probably that a formal peace was now concluded, and any grudges the parties might still entertain were patched up. Consequently Aigina and Athens could act as solid allies in the crucial year 480. The Aiginetans who back in the late 490s had given the Persians earth and water, had become Xerxes' enemies by the time he crossed the Hellespont in early 480 (7.147), and Athenians and Aiginetans were jointly on the look-out off Skiathos before the fighting at Artemision (7.179). Thereupon the Athenians deposited some of their refugees in Aigina (8.41) and the Aiginetans sent their 30 best ships to Salamis, manning others to guard their own island, obviously in fear of retribution from the Persians, their former friends, for having deserted them (8.46). Their Aiakids did service for the common cause (8.64) and during the battle the Athenians and Aiginetans acted in remarkable concert (8.91). Polykritos, the son of the medizer Krios who had been held as a hostage in Athens during the conflict between the two states, shared honour with two Athenians for his valour (8.93.1). Herodotos' picture of close collaboration between Athens and Aigina in 480 is more reasonable if he thought of their actual fighting as terminated before 490, than if he, like Pausanias, Aelius Aristeides, Polyainos and modern scholars, figured that the war had been in progress until the eve of Xerxes' invasion. Thus in Herodotos as well as in actual fact, the naval bill moved by Themistokles during the war with Aigina is to be dated before Marathon and to be identified with bill A of Nepos and Stesimbrotos.
Now Thukydides. His reference to Themistokles' bill A is vague since he fails to mention the find of a new vein of silver and the decision of shipbuilding instead of distribution among the citizens. But he is our main source for that other part of Themistokles' naval scheme, the fortification of Piraeus as a first-rate harbour to replace the open beach at Phaleron.

Whoever his source, Kleidemos seems to have stated in about 350 BC that Theseus had built a fleet of triremes (Plut. *Thes.* 19.5 = FGrHist 323 F 17), a notion rejected by Thukydides: strong fleets of up-to-date triremes were a prerequisite for the greatest war ever, namely his own 27-year Peloponnesian War, which he claims to have recorded meticulously from its very beginning. He saw his war as greater than the Trojan War embellished and exaggerated by Homer who lived many generations later, in which the ships were only small (1.10); greater also than the Persian Wars as strung together at a later time by Herodotos with a view to making them not more truthful but more attractive to his audience (1.21), wars quickly decided by two battles on land and two at sea. Strong fleets of fully developed triremes were a recent phenomenon. True, in the past the Korinthians, the Ionians, Polykrates of Samos and the Phokaians all did have powerful fleets, but of pentekonters and long vessels rather than of triremes (1.13). Then Thukydides goes on (1.14.2-15.1):

These navies, then, which arose many generations after the Trojan War, were the most powerful, and it seems that even these were using few triremes. They continued to outfit pentekonters and long boats just as in the earlier conflict. Shortly before the Persian Wars (τὰ Μῆδωτα) and the death of Dareios, who ruled Persia after Kambyses, triremes were used in strength by the tyrants in Sicily and by the Korkyraians. These were the last naval powers of note to be established in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes. Aigina, Athens, and perhaps a few other states had paltry navies made up mostly of pentek-
konters. And long after the time (οἷς ἀφ’ οὗ) when Themistokles persuaded the Athenians - when they were at war with Aigina and when too the barbarian invasion was expected (τοῦ βαρβάρου προσδιοκῶν δυνάς) - to build the ships with which they actually fought at sea (ἀπεκεφαλήσαντοι οἱ Αθηναῖοι), even these were not yet fully equipped with decks fore and aft. Such were (the inadequacies of) the Greek navies, both of those of antiquity and those that arose later.

Thus the correct interpretation of Schmidt in 1879, with a comma after enaumakhesan. But all editions I have found prefer a semicolon, and the sentence ‘And long after the time when (opse aph’ hou ...)’ is regularly translated: ‘It was only quite recently that Themistokles persuaded the Athenians - when they were at war with Aigina and when too the barbarian invasion was expected - to build the ships with which they actually fought at sea. Even these were not yet equipped with decks fore and aft.’ This against the prudent protest of Schmidt (p.12): ‘Die traditionelle Interpunction der Stelle ist falsch; es handelt sich nicht um zwei Sätze, sondern um einen Vorder- und Nachsatz; hinter ἐναυμάχησαν, wo der Vordersatz schliesst, darf nur ein Komma stehen; der ganze Sinn ist sprachlich und geschichtlich klipp und klar, wenn man das ἀφ’ οὗ in der gewohnlichen Bedeutung nimmt, «seit der Zeit, wo».’ What happened late according to Thukydides, was not the construction of the ships but their decking.

Mentioning ta Medika before the death of Dareios in 486, Thukydides seems to be including in the term the expedition of Datis in 490. In the early period, Aigina and Athens had only had small fleets, of mostly pentekonters. Then Themistokles, during the Aiginetan war and before the expedition of Datis, persuaded the Athenians to build the fleet with which they actually fought at Artemision and Salamis (bill A). These triremes were not of the advanced kind used by the Athenians later, when after the Persian Wars they acquired that arche which by causing fear in Sparta be-
came the true cause of Thukydidès' own Peloponnesian War, the longest and greatest in all history.\textsuperscript{40} For the triremes of Themistokles used in the insignificant Persian Wars recorded by Herodotès did not have the full decks that could carry many soldiers.\textsuperscript{41} Thukydidès might have added that it was only at the time of the battle of Eurymedon in the 460s\textsuperscript{42} that fully developed triremes were used by the Athenians, Kimon adding bridges to connect the decks (Plut. \textit{Kim.} 12.2).

In 1.41.2 Thukydidès has the Korinthian delegates referring to the 20 long vessels (not triremes\textsuperscript{45}) that they had lent to the Athenians in the Aiginetan war \textit{hyper ta Medika}. Here again \textit{ta Medika} will include the expedition of Datis. We learn in 1.18.2 that Athenians only became \textit{nautikoi} when they packed off their possessions and boarded their ships, evidently in 480. Now the Athenians had long possessed pentekonters, and triremes from before Marathon, so what Thukydidès means to say must be that it was only in 480 that they acquired that competence in naval war which allowed them to win their subsequent \textit{arche}. He cannot, like many modern scholars,\textsuperscript{44} mean that the fleet of triremes possessed by the Athenians in 480 was all brand new.

In 1.89.3-93.2 we learn how after 479, the Athenians on Themistokles' proposal built a city wall around Athens against Spartan opposition. They had little benefit from the earlier circuit wall since only small parts of it were still standing and because they extended the bounds of the city in all directions. The new wall was a makeshift construction erected in great haste. 'The foundations were made of different kinds of stones, unsquared here and there and laid down as they came to hand. Many gravestones and bits of sculpture were also built into it.' (Upon these lower courses there will have been a sunbrick wall.) Then by contrast we pass from the hastily built post-war wall of Athens to the extremely well-built one of Piræus (1.93.3-7):
Themistokles also persuaded (ἐπείσε) them to finish constructing the wall around Piraeus. A beginning of this had been made earlier during his magistracy which he held among the Athenians for a year (ὑπήρκετο δ’αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἄρχης ἡς κατ’ ἐναυτῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦρξε), considering (νομίζων) that the location, with its three natural harbours, was excellent, and that it would greatly assist them towards the acquisition of power if they themselves became a nation of seamen (αὐτοῦς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους). He was the first man bold enough to say that the Athenians must take to the sea, and he forthwith in action helped to lay the basis of their empire (τὴν ἄρχην εἰσὶς ξυγκατεσκεύασεν). In accordance with his plan they had built the wall to the thickness which still can be seen around Piraeus, namely so that two wagons abreast could carry building stones atop it. The inside was not filled with gravel or clay, but with huge stones, hewn square and fitted together, and bound to one another with iron and lead clamps. The height of the wall, however, was only about half what Themistokles had intended. He had wanted its sheer height and width to discourage enemy aggression, and believed that a few men, drawn from the most inferior troops, would suffice to defend it, while the rest would man the fleet. In my opinion, he attached great importance to the navy because he foresaw that the king would launch a naval rather than a military offensive. He believed that Piraeus would be of greater advantage than the upper city, and he frequently urged the Athenians to go down to it if they were attacked by land and resist all their opponents with their ships.

Themistokles had a broader picture of what would take place in the future than anyone else (1.138.3), and his prediction that the Persian king would launch his offensive by sea rather than by land must belong before the naval expedition of Datis in 490, not before the land-and-sea invasion of Xerxes in 480. Rather than strengthening the poor existing circuit wall of Athens, Themistokles had persuaded his fellow citizens to initiate the construc-
tion of a very solid wall around Piraeus, which he considered more valuable than Athens (and so, having only an insufficient city wall in 490, the Athenians did not dare to stand a siege but marched out to encounter the Persian enemy at Marathon). Contrary to the common interpretation, Themistokles’ argument that with its three natural harbours, Piraeus offered a splendid location, must belong to his archonship 493/2 when he persuaded the Athenians to initiate the work (like clearly in Pausanias 1.1.2), not to the time after 479 when he would have them complete it. Like in 1.14, it is all a matter of punctuation. The text from ἐπιγράφοντο ἃρξε is not, as e.g. in the Oxford edition, to be bracketed, and the participle νομίζων should be linked not with ἔπελευθερία which Themistokles did after 479 but with ἃρξε, which he did in the year 493/2. After 480 he would have been more apt to have said something like: ‘If only you had after Marathon completed the strong Piraeus fortification which I had initiated in my archonship, instead of wasting our resources on building the treasury in Delphi and starting the huge building project of the pre-Parthenon entirely in marble on the Akropolis, then we would have had an impregnable Piraeus fortress to evacuate to when Xerxes and the Persians were here.’ No evacuation to Aigina and Troizen would have been needed. Let us now for Poseidon’s sake complete the half-finished Piraeus fortification.’ And as Thukydides assures us, after the retreat of the Persians Themistokles did prevail on his fellow citizens not only to build a new wall around Athens but also to finish the Piraean wall. It could be that he had originally, in 493/2, planned for his harbour a sound and solid wall right to the top. But given the opposition of Sparta, there was not time in the early 470s to complete the half-finished wall in the same quality. We should think of unsquared stones and mud-brick in these post-war upper courses.

An up-to-date harbour was only one prerequisite for Athens to acquire the seapower and the archē that by producing fear in Sparta was allegedly the true cause of Thukydides’ ever-so-
great Peloponnesian War. The other was that the Athenians them­

selves became experts in naval war. So autous nautikous gegenemenous does not mean 'the fact that they had now after the Persian Wars become expert sea fighters' but 'if they became a nation of sea fighters in the future', viz., if they built a fleet of triremes and learned how to use them. Here Thukydides again, like in 1.14 quoted above, is referring to the pre-Marathon bill A of Themistokles. So in 493/2 the farseeing Themistokles of Thukydides launched his double project, the fortification of Piraeus and construction of a fleet, not only as a defensive measure against the Persians but as a means for Athens to acquire an empire in the future. And he followed up his thoughts by immediate actions to lay the foundations of the empire (ten arkhen euthys xygkateskeuizen). These immediate actions refer to the pre-Marathon campaign by Themistokles against Aigina and other states. The campaign is sadly omitted by Herodotos, but we have seen it figuring in Polyainos and Nepos (who oddly says Korkyra). We also meet with it in Nikolaos of Myra (prosgymn. 8.7*): when the Athenians were wasting public money by distributing it, Themistokles persuaded them to build ships instead, with which they conquered the islands and Aigina.

Diodoros Book Ten is lost, and his record of the archon­ship of Themistokles in 493/2 is unknown. Diodoros cannot however, like Thukydides, have put the inception of the Piraean fortifications already in the archon-year, for in 11.41.2 we learn, under the year 477/6, that

Piraeus, as it is called, was not at that time a harbour, but the Athenians were using as their ship-yard the bay called Phaleric, which was quite small; and so Themistokles conceived the plan of making Piraeus into a harbour, since it would require only a small amount of construction and could be made into a harbour, the best and largest in Greece. He also hoped that when this improvement had been added to what the Athenians possessed, the city would be able to
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compete for the hegemony at sea; for the Athenians possessed at that
time the largest number of triremes and through an unbroken
succession of battles at sea which the city had waged had gained
experience and renown in naval conflicts.

Athens possessed a large number of triremes, but it was only in
477/6 that Diodoros' Themistokles conceived the plan of granting
them a harbour by fortifying Piraeus, which was so ideally located.
He told the people that he had an advantageous plan, but knowing
that the Spartans were as much opposed to a fortified Piraeus as to
a walled Athens, he first did not dare to divulge the plan to the
people. The impulse of the Spartans to interfere was, however,
dulled by the argument that it was in the interest of Greece to have
a first-rate harbour, whereupon Themistokles 'devoted himself to
the work, and since everybody enthusiastically took part it was
speedily done and the harbour was finished before anyone
expected' (11.43.2). In Diodoros, like in Nepos Them. 6, it was a
matter of constructions from scratch, not of completing a half­
finished work. Diodoros' reason for cramming the whole construc­tion
from inception to completion into one post-war year was
probably that like Nepos he was following Ephoros who, writing
{kata gene} and not annalistically, treated the entire Piraeus forti­
fication when after his account of the Persian Wars he passed over
to the subsequent period of relative peace. (Cf. 11.54-59, where
Diodoros packs into the year 471/0 Themistokles' whereabouts
from his impeachment to his death some eight years later. Dio­
doros may have taken the year 477/6 for the entire Piraean forti­
fication from a chronographic source different from from Euse­
bios Chron. who records in 496/5 {Peiraeus munitus est a
Themistocle}, and in 479/8 {Atheniens Piraeeum muro valiant}.)

If Diodoros' reading of Ephoros misled him into cram­
mimg Themistokles' Piraean fortifications into one year, the ques­tion is whether Diodoros also combined pre-Marathon naval bill A
and pre-Salamis naval bill B into just one bill of the late 480s. As
we saw, the Diodorean Themistokles states that in 477, Athens had the largest number of triremes and through an unbroken succession of battles at sea had gained experience and renown in naval conflicts. The unbroken succession suggests naval battles previous to Artemision and Salamis in 480, namely Miltiades' Parian campaign after Marathon and Themistokles' preventive war with Aigina and other medizing islands before Marathon. These campaigns require that the Athenians, after adopting bill A, had built a considerable fleet of triremes. This means that in the lost Book Ten, Diodoros is likely to have recorded first bill A under a year before Marathon and then bill B before Salamis. This sounds hypothetical, but I shall argue in ch. VII that bill A must indeed have figured in Ephoros, the influential historian upon whom Diodoros and Nepos depended.

NOTES

1. Against Kahrstedt 1934: 1687 who dubs the fortification of Piraeus in 493/2 'keine Massregel gegen Persien, da Athen noch keine Flotte hatte...'
2. Curtius 1874: 18, referring to the fact that in 489, the Athenians possessed at least 70 ships. Duncker 1888: 173 dates the first bill 'im Jahre des Wiederausbruchs des Krieges mit Aegina (487 v. Chr.) unmittelbar nach jenem Verlust der attischen Trieren gegen die Flotte der Aegineten.' Correct, except that the new outbreak of war is to be dated before Marathon, not in 487. Duncker saw that Themistokles did defeat Aigina with the new fleet, p. 174.
4. van Wees 2000: 173 n. 10. Gabrielsen 1994: 33 'With or without Themistokles' direct involvement, a naval policy seems to have been adopted earlier than 483/2.'

6. How & Wells 1912: 185 state that 'the creation of the navy clearly is later than the expedition to Paros,' and understandably they have qualms (p. 184) over 'the long separation between fortification of Piraeus (493) and the building of the fleet (483).' Also understandable are their problems with the Athenians who, after sending 70 ships against Paros in 489, on their chronology in 486 had only 50 sails of their own for the war with Aigina (p. 100). Many scholars think that the Athenians dared to send Miltiades with their full fleet against Paros, as if Aigina did not exist and no ships were needed to guard the coasts, e.g. Burn 1962: 258, Ambr 1965: 18, Karavites 1977: 131, Green 1996: 44, Hammond 1997: 518; Lank 2000: 41 n. 6, 47. How & Wells 1912: 100 and Ehrenberg 1946 do not accept that Athens possessed as many as 70 ships in 489.

7. Wallinga 1993: 157 explains that the inception of the Piraeus fortification in 493 'can have nothing to do with the fleet of his bill, not even indirectly,' whereas the Themistokles of Curtius 1874: 37 in 483 would continue his naval policy 'nach langem Warten und unverdrossenem Streben.' Busolt 1895: 642 reasonably held that the fortification 'zugleich für die Flotte, deren Vergrößerung er wohl damals ins Auge gefasst haben wird, die notwendige sichere Basis gewähren sollte.' The version of Ehrenberg 1973: 128 is that Themistokles' first move was to create a safe harbour, but then he was stopped by Miltiades; for the shipbuilding, 'the time was not yet ripe, and it was at any rate a long-term policy.' Labarbe 1957: 85 thinks that Themistokles wanted to build a fleet in 493 'mais les moyens lui manquaient encore.' Jordan 1975: 18 asserts that the Piraeus fortification plus the construction of a large fleet 'would have taxed the resources of Athens beyond endurance.' Green 1996: 28 has a curious statement, 'In 493-2 his naval development programme was defeated; but the Assembly nevertheless voted for the fortification of Piraeus, and its development as the port of Athens.' Cf. also Wolski 1983/84.

8. Like Plut. Them. 3.4, Busolt 1895: 644 and Hignett 1963: 96 underrate the Athenian brains, the latter imagining that 'the threat
from the East was forgotten after the battle of Marathon.’ Cf. Kinzl
1977: 215 who speaks of a false sense of security shown by the
construction of the pre-Parthenon on the Akropolis and Miltiades’
expedition against Paros. Wallinga 1993: 158 states that the majority
of the Athenians were unaware of an acute Persian danger. Badian
1971: 6 ‘no politician would have tried to frighten the Athenians
with the bugbear Darius ... to conceive of Persia (defeated in 490) as
a serious future enemy demanded far more foresight than
democracies, ancient and modern, are given to applying in politics.’
Knight 1970: 35 wrongly states that Herodotus gives ‘no credit to
Themistokles for foreseeing in the year 483/2 B.C. the possibility of
a Persian invasion, and the triremes built at this time (iiic) at the
instigation of Themistokles are said to be solely for the war against
Aigina.’ Better Gruen 1970: 94 ‘after Marathon it would surely be
nonsense for Themistocles (or anyone else) to feel that the Persians
were too far away to contemplate an invasion of Greece.’

9. Frost 1980: 83 states that the war continued right down to the eve of
the Persian invasion. In Hammond 1982: 80, 85 the war was only
brought to an end in late October or early November 481. He states
(p. 86) that the Aiginetan fleet was a threat to Salamis and the coast
of Attika in 480, and he has to reject the plausible restoration
Aiginetan in l. 17 of the Themistokles Decree. But cf. Gabrielsen
1994: 237 n. 50. Podlecki 1976: 403 is certain that ‘hostilities not
only continued but reached a distinct crescendo’ during the 480s.
The engagements ‘reached a climax immediately preceding
542 of ‘the one fact that seems certain in the mid-480s, that matters
with Aigina had reached crisis proportions,’ and on p. 543 of
‘Themistokles’ failure in the Aiginetan War’ in 486. Williams knows
(p. 541) ‘that it was Themistokles who offered the Aiginetan War as
the motivation for strengthening the Athenian navy in the years
immediately preceding 483/2.’ The authors of Cah IV2 agree that
the war with Aigina went on until the eve of Xerxes’ invasion. In
4 has it that the war between Athens and Aigina was not the only
internecine war in progress between Greek states in 481.
10. I quote some impressive numbers from great scholars. McGregor 1940: 82 says 200 ships built from 482 to 480. Wilcken 1951: 148 'in fieberhafter Anspannung aller Kräfte' 180 ships built in a year and a half; Hammond 1982: 85 says 200 ships in anything between 14 and 26 months. Green 1996: 57 has 6 to 8 triremes a month. So also Labarbe 1957: 123, but 'par la force des choses' 15-20 ships from early May to mid-July 480. For comparison, in the years from 357/6 to 353/2, when the Athenians had a long tradition of shipbuilding, the fleet was increased with 66 triremes from 283 to 349, IG II1 1611.9, 1613.302.

11. Oars preferably of silver fir, about 4.5 m long, with blades consisting of a separate piece spliced and riveted on to the shaft. Hignett 1963: 97 suggests that the timber came from the forests of South Italy. According to Hammond 1997: 525 it came from king Alexander of Makedonia who was thanked by the Athenians with a grant of citizenship.

12. Kenyon 1891: 63, against Dion. Hal. 5.34. Bicknell 1970: 437 rightly states that the fortification of Piraeus is logically connected with the naval bill, and so he transfers the fortification to 483. He suggests that it was another Themistokles who was archon in 493/2, whereas Gomme 1950: 262, accepting the archonship of our Themistokles in 493/2 and finding it unlikely that he began a naval policy which was dropped for ten years, explains that it was when he held another office in the late 480s that he initiated the Piraeus fortification. Frost 1968: 114 questions Themistokles' prominence before Marathon but accepts his archonship in 493/2. He regards the archonship as a proving-ground for young men of promise. Badian 1971: 7, 9 accepts Themistokles' archonship in 493/2, but 'the office had relative unimportance, and only small beginnings of fortifications were made in that year.' Alternatively, Badian like Gomme goes for some other office held just before the invasion of Xerxes. Develin 1989: 55 notes that Thukydides does not state that Themistokles was responsible for the Piraeus fortifications, only that a beginning was made in his archonship. Cf. also Fornara 1971a; Mosshammer 1975; Podlecki 1975: 7 'perhaps no more than the surveying and planning'; Sealey 1976: 185; Chambers 1984. Ehrenberg 1973: 131 thinks that Themistokles held office in 493/2, 'though hardly the first
archonship.' He is against inventing another Themistokles for the
archonship in 493/2. A prominent Themistokles in the 490s is
plausibly claimed by a phalanx led by Meyer, 1954: 292-294 and
Walker 1926: 170 'If the party (of Them.) was in existence at the
time of the embassy of Aristagoras, it cannot be doubted that
Themistocles would have been one of the strongest supporters of
the Ionian cause.'

13. Schmidt 1879; Bauer 1881: 57, 166; Holzapfel 1884: 585. For
obvious reasons, these scholars wrote in blissful ignorance of
Aristotle's *Athenaion politeia*. But Labarbe 1957: 83 is far from right
in stating that the publication of *AP* 'a inflige un démenti' of their
view. In 378/7, the Athenians furnished Piraeus with gates and set
about building ships: harbour fortification and shipbuilding hand in
hand, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.34.

14. Against Figueira 1993: 130 who thinks that *praetor* does not mean
archon in 493/2 but stratege in 483/2.

15. Hammond 1982: 91 n. 65 oddly thought that the 100 obviously new
ships of Nepos were old ships in the sheds.

16. Scholars can be amazingly certain that Stesimbrotos was mistaken.
Jacoby on FGrHist 107 F 2: 'Miltiades' name ist sicher falsch.' Meyer
1954: 296 n. 1 'Das ist unmöglich und kann auch von Stesimbrotos
... nicht erzählt sein.' Podlecki 1976: 404 suggests that Stesimbrotos
meant to say Aristeides and Xerxes, not Miltiades and Dareios. Cf.
Bicknell 1970: 438 who emends Miltiades to Aristeides, and Lazenby
1993: 84 n. 14 who has it that 'this is obviously wrong.' Bibliography
in Carena/Manfredini/Piccirilli 1983: 235.


19. Haas 1985: 43; in the title of his article 'Athenian naval power before
Themistocles,' before Themistokles means before 483. He totally
ignores Stesimbrotos. Kimon may have inherited from Miltiades his
private trireme on which he brought home 'the bones of Theseus'

20. Kinzl 1977: 212 may, however, be right in stating that 'evidence for
rivalry in 492/89 between these two men has yet to be produced.'
But as he states (p. 211), it would 'have been a miracle in Greek
politics if he (Miltiades) had had no enemies.' Williams 1982: 532
‘What little tradition we have speaks of rivalry between the two men,’ whereas in Walker 1926: 270-271 and McGregor 1940: 85, Themistokles is an ally of Miltiades. Knight 1970: 28 ‘From the available evidence there appears to be nothing that is clear and reasonable about anything in the relationship between Themistokles and Miltiades.’

21. After his achievement at Marathon, the Miltiades of Herodotos is put in a poor light when he turned to the sea, for as stated by Bicknell 1972: 226 n. 5, Herodotos only mentions his setback in Paros and ‘suppresses successful operations by Miltiades, recorded by Ephorus and confirmed by Hdt. 8.1 and 46-8, against other islands of the Kyklades.’ Cf. Ch. VII below.

22. Herodotos clearly means that the ships were actually built and not only planned for the future, against Lenardon 1978: 45; Lazenby 1993: 100; Gabrielsen 1994: 235 n. 30. As stated by Hammond 1982: 80 n. 26, ‘the Greek of Herodotos is crystal clear.’

23. Cf. n. 9 above.

24. Cf. Iustinus 2.12.12* who, without mentioning the war with Aigina, has Themistokles building 200 ships in the 480s.


26. There is nothing in Herodotos to warrant the idea that non-appearance of Aiginetan aid to the Persians in 490 is attributable to their ten oligarchs being held as hostages in Athens, against Meyer 1954: 304; Cartledge 1979: 151; Figueira 1993: 127. With De Sanctis 1930, Amit 1973: 27 is unwilling to accept that Persian heralds were ever sent to Greece.

27. Surprisingly some scholars like Figueira 1993: 116, 122 and Gabrielsen 1994: 34 think that the ships were bought, not borrowed. But Herodotos’ verb ἄδημεν must mean borrow.

28. Macan 1895: 115 ‘The exchange of captives is an omitted passage, that would come in well between c. 87 and c. 88.’ Against Figueira 1993: 126 ‘it was the retention of the hostages that compelled the Aiginetans to remain inactive.’ So also Grundy 1901: 155.
29. The defeat was hardly serious enough to account for the non-appearance of aid to Datis in 490, against Hegyi 1969: 181.

30. Balcer 1995: 213 reflects on why the Persian navy made rounds of the islands rather than proceeding rapidly toward Athens: 'The Persians had to exercise on land their shoeless horses, then feed, water and groom them.' They likewise chose Marathon for their landing because the plain would serve the horses well for food, water and exercise (p. 215). But the Persians intended to march immediately towards Athens, not to spend some days at Marathon. Schachermeyr 1974: 87-88 asks 'Warum nun all das Zögern, warum die systematische Unterwerfung all der Athen vorgelagerter Plätze, welche nach einer Gewinnung von Attika - zumal die Perser die uneingeschränkte Seeherrschaft besassen - doch ohnehin kampflos dem Imperium zufallen mussten?' His answer (p. 93): 'Die Bürgerschaft sollte gar nicht überrascht werden, nein, sie sollte im Gegenteil recht viel Zeit zur Überlegung haben und hierdurch dem Miltiades abspenstig, der Kapitulation aber zugänglich gemacht werden. Daher also die Gründlichkeit, ja fast Gemächlichkeit, mit der die Perser sich zuerst der Unterwerfung der Inseln hingaben.' Kraft 1973: 10-15 argues persuasively against Schachermeyr.

31. Walker 1926: 264 'At this point the narrative of Herodotus breaks off. Evidently Athenian tradition had no further successes to recount.' As if there was only one Athenian tradition, which was recorded meticulously by Herodotos! Hammond 1997: 502 also states that the operations ceased after the seizure of four ships by the Aignetans. Holzapfel 1884: 585 is the only scholar known to me who holds Herodotos wrong in denying that the new ships were used against Aigina before Marathon, cf. Doenges 1998: 3 who claims 'naval operations continuing apparently until the very eve of the Persian landing at Marathon.' Duncker 1888: 178 (ignoring Polyainos and Nikolaos but referring to Nepos in whom Korkyra is 'verschrieben' for Aigina) agrees with Holzapfel in that Themistokles defeated Aigina with the new fleet. But Duncker unfortunately puts bill A as late as 487, cf. n. 2 above.

32. How & Wells 1912: 101-102; Andrewes 1936/7: 7 new outbreak as late as in 482. Most scholars say new outbreak in 488/7, Busolt
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35. Cf. n. 7 above.
36. After the publication of AP, I have not found any scholar who like Herodotos and myself see the Aiginetan war as terminating before Marathon.
37. Labarbe 1957: 82 n. 4 is right in stating that 'la ponctuation d' Adolf Schmidt est la seule qui donne un sens acceptable.'
40. Thukyditides was no more modest than Josephus, whose Judaean war was 'the greatest of any wars on record between either citystates or nations,' W ar 1.1.1. For the polemic nature of Thukyditides' unitary-war thesis, cf. Strauss 1997.
41. Schmidt 1879: 11 Thukyditides 'will daher an dieser Stelle gar nichts weiter behaupten, als dass auch die athinische Flotte, selbst nach der Annahme des themistokleischen Antrags, noch lange Zeit in Bezug auf die Schiffconstruction hinter den Ansprüchen der Zeit, und namentlich hinter Sizilien und Kerkyra zurückblieb.'
42. Scholars follow Thukyditides 1.100 in dating the battle before 465. I have argued for the year 462, cf. Schreiner 1997: 38-49.
43. Against Gabrielsen 1994: 34.
44. e.g. Green, 1996: 57.
45. e.g. Hornblower 1991: comm. ad loc. Most recently Joyce 1999 n. 47. He is right in seeing, like LS s.v. ὑπάρχω, ὑπῆρκτο as an impersonal pluperfect passive. Ruschenbusch 2003: 8 aptly states that Joyce's 'Polemik gegen Jacoby ist nicht nur ungerechtfertigt, sondern darüber hinaus unerfreulich.'
46. The statement of Podlecki 1975: 7 that 'Themistocles' main activity during his year as archon was to begin the fortification of the Peiraeus, whose three natural harbours he discerned would be more serviceable as the port of Athens than the relatively open Bay of
Phaleron’ is a correct paraphrase of Thuk. 1.93.3-4. But on p. 203 n. 13 he surprisingly rejects this interpretation.

47. I imply that Themistokles agreed with those modern scholars who date the treasury and the pre-Parthenon in the 480s. For Delphi cf. e.g. Gauer 1968: 51-64; Amandry: 1998; for pre-Parthenon Drerup 1981, Boersma 1970: 38-39. The marble treasury at Delphi was something of a luxury since it replaced a sixth-century predecessor of poros, and the pre-Parthenon required immense foundation works. Kinzl 1977 takes the building activity as evidence of a false sense of security in Athens. I prefer the opposite stand, that the Athenians in a mood of awed anticipation and terror would spare no effort to ensure future aid from Athena and Apollo. The construction of temples was as much a defensive measure as the building of triremes and walls. Kinzl also sees the conduct of ostracism in 483/2 as a trivial matter in comparison with the threat of renewed war with Persia. I read it as a means to get rid of medizing traitors. Cf. Ch. VII below.
CHAPTER V

The Second Naval Bill of Themistokles

In the previous chapter, we saw that thanks not least to Themistokles’ naval bill \( A \) from the latter 490s, Athens possessed a substantial fleet in the year of Marathon. The role of that fleet in 490 is our obvious next theme. But in this chapter I prefer to stick to shipbuilding for a moment, dealing with Themistokles’ naval bill \( B \) of the 480s, before returning to the year 490 in the next chapter.

Our principal sources for bill \( A \) were Stesimbrotos, Herodotos and Nepos. Also recorded by Herodotos and Nepos is bill \( B \), which was carried after the adoption of Themistokles’ exposition of Apollo’s Wooden Wall oracle. Herodotos speaks of a need to expand the existing fleet by building new ships, whereas Nepos specifies the number of ships as 100. A shipbuilding scheme of such dimensions was not a matter of months, and sufficient time must be allowed to pass between the Wooden Wall oracle and the year of Salamis. Now scholars, erroneously dating the famous bill from the Aiginetan war as late as 483, imply that the Athenians were pre-occupied with shipbuilding in the following years. So they date the subsequent mission to Delphi, and the resolution to obey the god, as late as 481 or even 480.\(^1\) There was hardly time now before Artemision and Salamis even for constructing Herodotos’ undefined number of new ships, to say nothing of the 100 vessels of Nepos. We are thus told by some scholars that the new ships were not actually built but only planned for the future.\(^2\)

Herodotos states that after the defeat at Marathon, king Dareios began three years of preparations for a major campaign against Greece to exact vengeance, before his death in the fourth year (7.1,4). The Argives learned of the plans of ‘the king’ right
from the beginning and consulted Delphic Apollo. This was only a few years after their defeat by Kleomenes of Sparta in about 494 (7.148.2), and so ‘the king’ is Dareios rather than Xerxes after his accession in 486. The Spartans were the first of the Greeks to be informed of Xerxes’ planned invasion of Greece, warned from Susa by their ex-king Demaratos, and they too consulted Delphi (7.239, 220.3). The Athenians must have had a particular cause for fearing a Persian revenge after Marathon. They were in close contact with Delphi in these years, pleasing Apollo by replacing their former treasury of poros with the splendid one entirely in marble, and they would hardly have been tardier than the Spartans in consulting the oracle about their conduct. They are unlikely to have done so much later than, say, 485, and so there would be time enough from the Wooden Wall oracle to the battle of Salamis for a substantial shipbuilding programme. Even after the pre-Marathon Athenian shipbuilding scheme (bill $A$), many Greeks still feared that there were not ships enough to face the Persian invasion (7.138.2). After the Wooden Wall oracle, this was put right by bill $B$, the decision of the Athenians to mount a second shipbuilding programme (7.144.3).

A third important source after Herodotos and Nepos, and one that explicitly identifies Themistokles as the mover of our bill $B$, is Aristotle’s *Athenaion politeia*. The historical first part of that work is not a history of Athens but one of her constitution, from the original one under Ion to the one prevailing in the author’s own time, and in his Atthidographic sources he mainly searched for any ‘facts’ with a bearing on constitutional change. In ch. 41, he summarises all the changes, one of them being that after the Persian Wars the Areiopagos obtained the leadership, the next being Ephialtes’ reform, which deprived the Areiopagos of its power. In 23.1-2 we are told how the Areiopagos had acquired its ascendancy:
After the Persian Wars, the Areiopagos again acquired strength and was again in control of the public life. It acquired this leadership, not by formal decree, but in consequence of the fact that it had been responsible for the battle of Salamis. For when the strateges did not know how to deal with the emergency and made a public proclamation saying that everybody should care for his own safety, the council provided sufficient money to distribute eight drachmas to each man and so prevailed upon them to man the ships. For this reason the people held it in high repute, and during this period the public order in Athens was in an excellent state.

When Themistokles and the other strateges were at a loss as to what to do, the situation was saved by the Areiopagos. And not only was the credit for manning the ships in 480 due to the old council; some years previously it was the aristocracy who had constructed 100 of the ships which were to win the day at Salamis (22.7):

In the archonship of Nikodemos (483/2), when the mines in Maroneia came to light (ἐφαύνονε) and the state had a surplus of 100 talents from their exploitation, some men proposed to distribute the money among the people, but Themistokles prevented this. He did not tell what he would use the money for, but urged that it be lent to the 100 wealthiest citizens, a talent to each and then if their expenditure of it should be satisfactory, the state would bear the expense, but if not, the state could reclaim the money from the men to whom it had been lent. When he was granted the money on these terms, he had 100 triremes built, each of the 100 citizens building one of them. With these ships they fought at Salamis against the barbarians.

According to Xenophon (Vect. 4.2), everybody knew - and Aristotle will have been no exception - that the silver mines had been worked for a long time. For the Laureion area this is
confirmed by archaeology. But in 483/2 new mines came to light in Maroneia.4 The people honourably renounced taking the money from Maroneia themselves, and so great was their trust in their betters that they lent it to them, without the faintest idea of what the money was to be used for, since Themistokles did not utter a word about shipbuilding or a threat from Aigina, Persia or any other foe. The trust was not unfounded, for to a man the 100 aristocrats entrusted with the silver did their job so well that the result was another 100 ships to contribute to the victory at Salamis.

So far Aristotle and his source Androtion, who like his teacher Isokrates was a champion of the Areiopagos.5 But we learn from Plutarch that there existed a rival version6 of how the ships were manned for the battle of Salamis (Plut. Them. 10.4 = Kleidemos FGrHist 323 F 21):

At this moment the Athenians were without any public funds, and according to Aristotle it was the council of the Areiopagos which gave an advance of eight drachmas to each fighting man, and so was mainly instrumental in getting the triremes manned. However, Kleidemos claims that this, too, was achieved by a trick on Themistokles’ part. He says that as the Athenians were moving down to Piræus, the Gorgoneion was lost from the statue of the goddess. Themistokles, under the pretence of searching for it, ransacked everything and discovered large sums of money hidden away in the baggage; these were confiscated and served to provide ample subsistence for the men embarking on the ships.

‘This too’ was achieved by a clever trick of Themistokles according to Kleidemos who wrote his Atthis about 350, some ten years before Androtion. This means that also the previous trick just recorded by Plutarch must come from Kleidemos:7 when it was believed that the snake had disappeared from its sacred enclosure on the Akropolis, Themistokles instructed the priests to tell the people that Athena had abandoned her city and was showing them
their way to the sea, and thus he made the people pass his decree of evacuation. Under the evacuation of Athens, Themistokles invented an excuse for searching men's luggage and confiscating the money that he found, wealth that rich people apparently tried to hide away instead of making it available for public benefit. Favoring Themistokles, the historian Kleidemos has the Athenians evacuating to board the ships in Piraeus, not in the old harbour Phaleron. This may mean that Kleidemos agreed with Thukydides in having Themistokles initiating the fortification of Piraeus before Marathon. Attributing the glory for manning the ships before Salamis to Themistokles rather than to the aristocracy, Kleidemos will have painted the ascendancy of the Areiopagos in the period from Salamis to Ephialtes' reform in rather darker colours than did Androtion. In the choice between his two sources, Kleidemos and Androtion, Aristotle preferred the latter and his glorious Areiopagos constitution to the more hostile version of the former.

Of Ephialtes, the man who brought the ascendancy of the Areiopagos to its end, we would expect a positive judgement in Kleidemos and a negative one in Androtion. Aristotle's picture of Ephialtes is first friendly and smacking of Kleidemos. We learn that the Areiopagos had the leadership for seventeen years after the Persian Wars, and then (25.1-2):

As the common people grew in strength, Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, who had a reputation for incorruptibility and loyalty to the constitution, became the leader of the people and made an attack upon the Areiopagos. First he eliminated many of its members by bringing suit against them on the ground of administrative misconduct. Then, in the archonship of Konon (462/1) he deprived the council of all those prerogatives which it recently had acquired and which had made it the guardian of the state, and gave some of them to the council of 500, some to the people, and some to the law courts.
An honest and laudable Ephialtes restores the good old order by taking dishonest aristocrats to court and depriving the Areiopagos of power it had recently usurped. Expecting now to meet a righteous Perikles as Ephialtes' accomplice in his justified reform of the Areiopagos, we are somewhat amazed to read (25.3-4):

Ephialtes did this with the assistance of Themistokles who was a member of the Areiopagos and was about to be put on trial for treasonable dealings with Persia. For this reason Themistokles wished the Areiopagos to be destroyed, and therefore he told Ephialtes that the council was going to arrest him, while at the same time he told members of the Areiopagos that he would give information about certain persons who were conspiring to overthrow the constitution. Then he led selected members of the Areiopagos to a place where Ephialtes could be found, as if he were going to show them the conspirators who had assembled there, and conversed with them seriously. Ephialtes was dismayed when he saw this, and took refuge at an altar in only his undergarment. Everybody was amazed at what had happened, and afterwards when the council of 500 assembled, and later, before the assembly of the people, Ephialtes and Themistokles denounced (κατηγόρων) the Areiopagites again and again until they deprived them of their power.

A very different and unfriendly picture of Ephialtes. Again he seems to take individual members of the Areiopagos to court before his final assault upon the institution, acting with Themistokles as his consort, the villain who was about to be tried for medism and had only a personal motive for his sordid action. An honest Ephialtes collaborating with such a dark figure is odd. A more appropriate Ephialtes for such wicked company is the one of the hypothesis to the Areiopagitikes of Isokrates, the teacher of Androtion. The motive of this Ephialtes for the assault was that, like his accomplice Themistokles, he was in debt to the state. The date of the actions of the discreditable consorts against the
venerable old council is not, in this Androtion-smacking version, the 460s, with the final blow in 462/1, but the 470s, before the ostracism of Themistokles and at a time when Kimon, the chief of the better people, was still a rather young man (26.1).

Chronology was of course one of many issues disputed by the Atthidographers whom Aristotle used as his sources: 'most writers' dated the institution of the eponymous archon under king Medon, whereas 'others' said Akastos (3.3); 'some' dated Peisistratos' marriage to Argive Timonassa during his exile, whereas 'others' said while he was in power (17.4). For Ephialtes' reform we would have preferred the philosopher to follow Kleidemos with his friendly version and chronology or Androtion with his hostile version and chronology - instead of following first Kleidemos and then Androtion. What, then, about Perikles, the likely accomplice of Ephialtes in the version of Kleidemos (and of Aristotle himself in Pol. 1274a 7-8)? Perikles' action against the Arei­pagos is curiously transplanted to the 450s (27.1), but the philosopher would hardly have welcomed being pressed for a more precise date and substance of Perikles' act.

Kleidemos and Androtion disagreed about the mode and date of the reform that put an end to the leadership of the Arei­pagos. They also disagreed about how the whole fleet had been manned right before Salamis, and there is no reason why they should have agreed about the mode and date of the construction of new ships some time prior to the battle. There is no knowing that, like (probably) Androtion as reproduced in AP, Kleidemos dated the bill in Nikodemos' archonship 483/2, or that in the narrative of this Atthidographer, the shipbuilding was brilliantly effected by the 100 richest citizens and financed from a new mine opened at Maroneia. But we may be confident that both of these patriotic historians attributed to their own city the lion's part of the glory for the Salamis victory and that they had the Athenians mustering more ships than just the 100 triremes of AP 22.7. So if the pre-Marathon bill A of 100 ships is missing from Aristotle,
whose exclusive concern was constitutional change, it will certainly have been recorded by Kleidemos and Androtion (as well as by the other Attidographers). Dealing with constitutional change, the philosopher concentrated on the building of the ships that, jointly with their manning, in Androtion's version legitimated the predominance of the Areiopagos after the Persian Wars. Aristotle is not to be blamed for the fact that modern scholars writing after the recovery of *AP* unanimously and erroneously identify the bill of the year 483/2 (*AP* 22.7) with the previous bill *A* from the days of the pre-Marathon war with Aigina. As stated in Ch. IV, for historical truth we have to turn to good old scholars from pre-*AP* days.

**Polyainos** (1.30.6) gives much the same story as Aristotle:

> During the war with Aigina, when the Athenians were about to divide the income from the silver mines, 100 talents, Themistokles prevented them and persuaded them to give a talent each to the 100 wealthiest men. If what was done proved satisfactory, the expenditure would be counted among the city’s expenses, but if it did not, the men would return the money. This proposal was approved. The 100 men each hurriedly outfitted a trireme, beautiful and fast. The Athenians were delighted at having made a new fleet, and they used these triremes not only against the Aiginetans, but also against the Persians. (Transl. Krentz & Wheeler 1994)

Unlike the Themistokles of Aristotle, the one of Polyainos does not say that Themistokles persuaded the Athenians to lend the 100 talents to the wealthiest citizens without indicating that shipbuilding was what it was all about; but this was probably Polyainos' idea, since he records the story as a clever stratagem by Themistokles. In its original version, the fanciful story presupposes that, like in Aristotle, no war with Aigina or any other state was going on, for otherwise Themistokles must necessarily have referred to that war if he wanted to persuade the Athenians. So Polyainos has combined Androtion’s bill *B* of the warless year
483/2 with bill A from the pre-Marathon Aiginetan war. We are often told that Aristotle is Polyainos' source here. More probably, Polyainos derived Androtion's (?) fanciful story from an intermediary source other than Aristotle. At least he did not use AP for his account of Peisistratos (1.21.1), but plausibly gives to the tyrant just one exile and one return. This was the correct version of the Aithidographers; as stated above, these historians disagreed on the chronology of the tyranny, 'some' dating the marriage of Peisistratos to Argive Timonassa during his exile, and 'others' while he was in possession of power (AP 17.4). One of them said that Peisistratos was exiled in the sixth year after he seized power and returned in the twelfth after that, while another preferred exile in the seventh year and return in the eleventh. Following Herodotos (1.59-62), who gives to the tyrant two spells of exile and two returns, Aristotle here in ch. 14-15, as in ch. 25, makes a mess of all chronology by duplicating the two historians, adding 6+12 years to 7+11. Wisely failing to use AP as his source for Peisistratos' tyranny, Polyainos is no more likely to derive his report of Themistokles' bill B from that curious piece of literature.

In this chapter I have argued that like Nepos, Herodotos attributed to Themistokles a second naval bill in the 480s; but unlike the Roman historian, he did not specify the number of new ships as 100. The year of the second bill was possibly as late as 483/2, a time when the Aiginetan war had been history for years and the invasion of Xerxes was imminent. The victory of Salamis was conditioned by the existence of these additional Athenian triremes and the collaboration of the former enemies Athens and Aigina.
1. Robertson 1987: 3, 12 has the oracle in mid-481, and in n. 4 he quotes scholars who even say 480. Cf. bibliography in Green 1996: 295 n. 3 and Hamel 1998: 173 n. 5, 7. How & Wells 1912: 186 saw the problem, asking: 'But was there time to build more ships?' Labarbe 1957: 123 finds time for 15-20 ships in the second programme.

2. Cf. Ch. IV, n. 22.

3. Justinus 2.10 has it that Dareios died while preparing an invasion of Greece, and that Xerxes planned his expedition for five years.

4. For the location, cf. Labarbe 1957: 24-37; Rhodes 1981: 278. Labarbe 37: 'La faute initiale commise par la critique a été d'assimiler les 100 trières de Plutarque aux 100 trières d'Aristote. On doit abandonner l'idée que, chez ces auteurs, le revenu du Laurion et le revenu de Maronée seraient une seule et même chose. Il s'agit, dans un cas, de la somme qu'avait donnée le district ancien et, dans l'autre, de celle que l'État, continuant à user de son droit royal, venait de retirer pour la première fois d'un district nouveau.'

5. Jacoby 1949: 75 AP 23 is 'almost certainly following Androtion'; cf. Chambers 1993: 42, against Harding 1977: 153 n. 51; Rhodes 1981: 289. I feel more confident that AP 23.1-2 is from Androtion than AP 22.7 with its record of a clever trick by Themistokles, reminding of his tricks in Kleidemos, cf. below. But in 22.7 the rich people come out with so much more credit than in Kleidemos F 21 that it is hard to imagine Kleidemos as its source.

6. Jacoby's theory of political bias in the Athidographers is maintained by e.g. Malitz (p. 144) after the paper of Rhodes 1990; McInerney: 1994; Hornblower OCD³: 714. Harding is the standardbearer of the opposite school. He (1977: 153) finds that the difference between Kleidemos F 21 and AP 'might be more imagined than real.' The Androtion of Harding had scholarly concern for accuracy of detail. Cf. Piccirilli 1988: 81; Rhodes 1990; Ostwald 1993: 142. Meister 1994: 121-123 gives a useful review of the discussion. A third version of how the ships were manned is given in the Themistokles Decree, which charges the council and strateges to provide the money.
8. Chambers 1990: 259 states that Aristotle combines two sources with different chronologies but he emends the text in 26.1 to get away with Kimon's youth (p. 262). Rhodes 1981 is confident that the story of Themistokles and Ephialtes is a later insertion not contained in the original version (pp. 53-55), 'a late addition to the text of A.P., probably a deliberate revision made by the Aristotelian school rather than an interpolation made by a later reader in his own copy (p. 283).’ As for Kimon's youth in 26.1, it is misapplied to the period after Ephialtes' reform (p. 326) and Perikles' attack on the Areiopagos in 27.1 is a misunderstanding of a source (p. 335). Better to use Occam's razor and explain the oddities by claiming that Aristotle was clumsily trying to combine his discordant sources. An amusing statement about the Ephialtes-Themistokles story: 'It is precisely because the story is at first sight so confusing that we should value it as evidence,' Jones 1987: 63.
9. Ktesias FGrHist 688 F 13, 26 gives to the Athenians 110 of the 700 Greek ships, Thukydides 1.74.1 says a little less than two-thirds of 400 ships, whereas Demosthenes 19.238 puts the number at 200 out of 300. Andokides 3.5 seems to think of only 100 ships.
10. e.g. Podlecki 1975: 201; Rhodes 1981: 277.
12. Cf. Schreiner 1981. The A.P chronology has caused much scholarly headache, cf. the eight pages of discussion in Rhodes 1981: 191-199. In this case Rhodes saves the A.P author not by claiming a later insertion in his text but by 'correcting' it, blaming the mess on later copyists. Chambers 1990: 200-204 does not think of two discordant sources here as in A.P 25; like most scholars, he decides for two exiles and two returns of Peisistratos, emending the text. Jacoby 1949: 193-194 'Actually out of seven numbers relating to intervals five must be altered' (p. 194). But even after having created his own personal text by changing five of the seven figures, Jacoby still did not manage to get away with the mess. The error is certainly with Jacoby, not the copyists. The great scholar acutely detected the political bias of the Attidographers but he failed to accept their controversy over chronology. Two exiles and two returns of Peisistratos are claimed for the Attidographers as for Herodotos by
Maddoli 1994: 143. The complicated theory of Piccirilli 1988: 77-90 is that Aristotle combines two different chronological schemes; in addition to the high chronology, Piccirilli assumes ‘un tipo di cronologia ‘bassa’, la quale si differenziava de quella ‘alta’ per uno scarto di dieci anni.’ As for my interpretation of the AP chronology, ‘È superfluo sottolineare come tali ipotesi abbiano scarso fondamento.’ A further Italian contribution to the scholarly headache is Micalella 1983.
CHAPTER VI

The Phantom Battle of Phaleron

I suppose that many scholars would ask with Henderson, 'Why did the Persians retreat from Phaleron without striking a blow?' For my part, I could hardly imagine, even lacking the slightest bit of literary or epigraphical evidence, that the Persians actually failed to strike a blow, or that the Athenians failed to prepare for battle once the Persian fleet, after doubling Cape Sounion, appeared off Phaleron for an attack upon their city. I take Athenian resistance for granted, by infantry and by the fleet consisting of the 70 triremes that sailed against Paros the next year while other vessels undoubtedly guarded the coast. Does any evidence exist for the surmised engagement? Our principal source for the aftermath of Marathon is Herodotos 6.115-116:

In this way the Athenians captured seven ships. With the rest of the fleet, the barbarians embarked, and after picking up the Eretrian prisoners from the island where they had left them, rounded Cape Sounion, because they wished to get to Athens in advance of the Athenian army. There was a slander prevalent in Athens that they got this idea from a contrivance of the Alkmaionidai. It was said that the Alkmaionidai, in accord with a covenant they had made with the Persians, raised a shield as a signal to them when they were already on board. While the Persian fleet rounded Sounion, the Athenians, rushing with all speed to defend their city, reached it before the barbarians came, and encamped, moving from one sanctuary of Herakles - the one at Marathon - to another, the one at Kynosarges. The barbarians anchored off Phaleron (at that time the harbour of Athens) and, after riding at anchor there for a while, they sailed back to Asia.
As stated in Ch. I, it is surprising that the Persians, despite their hurry to get to Athens before the Athenians, should waste time in picking up the Eretrian captives from the island. Unlike Herodotos’ Mardonios, who did disembark his troops at Phaleron in 479 (9.32.2), his Datis in 490 just sailed away - though not, apparently, frightened off by Athenian ships in Piraeus or Phaleron, or by the report of 2,000 Spartan hoplites approaching. The cause of the retreat was rather the speedy marathonomachoi who had reached the city and had set up camp at Kynosarges. A generation later, the helmet and spear of Athena Promakhos on the Akropolis (allegedly financed by a tithe from the battle of Marathon, Paus. 1.8.2) may have been visible from ships off Phaleron, but even sharp-sighted Argos would have been hard put to it to discern hoplites encamped in the 4 kms distant suburb of Kynosarges. If Herodotos’ version fails to convince, we turn to Frontinus (Str. 2.9.8) who likewise has the Persians sailing for Athens after the battle of Marathon:

When Miltiades had defeated a huge host of Persians at Marathon, and the Athenians were losing time in rejoicing over the victory, he forced them to hurry to bear aid to the city, at which the Persian fleet was aiming. Having thus got ahead of the enemy, he filled the walls with warriors, so that the Persians, thinking that the number of the Athenians was enormous and that they themselves had met one army at Marathon while another was now confronting them on the walls, straightaway turned their vessels about and laid their course for Asia.

To men aboard ships off Phaleron, soldiers posted upon the walls of Athens would hardly have been more discernible than hoplites encamped outside the walls at Kynosarges. In Frontinus the time wasters were not the Persians who picked up prisoners but the marathonomakhoi who at Marathon were rejoicing over their victory. So the Persians of Frontinus may have had time for an
undisturbed landing at Phaleron. But we would have liked the author to be more explicit if indeed he meant to say that it was after disembarking in Phaleron and advancing upon Athens that the Persians became aware of the warriors on the walls. In any case, there are no more subsequent land or sea battles in Frontinus than in Herodotos.\textsuperscript{2} The saving of Athens was again due to Miltiades and his sturdy hoplites from Marathon.

The Suda gives a somewhat different version. Unfortunately, we are not told in the brief entry \textit{khoris hippēis} that it was for a voyage to Phaleron and a frontal attack on Athens that Datis embarked his forces. But as stated in Ch. II, his \textit{apokhoresīs} smacks of a retreat the way he had come, by sea. Having set out from Marathon already before Miltiades' battle \textit{B}, such a Datis will have arrived at Phaleron before the return of the marathonomakhoi, in time to land and attempt an assault on the city. Unlike the Datis of Herodotos who returned safely to Asia after his ill-starred expedition (6.119), the one of Ktesias, whom we only know from the abridged version of Photios, was killed in the battle of Marathon, the Athenians refusing to restore his body to the Persians (fGrHist 688 F 13, 22).\textsuperscript{3} It could be that the Datis of Ktesias' own full account, like the one of the Suda, had left Marathon before Miltiades' battle \textit{B}, only falling after a voyage around Sounion and a landing at Phaleron (like the Spartan commander Ankhimolios in c. 512 who was buried near the Kynosarges Herakleion, Hdt. 5.63). And the fall of their commander may, in the original full Ktesias, have caused the Persians to give up the fight, like they did after the death of Mardonios at Plataiai in 479 (Hdt. 9.63). But this is just guesswork.

The Persians of modern scholars mostly resemble those of Herodotos and Frontinus in setting off for Asia without even attempting a landing at Phaleron.\textsuperscript{1} The exceptions are Maas\textsuperscript{5} and Raubitschek.\textsuperscript{6} The former claimed an engagement at Kynosarges, whereas the latter held that the Persians did try to land, but now the marathonomakhoi had hurried from Marathon back to Athens
and Phaleron, where on the shore of the sea they forced the Persians to turn back. It was a feat by the army alone, Maas and Raubitschek assigning no role to the Athenian navy. But the obvious question is posed by Kinzl: ‘Why is it that the Athenian fleet (numbering no less than seventy …) - with rare consistency among our sources (and their modern counterparts) - is at least as chorís as the notorious hippeis of the invaders?’ From Herodotos who ventures to deny that the new navy of Themistokles’ bill A was used against Aigina before Marathon (and surpresses its use by Miltiades against islands other than Aigina in 489), we cannot expect a report of its use right after Marathon. But as we have seen, the pre-Marathon expedition of Themistokles against Aigina with the new fleet is happily recorded by Polyainos and Nikolaos of Myra, whereas not one preserved author reports seamen and footsoldiers jointly hampering and repelling a Persian assault on Athens from Phaleron. Themistokles is likely to have had a hand in such assumed naval operations. Now Plutarch is inconsistent about Themistokles’ whereabouts in 490, having him participating at Marathon at Arist. 5.4 (like Iustinus 2.9.15), but at Them. 3.4 dubbing him pretty young at the time and afterwards jealous of the success of Miltiades, the impression now being that Themistokles did not take part in the battle. If Themistokles’ presence at Marathon can be questioned, and if it is hard to imagine him being idle in 490, then some naval activity suggests itself. But sad to say, any such activity by Themistokles, and any military engagement at Phaleron or closer to Athens is unattested in the vitae of Themistokles by Nepos or Plutarch, or in our entire literary record.

The only possible evidence for our missing engagements is that used by Raubitschek and Maas, namely the so-called Marathon epigrams in the Agora museum at Athens (IG I 1’ 503/504, ML 26). Two epigrams are inscribed on a block of which two parts have long been known, the so-called Block I. The nature of the monument has been in dispute: obviously the top course of a base, but
for herms, statues, reliefs or casualty lists? In 1988 Matthaiou opened a new phase in the study of the monument with his publication of a new Block III. We now see that the top layer consisted of at least four contiguous blocks. Of Block II on the right side of Block I, we only have a tiny fragment published by Peek in 1953; and nothing remains of IV to the right of Matthaiou's Block III. (There may even have been one block or more outside Block IV.) The long base supported at least three large stelai anchored into cuttings in the top surface centered over the joints. The cuttings are 17 cm from the edge of the stone, for stelai 68 cm wide and 20 cm thick. Nothing is preserved of the stelai. They were perhaps among the stones from public graves that in the early 470s were taken as building material for the city wall (Thuk. 1.90.3). Hidden within the wall, the stelai might have had a chance of survival, like many items on display in the museums today. But no trace of them exists.

Barron must be right in arguing that we have to do with a funerary monument from the Demosion Sema in the Kerameikos. A fragment of a vase gives a glimpse of such a monument. Upon a base which may be barely discernible on the sherd, at least five
stelai were erected, one of them recording casualties 'in Byzan(tion)'.

The vase painting may have shown ten stelai, one to a tribe, like the case of the monument of 460 BC to which the casualty list of the Erekhtheis (177 fallen in three columns) belonged (IG I 1 1147 = ML 33). Or the vase showed no more stelai than the five we see, the dead of two tribes being listed on each stele as in the Koroneia monument (IG I 1 1163). In years without that many war dead deserving of a state burial, a single slab could suffice for all ten tribes (IG I 1 1162 = ML 48, with 58 fallen in two columns; cf. Paus. 1.29.11). Returning now to our monument, stelai 68 cm wide in the bottom and slightly narrowing towards the top (but of unknown height) will have been wide enough for three or even four columns of inscribed names. Three stelai may have sufficed for listing the substantial number of casualties from all tribes, but there may have been more stelai than the three attested. They will have indicated the locations where the men had fallen, like 'in Byzan(tion)' on the vase sherd and 'in Khersonesos' and 'in Byzantion' in ML 48. Some geographical designation may recur in the epigram inscribed below; in ML 48, only the Hellespont is
recorded, whereas the four localities Euboia, Khios, Asia Minor and Sicily were given in the epitaph of the monument mentioned by Pausanias 1.29.11. No locality is indicated, however, in the epitaph contained on the base IG I' 1163, a monument commonly associated with the battle of Koroneia in 446 BC. But since no geographical designation has survived in the fragments we have of four of the stelai, the monument has alternatively been ascribed to the battle of Delion in 424. The stelai belonging to our monument from the Persian Wars are totally lost, and what is preserved of the epigrams on the base is frustratingly vague about locations. On the long-known Block I, two elegiac couplets are inscribed on the original smooth band which ran around the face of the base, at the extreme left-hand end of the monument:

ἀνδρὸν τὸν ἄτετε[

[...

]...

νεμοςι θεο[...

]

έχει ἡλι[...

]

[...

]

дей νεο]

The valour of these men will shine as a light imperishable forever
No matter to whom the deeds of war the gods may grant success
For they on foot and on swift-faring ships
Kept all Greece from seeing a day of slavery.
(transl. Meritt 1962: 296)

The crucial words for our purpose, 'and on swift-faring ships', are only restored by comparison with what is almost certainly a fourth-century copy of the epigram. More couplets will have followed to the right on the same original band, whether a continuation of the poem or separate epigrams. But there is no knowing if the locations of the deeds of 'these men' were indicated in the lost distichs that followed.
Later, as it seems, a new panel was smoothed on the blocks in the previously stippled area below the upper band to receive other couplets:

Block I:
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{ἐν ἁρὰ τοῖσι ἀδαμ[άς ἐν στέθει θυμός] ἢτ' αἴχμέν} \\
&\text{στέσαμι πρόθε πυλῶν ἀντία μυρίασιν} \\
&\text{ἀνχαλοῦ πρέσαι β[ολευσαμένον ἐρυκές]} \\
&\text{ἀντυ βίαι Περσῶν κλινάμενοι [στρατιάν]} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Block II:
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{[--- --- --- -πε ζοῦ τε καὶ ---]} \\
&\text{--- --- --- --- ---} \\
&\text{--- --- --- --- --- o νέσαι} \\
&\text{--- --- --- --- --- -βαλού} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Block III:
\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{héρκος γὰρ προπάροιθεν} \quad --- --- --- \\
&\text{της--- ---μὲν Παλλάδος ἱππο---} \\
&\text{οὐθαρ δ' ἀπείρο πορτατρόφо ἀκρον ἐχουτες} \\
&\text{τοῖσι μαθαλὲς ὀλβὸς ἐπιστρε[φεῖτα]} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The fragmentary two couplets on Block I seem to refer back to 'the valour of these men' in the first line of the poem above. While the upper poem commemorates the achievements of the infantry in general and the fleet, those honoured here seem to be hoplites who fell 'when spear was poised in front of the gates in the face of [---] [who wished] to burn the sea-girt [---] city, turning back by force the Persian [power].' Of the two couplets following on the lost Block II, little more is preserved than |balon of the second line, which continued on Block III adjacent to the right. Then on Block III we seem to read a specification of the deeds recorded earlier in the poem on Block II, herkos gar proparaithen probably meaning 'for they put up defence before the city.' Again as in the
original inscription above, we cannot tell whether this secondary
inscription hewn below it was one long epitaph or several separate
poems. For our purpose, it is frustrating that herkos gar
proparoithen on Block III is no more geographically informative
than prosthē pylon on Block I.

We were often told, before it became clear that the base
was one for stelai, not for herms etc., that the secondary epigram,
with spears poised in front of the gates, refers to Marathon, some
40 kms distant. But the fallen marathonomakhoi were buried in
the battlefield, not in the Demosion Sema in Kerameikos. Being
buried in the same grave, the men honoured in the epitaphs must
all have fallen in the same campaigning season of the Persian
Wars. The question is: what year?

Excluding Marathon, Mykale, and Salamis plus Plataiai,
Barron ends up with ‘All for Salamis’ and the year 480. The men of
the secondary epitaph who poised spear prosthē pylon to hinder
the sea-girt asty from being burnt, were in Barron’s view those
who in 480 bravely refused to evacuate the city on Xerxes’
approach and remained to save Athens from destruction. But
according to Herodotos (8.51), those who did remain in Athens
stayed up on the Akropolis, which they fortified by a wooden
palisade. They can hardly have poised spear prosthē pylon in an
unsuccessful attempt to hinder the Persians from burning the city.
The men honoured in the original epitaph who fought ‘as
footsoldiers and on swift-faring ships’ were more likely the seamen
who in 490 manned the fleet that had been expanded by
Themistokles’ pre-Marathon bill A and the footsoldiers of the
home guard who stayed behind when the army marched out to
Marathon. They fell in battle on land and sea when Datis
disembarked his troops at Phaleron for a frontal assault on Athens.
Some Persians may have got through to the Kynosarges area, and
by that time some victorious marathonomakhoi may have returned
from Marathon for the defence of the city and have sustained
losses in an engagement outside the gates. In the first place, a
funerary monument was erected with elegiac verses inscribed on
the original smooth band of the base, honouring all the fallen -
both ship crews, footsoldiers of the home guard, and
returning marathonomakhoi. Later a band was smoothed under­
neath the original inscription, and secondary couplets were added,
not because more fallen had been found and been buried in the
grave, but with a view to bestowing particular honour on those of
the dead who were hoplites and had met their destiny outside the
walls of Athens. These spearmen had failed to win immortal fame
by falling at Marathon and having like heroes and aristocrats of the
past, an old-fashioned tomb raised above their graves, with their
names inscribed on the monument. The secondary inscription was
hardly made many years after the first, and so it seems that
already from a date well before the Stoa Poikile painting of the late
460s, the hoplites were singled out as having fulfilled an
extraordinary role in the year of Marathon.

This cannot be other than guesswork until one of the lost
stelai is recovered, with for example a 'these men fell at Phaleron
and Kynosarges,' or until another neos lithos from the base is
found, its elegiac verses giving precise geographical designations.
As it is, despite the epitaph's (restored) wording 'as footsoldiers
and on swift-faring ships' I do not pretend that the funerary
monument provides irrefutable evidence and sturdy proof of the
fighting I am claiming. But by no stretch of imagination can I
accept that Themistokles' fleet failed to raise a finger the moment
the Persians came sailing around Cape Sounion to Phaleron.

A final problem: the use of the new fleet by Themistokles
against Aigina and other islands before Marathon is attested in
sources other than Herodotos, whereas any participation by him in
presumed naval actions at Phaleron after Marathon is unknown
from any source. If we are right in thinking that with the new fleet,
Themistokles did play a significant role before as well as after
Marathon, how could it then be that the command in the
subsequent naval expedition against Paros and other islands was
given to Miltiades rather than to him? A personal rivalry between the two men is suggested by Stesimbrotos, and a contest may have taken place in the assembly about the command. Here the triumph of Miltiades at Marathon will have carried more weight with the citizens than the achievements of Themistokles. Guesswork again, but what is the alternative when the sources desert us?

NOTES

1. Henderson 1932: 302, cf. Currius 1874: 25 'Was nun aber die Perser veranlasste, von jedem Versuche der Landung abzusehen, ist schwer zu entrathseln.' I quote some answers, Wecklein 1876: 277 'die Annaherung der Spartaner' made Datis withdraw; Burn 1962: 252 'when their leading ships arrived at Phaleron, it was only to see the spearmen of Marathon facing them again.' In the florid parlance of Green 1996: 38 'The reappearance of the Marathon warriors - grim, indomitable, caked with dust and sweat and dried blood - not only gave Datis pause for thought; ...' Obst 1932: 1694 has the Persians sailing to Phaleron already before the battle of Marathon, for after the battle the voyage would have been 'absurd und aussichtslos'.

2. No fighting could be expected in Plut. Arist. 5.3 where the Persians double Cape Sounion not by intent but under compulsion of wind and wave. Doenges 1998: 16 has it that Datis' 'purpose almost certainly was reconnaissance only. He wished to survey the bay of Phaleron and the defenses of the city with the intent of reporting back to Darius.'

3. Cagnassi: 1999 is a healthy attempt at an Ehrenrettung of Ktesias.

4. e.g. Bengtson 1960: 159 n. 2 'Dass Kampfhandlungen stattgefunden haben ... ist nicht overliefert und kaum wahrscheinlich.' Hammond 1973: 226 is able to report that the Persians arrived off Phaleron about 5.30 p.m.


7. Kinzl 1977: 214 n. 85. In Der kleine Pauly, s.v. Themistokles, Kinzl has not a word about the fleet in 490, and Hammond 1973: 218 states that ‘the Persian fleet was not challenged by Eretria and Athens; it had complete thalassocracy wherever it sailed.’ Cf. Wallinga 1993: 139 in 490 ‘none of the poleis attacked could mobilize its naval forces. The tradition evidently did not preserve any memory of such a thing being proposed or even contemplated.’


9. Calabi Limentani 1964: liii, 23 with reference to the discussion about whether Themistokles participated at Marathon.


15. So e.g. Amandry 1960; Vidal-Naquet 1986: 90; Welwei 2000:188.


17. Plut. Aris. 5.4 cannot be right in stating that the city was left empty of defenders when the army marched to Marathon.

18. Strauss 2000 argues convincingly that also sailors were buried in the Demosion Sema. Plato Menex. 234c, states that even the poor were honoured with a state burial.


20. Against Vidal-Naquet 1986: 92 who states that the second poem was ‘undeniably inscribed in the time of Cimon, around 465,’ whereas the first poem ‘doubtless describes the second Persian War.’ He might have left some room for doubt.
CHAPTER VII

Conclusion: Sources and Facts

_Herodotos versus Ephoros and Nepos_

In Ch. I, I questioned the common notion that Herodotos is our best source for the battle of Marathon. This book is to a large extent a defence of the secondary sources, at the expense of Herodotos. The theory is that much non-Herodotean matter in Cornelius Nepos and other secondary sources somehow derives from Ephoros, who wrote his lost *Universal History* in about 340 BC, and that he in his turn drew upon earlier literature, and possibly on oral tradition as well. Our only fragment of Ephoros which allows a direct comparison with Herodotos unfortunately does not concern Marathon or, directly, the naval policy of Themistokles, but the expedition of Miltiades against Paros shortly after Marathon (FGrHist 70 F 63).* We shall first discuss the diverging versions of the expedition of Herodotos and Ephoros, before dealing with the debt of Nepos to Ephoros.

_Herodotos* (6.132-136) relates that shortly after his triumph at Marathon, Miltiades, with a promise to obtain much gold for the Athenians, induced them to give him 70 ships for an expedition against a target known only to him. He attacked Paros, ostensibly because the Parians had sent one trireme to help the Persian war-effort at Marathon but in fact because of a private grudge against the Parian Lysagoras who had reported ill of him to Hydarnes the Persian (and who may have had some hand in the medism of Paros). Miltiades began a siege of Paros, demanding 100 talents. But refusing to yield, the Parians in one night doubled the height of the wall where it was most assailable. So far the version of all
the Greeks, Herodotos says; in the following, he will give the
version of the Parians. When he was unable to get anywhere with
the siege, Miltiades was approached by a woman prisoner called
Timo who was a priestess of the earth goddesses Demeter and
Kore. On her advice, he made his way to the shrine of Demeter
Thesmophoros on the hill in front of the city. Finding the door to
the precinct wall locked, he jumped over and made for the shrine,
intent on some sort of sacrilege which Herodotos is unable to
specify. But when he reached the door a sudden panic came upon
him, and he ran back. In jumping the wall, he fell and twisted his
thigh, or as others say, smashed his knee. He now returned empty­
handed to Athens, all he had achieved after 26 days of siege being
to destroy the crops in the countryside. The Parians wanted to
punish Timo and asked Delphi if they were right in putting her to
death for her treachery and for revealing to Miltiades the mys­
teries which no man was allowed to know. Pythia answered that
Timo was not guilty of these crimes, but Miltiades was destined to
end badly. She had only been his guide into trouble. So far, it
seems, the Parian version, and henceforth the one of the Athenians
or all the Greeks. On his return to Athens, Miltiades became
the talk of the city, and Xanthippos brought him to trial for de­
ceiving the people, proposing the death penalty. Miltiades was
present at the trial but was incapable of speaking in his own
defence because of his gangrened leg. His friends spoke for him,
reminding the Athenians of his his victory at Marathon and his
earlier conquest of Lemnos, which he had handed over to the
Athenians. The proposed death penalty was rejected and he was
given a fine of 50 talents. Soon afterwards he died of his wound,
and his son Kimon paid the fine.

The idea of the citizens entrusting Miltiades with a fleet of
70 ships on which many of them would themselves be sailing,
without any inkling of the destination, is scarcely more credible
than that in 483, rather than receiving some drachmas themselves,
they should have handed over 100 talents to the richest people
CONCLUSION: SOURCES AND FACTS

without the faintest idea that they were to build 100 ships (AP 22.7).¹ And one wonders how Herodotos could be familiar with Miltiades' purely personal motive for the raid. The contrast of the common version told by all (!) the Greeks with what was stated by the Parians alone is meant to inspire confidence but Fehling aptly asks how it could be that Herodotos was constantly capable of citing the inhabitants of the places in which events occurred, the ones who ought to know best.² As for one Parian version that Miltiades injured his thigh, against others who said his knee, Fehling comments that 'such slight variation is tantamount to the agreement of two separate sources and at the same time serves to demonstrate the author's own painstaking accuracy.'³ The true motive of Miltiades, and whatever else Herodotos does report, is presented as the plain truth, and should he be ignorant of something, like the nature of Miltiades' intended sacrilege at the sanctuary of Demeter, he confesses his ignorance. Now thigh versus knee, like the professed want of knowledge about the sacrilege, do have an air of literary tricks, but we cannot rule out the possibility that Herodotos had actually heard a Parian version, one he prefers because it gave a supernatural explanation for the failure of Miltiades, pointing a moral acceptable to his mind. To some readers, the precise duration of 26 days of the siege looks like genuine historic tradition,⁴ whereas Fehling would retort that preference for precise numbers is based on the principle that the detail makes for credibility.⁵

Herodotos' first presentation of Miltiades starts in a minor key, with Miltiades establishing himself as tyrant of the Thracian Khersonesos by an unsympathetic ruse. But so dear did he soon become to the inhabitants that they fetched him back once when he had to flee from his principality (6.39-40). In Book Four, Herodotos has applauded Miltiades' counsel to the Greeks to break up the bridge over the Danube on the advice of the Skythians, thus liberating Ionia from Persian sway (4.137). Foreshadowing Themistokles, the victor of Salamis who ended up in Persian service,
Metiokhos, the son of the victor of Marathon, was brought to Persia where the king presented him with a house and property and a Persian wife (6.41.4). This was hardly flattering for the family, but Miltiades himself in words and acts personated the great champion of freedom at Marathon, and Herodotos has composed an eloquent speech for him: 'It is now in your hands, Kallimakhos, either to enslave Athens, or to make her free and to leave behind you for all future generations a memory more glorious than even Harmodios and Aristogeiton left ...' The speech prevailed, and by the vote of Kallimakhos the decision to fight was made. But the glory of the victory certainly belonged to Miltiades rather than to the polemarch, and no role whatsoever was fulfilled by the fleet. The hoplite battle of Marathon denoted the culmination of the career of the Herodotean Miltiades, greatly enhancing his already high reputation. But 'the admonition that all that is too high and too mighty must fall runs through the entire Histories as their most important leitmotiv,' for when he was making no progress in the siege in Paros, he intended, on the counsel of the priestess Timo, to commit an act of gross impiety against Demeter and was punished by her for his hybris with a serious injury. Pythia declared that Timo was not guilty of treason but that it was Miltiades' destiny to die, like Kandaules, king of Sardis and Skyles, king of the Skythians, we may add (1.8.2, 4.79.1).

The apt statements of Blösel about the Herodotean picture of Themistokles are no less valid for Miltiades: 'A curious ambivalence characterizes Herodotus' tales about him; we see Themistokles now as upright champion of Greek liberty, now as unscrupulous egoist ... While Herodotus' tales do not condemn Themistokles utterly, neither do they praise him without exception. Rather, not only do they know the white and the black, but they are quite familiar with all the intermediate shades of grey as well. This mixture of contrary opinions must in my view be the result of Herodotus' shaping of the source material available to him.'
In their defence of Miltiades in the trial in Athens, his friends will have presented a flattering version of his general loyalty to the polis and his role at Marathon, likely to have raised the eyebrows of any relatives and friends of Kallimakhos present. The defence was probably the first presentation of the Marathon myth, whereas the notion that Miltiades’ motive for the raid on Paros was a private grudge against Lysagoras may derive from the speech of Xanthippos in prosecuting Miltiades for defrauding the people with an empty-handed return after promises of an abundance of gold. Could Lysagoras have been a friend of Xanthippos and the Alkmaionidai?

Stephanos of Byzantion s.v. Paros explains the verb anaparaiazein by a quote from Book Ten of Ephoros:

Miltiades landed on some of the other islands and sacked them; then for a long time besieged Paros, the richest and biggest of the Kyklades, cutting off its supplies from the sea and moving forth the siege train. As the walls were about to break and surrender had been agreed on, a forest fire broke out on Mykonos. The Parians, assuming that this was a beacon-signal from Datis, called off the negotiations and refused to give the town over to Miltiades. It is said that it is from this we use the saying ἀναπαραίαζειν about those who call off the negotiations.

Here Stephanos’ quote of Ephoros breaks off. With Kinzl, Ephoros’ narrative can tentatively be supplemented with four scholia on Aelius Aristides For the four* in which Ephoros is not referred to by name: Miltiades’ object was to bring the islands back under the Athenians (Σ 232,2); he attacked Paros for having given aid to the Persians or for having defected from its allegiance to the Athenians (Σ 177,2; in Σ hyp. Milt., Paros was held by the Persians). During the siege Miltiades, approaching the sanctuary of Demeter near the city wall tainted with enemy blood, was
wounded in his thigh by a shot which he assumed was sent by the
goddess, and in religious fear he returned empty-handed to Athens
(Σ 177,2; 232,2). He was accused of treason and sentenced to a
fine of 50 (Σ 177,2) or 40 talents (Σ hyp. Milt. 244,3) and thrown
into prison, and there he died. The fine was paid by his son Kimon
(Σ hyp. Milt. 244,3).

Stephanos and the Aristeides scholiast are unlikely to have
known Ephoros at first hand, and they merely give a brief extract
of Ephoros’ detailed narrative. A test of Ephoros’ broad narrative
can be Diodoros’ queer story (10.27) - unknown from Herodotos
and likely to derive from Ephoros - that Datis, himself a Mede, at
Marathon demanded that the Athenians should return to him the
sovereignty which had belonged to Medos, his ancestor who had
once been king of Athens. Three points in Stephanos and the
Aristeides scholia suffice to demonstrate how much Ephoros di­
verged from Herodotos on Miltiades’ Parian expedition:
• Before his fiasco in Paros, Miltiades reduced several islands back
under Athenian sway. This means that islands which had pre­
viously given earth and water to the Persian king, had first been
subdued under Athens by Themistokles, in the preemptive war
which is suppressed by Herodotos, with the fleet constructed after
the passage of his naval bill A. In 490, the islands had apparently
been compelled by the Persians to follow them, and after Mara­
thon the Athenian fleet was back, this time led by Miltiades, not
Themistokles.
• Miltiades was injured in the thigh by a shot which he assumed
came from Demeter, not by jumping the enclosure wall of her
sanctuary.
• He died in prison.12

To some extent, Ephoros may have drawn upon Hero­
dotos and rationalised his account; that might for instance account
for the total absence of the priestess Timo and the Delphic oracle
from Stephanos and the Aristeides scholia. But the version of Mil­
tiades approaching the sanctuary of Demeter tainted with enemy
blood and being hit by a shot which he assumed was sent by Demeter, is no more the work of a rationalising historian than Ephoros-Diodoros' story of Datis as a Mede claiming kingship in Athens. Like the pre-Marathon Athenian dominion and Miltiades' death in prison, the enemy blood and Demeter's shot must somehow be derived from earlier, non-Herodotean tradition. It will not do to dismiss Ephoros as nothing but a late rationalisation of Herodotos.

The use of Ephoros by Nepos (whether mediate or immediate makes no difference for our purpose) is clearly documented for the Paros expedition in his Miltiades ch. 7:

After the battle of Marathon the Athenians entrusted Miltiades with a fleet of 70 ships, in order to make war on the islands that had given help to the barbarians. While holding that command he compelled many to return to their allegiance, but with others he resorted to force. Among the latter, Paros was so confident of its strength that he could not bring it to terms by argument. Therefore he disembarked his troops, invested the town with siege-works, and completely cut off its supplies. Then he set up his mantlets and tortoise-sheds and advanced against the walls. He was on the point of taking the town, when a grove, which was some distance off on the mainland but visible from the island, by some chance caught fire one night. When the flames were seen by the townspeople and the besiegers, both parties thought it a signal given by the king's marines. The result was that the Parians were kept from surrendering, while Miltiades, fearing that the king's fleet was approaching, set fire to the works that he had constructed, and returned to Athens with all the ships which he had taken with him, to the great vexation of his fellow-citizens. In consequence, he was accused of treason, on the ground that, when he might have taken the town, he had been bribed by the king and had left without accomplishing his purpose. At the time he was disabled by wounds which he had suffered in the attack on the town, and
since for that reason he could not plead his own case, his brother Stesagoras spoke on his behalf. When the trial was concluded, he was not condemned to capital punishment, but to pay a fine, the amount of which was fixed at 50 talents, the sum which had been spent on the fleet. Since he could not pay the fine at once, he was put in the state prison, and there he met his end.

Like in Ephoros, Miltiades died in the prison, and the campaign was against a number of islands, in order to reduce them under Athenian dominion after they had given aid to the Persians. Again, the previous suzerainty presupposes the use by Themistokes of the fleet resulting from his naval bill $A$, in a preventive war with Aigina and other islands. The naval bill is duly reported by Nepos in *Them*. 2.2, where the war is oddly not with Aigina and other medizing islands but with Korkyra and the pirates, whether Nepos himself or an intermediary source is to blame. No less oddly, Eforos' forest fire in Mykonos is transplanted far off to the mainland. In Eforos, the besieged Parians withdrew their capitulation when they believed the Persians were approaching, whereas Miltiades seems to have returned to Athens in religious fright after being wounded by a shot from Demeter. The wound reappears in Nepos, but without a word of Demeter and a shot from her; it was in fear of the Persian fleet, not of a goddess, that the Miltiades of Nepos returned to Athens. Although Nepos fails to mention Eforos as a source in any of his biographies, he undoubtedly used him widely - directly or indirectly - for his *Miltiades* and *Themistokes*.

As stated above, the fact that Eforos, unlike Herodorus, did record Miltiades' reduction of islands to their former allegiance, implies that he included Themistokes' bill $A$ and his use of the new fleet in a preemptive war with Aigina and other islands that had submitted to the king. The Miltiades of Eforos had thus to share with Themistokes some of the glory for the triumph at
Marathon, Nepos' record of pre-Marathon naval bill \textit{A} in \textit{Them.} 2, must accordingly be based on Ephoros, and the same will apply to the un-Herodotean battle \textit{A} in \textit{Milt.} 5, in which the Persians were on the offensive. But the question is whether Ephoros reported two separate encounters, first battle \textit{A} with Kallimakhos in command and some days later battle \textit{B} with Miltiades. Did Miltiades in the most influential historian Ephoros have to share some of the glory of Marathon not only with Themistokles but also with Kallimakhos? The total absence of Kallimakhos in the Marathon accounts of both Nepos, Plutarch and Iustinus, and his next to total disappearance in the tradition, speak against it. And the chances are that Ephoros, like Aristophanes’ wasps and Nepos \textit{Milt.} 5, telescoped the two battles into one; omitting any light-armed troops, Ephoros had it that the hoplites immediately, without allowing themselves a rest after warding off the Persian attack on their defensive position, took up a pursuit of the enemy to the ships. And Miltiades was the commander in Ephoros’ one and only battle. In Ephoros-Diodoros 10.27, we are told that when Datis, after landing at Marathon and before arraying his troops for battle (obviously battle \textit{A}), demanded the return of the sovereignty in Athens, he was reputiated not by the polemarch Kallirnakhos but by Miltiades on behalf of the ten strateges. But even if the Ephorean Miltiades avoided having to share glory with Kallimakhos, the fact that the historian must have included Themistokles’ bill \textit{A} and his preemptive war with states that had submitted to the Persians, indicates that Marathon was not the same stunning triumph for Miltiades in Ephoros as in Herodotos. The peripatia of the fortunes of Ephoros’ Miltiades was less in both directions; he was not so high up, and did not to fall so deep as the Herodotean one. On his post-Marathon campaign he followed up his previous capture of Lemnos by reestablishing Athenian domination in the Aegean; he did not mount an isolated, ill-starred attack on Paros but led a campaign that was successful in other islands before the Parian fiasco; nor did he attack Paros from a
purely personal motive. To approach the sanctuary of Demeter tainted with Parian blood was probably a lesser offence than the sacrilege intended by the Herodotean Miltiades, and accordingly there was no Delphic Apollo to declare that he was destined to die.

The battered papyrus fragment of Ephoros (F 191) ends with a laudatory excursus on the character of Themistokles and the Athenians' shameful ingratitude to him. In the same vein, Nepos' Miltiades ends with moralising praise of Miltiades, who although innocent was sentenced by the people and died in prison. This smacks of the same Ephoros. Thus Herodotos and Ephoros both painted Miltiades and Themistokles with many traits in common, but the two historians' portraits of the two men were quite unlike. Modern scholars follow suit. One school follows Herodotos in depicting Miltiades as a fürstlicher Herr acting in a yet poorly developed polis, a towering individual who placed himself above the state and attacked Paros out of private motives, manipulating his fellow citizens at will. Following scholars with a more optimistic view of the early democracy, I prefer the version of Ephoros, in whom the expedition was against more islands than just Paros, and enacted by citizens who were well aware what they were doing. In 499, the majority of the citizens in the assembly had voted for helping the Ionians in their rising, and under the threat from Persia in the late 490s, they elected anti-Persian Themistokles first archon and voted for employing the profits from the silver strike to build a large public fleet rather than for distribution among themselves. And they had decided to use the fleet in a preventive war with Aigina and other medizing islands. Consequently, in 490 Datis was unable to simply mobilise Aigina and the other states which had given earth and water, for a frontal surprise attack on Athens from Phaleron. Before turning against Athens, he had to spend time forcing Karystos and other states back under Persian sway, thus giving the Athenians time to prepare their defence.
If Ephoros-Nepos are preferable to Herodotos on Miltiades’ last campaign, so are they also on the defensive battle A at Marathon, fought shortly after the Athenians and Plataians had arrived there, as well as when Nepos states that the ships resulting from naval bill A were indeed employed for the purpose for which they were built. But what about Ephoros’ sources? I have argued earlier that when Ephoros-Diodoros and other secondary sources disagree with Thukydides on Pentekontaetia chronology, they are indebted to Hellanikos, whom Ephoros is known to have used and whose chronology was not Thukydides’ cup of tea (1.97.2). The same Hellanikos may ultimately be behind much non-Herodotean matter in Ephoros and writers dependent on him. The loss of Hellanikos’ *Atthis* and other works from his pen may be among the saddest losses of Greek literature. Arid reading perhaps, far below the standard of Herodotos’ golden pen and Polemon’s golden tongue. But preserving non-Herodotean and non-Thukydidean traditions.

A final sigh about sources. When we are in the lucky position of having two diverging versions, as about Miltiades’ Parian expedition, we optimistically surmise that one of them gives us something near to the historical truth. When we only have one version, like Herodotos on the Aiginetan war, we more or less swallow what he says, despite knowing that the father of history was also the father of lies.

*The events*

The adult Themistokles only enters our sources when he was elected eponymous archon in 493, at the time when the Persians finally quelled the Ionian rising by their capture of Miletos. But Themistokles’ fellow citizens are unlikely to have elected an unknown quantity for first archon. He must have been known as an anti-Persian who predicted that the Persians would soon come to take vengeance for their aid to the Ionians. And Themistokles is likely to have had a hand in the preemptive fighting with medizing
Aigina that ended with the loss of four ships. In preparation of his punitive campaign, king Dareios is likely, straight after quelling the Ionian revolt, to have required earth and water from Athens' enemy Aigina and other islands, as well as from Argos and other mainland states. The Athenians asked king Kleomenes of Sparta for help to neutralise Aigina, and before his defeat of medizing Argos at Sepeia in 494 he took ten prominent Aiginetans as hostages and brought them over to Athens. To no avail, for Aigina responded by capturing a number of prominent Athenians, and an exchange of hostages followed. Next the Athenians, after attempting to foment an unsuccessful democratic revolution in Aigina, went to war with a fleet of ships partly their own and partly borrowed from Aigina's rival Korinth. But after initial victories at sea and on land, and the return of the borrowed ships, they suffered defeat and lost four ships. This was the situation when Themistokles was elected first archon. On his motion the citizens decided to begin fortifying Piraeus and to employ godsent newfound silver from the mines to expand their fleet. The next godsent gift came in 492 when on the first Persian punitive expedition against Greece, Mardonios had his ships destroyed off Athos by the god Boreas. Themistokles was sent with the expanded fleet on a successful preemptive campaign against Aigina and other islands that had submitted to king Dareios, and so in 490 Datis could not just order from them the provision of men and ships. He was obliged to sail around and force the islands back to their allegiance. Datis will have been well aware of the Athenian fleet stationed in Phaleron or half-fortified Piraeus. Themistokles was sent with the expanded fleet on a successful preemptive campaign against Aigina and other islands that had submitted to king Dareios, and so in 490 Datis could not just order from them the provision of men and ships. He was obliged to sail around and force the islands back to their allegiance. Datis will have been well aware of the Athenian fleet stationed in Phaleron or half-fortified Piraeus. After recovering Paros and other islands, and ordering ships and men, he did not risk sailing on against Aigina which was now under an anti-Persian regime, and then further on to Phaleron. Instead, he took to Euboian Karystos and Eretria, thus giving the Athenians time to prepare their defence and call for help from Sparta and other states. After the death of the strongly anti-Persian king Kleomenes probably in 491, the Spartans declined to march out right away.
Only a contingent from Plataiai arrived in time in Athens, and when it was reported that Datis was about to land at Marathon, the assembly commissioned the polemarch Kallimakhos to lead the Athenian spearmen and missile-troops plus the Plataians out to Marathon. There they took a defensive position, blocking the way to the Persians while waiting for their Spartan reinforcements to arrive. After an unsuccessful assault on the strong Greek position, most of the Persian forces reembarked for a frontal attack on Athens from Phaleron, confident that like in Eretria, their friends in Athens would open the city gates to them. But the attack was warded off by the Athenian fleet and the home guard; warriors had also returned in time from Marathon, after having, under the command of Miltiades, defeated the Persian forces left behind by Datis. After his two attempts at taking vengeance, in 492 and 490, king Dareios started preparations for a third campaign, but his godsent death in 486 and the ensuing troubles in the Persian empire gave the Athenians time to prepare their defence in three ways. First, they thanked Athena and Apollo for their help in 490 by initiating the building of the huge pre-Parthenon temple on Akropolis and the treasury at Delphi, thus securing their divine aid when the Persians returned. Second, by introducing the institution of ostracism, they got rid of a number of suspected medizers. Third, adopting Themistokles’ interpretation of Apollo’s Wooden Wall oracle in the mid 480s, they launched a second shipbuilding scheme. And on the eve of the great invasion of Dareios’ son Xerxes in 480 they contracted an alliance with a number of states, patching up any grudges that might remain against Aigina. The expanded fleet of Athens, and the collaboration of the former enemies Athens and Aigina, rendered possible the victory of Salamis.
NOTES

1. Kinzl 1976: 283 "einer herodoteischen Stereotypvorstellung vom Verhalten des athenischen Demos." Contra Bengston 1939: 53 'Natürlich ist die Nichtangabe des Expeditionsziels, an deren Geschichtlichkeit man nicht zu zweifeln hat, aus militärischen Gründen von Miltiades als notwendig empfunden worden.' Ignoring Themistokles' pre-Marathon preemptive expedition against Aegina and other islands, Bengston (p. 59) states that Miltiades' expedition against Paros 'stellt den ersten Versuch Athens dar, mit der Flotte seine Herrschaft in der Agais zu begründen.' Also Burn 1962: 259 and Develin 1977: 573 accept that Miltiades did not specify his aims.


7. Immerwahr 1966: 192 'The history of Miltiades and his family follows a particular pattern of fortune and impiety, since that family had risen to greatness by the good fortune of having the tyranny of the Chersonese offered them through an oracle.' Fornara 1971b: 65 'Herodotus' method is artistic, not historical.' Fornara (66-74) treats Herodotos' picture of Themistokles well, stating that 'Herodotus assuredly did not write his history in order to present Themistokles as if he were the hero of a nineteenth-century novel.' Kinzl 1976: 292 'Hdt.s Bericht handelt vom Verderben des Mannes Miltiades und ist als solcher beschränkt 'historisch' in seiner Zielsetzung.' I do not find that Link 2000 argues well against Kinzl and for Herodotos as 'correct and serious historiography' (p. 53). Cf. Gottlieb 1963: 63 who speaks of the 'objektive Geschichtsschreibung' of Herodotos.


CONCLUSION: SOURCES AND FACTS

11. Dindorf 1829, scholia on hypothesis Miltiades; 177,2; 232,2; 244,3.
12. Kinzl 1976: 296 oddly has it that ‘Ephoros vermutlich keine von Hdt. unbeinflusste, und somit unabhängige, Tradition vorlegen haben mag.' According to him, the only point where Ephoros and Herodotos cannot be reconciled is Miltiades' death in prison. Also Bengtson 1939 and Gottlieb 1963: 65-68 will play down any opposition between Herodotos and Ephoros.
13. A number of scholars unfortunately agree with How 1919: 60 ‘Here, as elsewhere, Ephorus gives us little more than a plausible but shallow attempt to rationalize the biased and defective tradition preserved in Herodotus.' Schachermeyr 1974: 98 n. 2 states that whether Ephoros 'von Herodot abweichende Versionen mit­erwandte, scheint mir äusserst fraglich.'
14. Nenci 1998: 313 Ephoros 'si ritiene attinga a una fonte diversa da quella di Erodoto.' Bicknell 1972: 225 'we must suppose that Ephoros got his non-Herodotean material from Hellanikos or Charon of Lampsakos who had at their disposal some authentic information.' Ephoros' use of Hellanikos is discussed by Barber 1935: 113-123. With Lehmann-Haupt, Obst 1913: 29 claims Dionysios of Miletos as Ephoros' source for his non-Herodotean matter about the expedition of Xerxes. Obst cites literature on Herodotos versus Ephoros-Diodoros on pp. 30-32. It is his odd view that Dionysios 'wahrscheinlich viel eher als Herodot den Ehrenname 'Vater der Geschichte' verdient.'
17. Noethe 1881: 27 expresses communis opinio: 'etiam in vitis Themis­toclis, Aristidis, Pausaniae componendis maximam partem narra­tionis Ephoro debuit.'
19. Possibly following Ephoros, Diod. 11.82.4 copares Myronides with the heroes of old, Miltiades and Themistokles, not Kallimakhos.
20. Gaps in the papyrus can be filled in by reference to Diodoros who presents a verbatim echo, 11.59.3.
22. Berve 1979: 56 in the year after Marathon 'ging der einstige Herr der Chersones an die Gewinnung einer neue Haupsmacht' in Paros. Ehrenberg 1946: 138 leaves no room for doubt, stating that later
sources explain the Parian expedition 'in a rational, but obviously misleading way. As it is emphasized by several scholars ... this must be said of the story which Ephorus tells us. There is no doubt that his (Hdt.'s) story is to be preferred.' Linke 2000: 52 speaks of 'das vorpolitische, altarisokratische Paros-Abenteuer.' Grote 1870: 290 n. 2 'The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect.' (Grote's editors 2001: 194 n. 48 prefer Ephoros-Nepos to Herodotos.) How: 1919: 60. Develin 1977: 572 finds considerable difficulties in elevating Ephoros' version above that of Herodotos.

23. Wecklein 1876: 8-9; Duncker 1888: 151; Macan 1895: 256. Even the great Herodotean Hammond 1997: 519 who blames the puerilities of Herodotos' account on sources bitterly hostile to Miltiades. His main position is (p. 493) that 'literary sources after Herodotus ... should not be regarded as rivals to Herodotus.'

24. Against the amusing statement of Macan 1895: 255 'the whole account of the affair from first to last as given by Nepos is so reasonable and coherent that the chief ground for doubting it is to be found in these, its good qualities.'

25. Schreiner 1997. As stated by Schepens 1977: 98, 'la vecchia tradizione gloriosa' of Schwartz, Laggueur and Jacoby is very critical of Ephoros. Add e.g. Busolt, Meyer, Swoboda, Whatley, Hammond, Lazenby, Pritchett. Hignett 1963: 16 is typical, 'when he merely supplements Herodotus, his additions to the story of the war are no more than the products of 'constructive inference' and at worst they are pure fiction.' Any attempt at a *Ehrenrettung* of the influential universal historian must be welcome.

26. In Schreiner 1978, I argue against *communis opinio* and with Androtion F 6 and Beloch 1914: 29 in dating the law of ostracism in 488.
Less common Sources

Ephoros, FGrHist 70
Stephanos Byzantios s. Paros

ο δὲ Μιλτιάδης τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ὑήσου τινάς ἀποβάσεις ποιησάμενος ἐπόρθησε, Πάρον δὲ εὐδαιμονεστάτην καὶ μεγίστην οὕσαν τότε τῶν Κυκλάδων καθεζόμενος ἐπολι- όρκεῖ πολὺν χρόνον τῆς θαλάττης εἰργῶν καὶ κατὰ γῆν μηχανήματα ἅγων. ἦδη τῶν τειχῶν πιπτότων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παραδιδονὸν τὴν πόλιν τῶν Παριων διωμολογημένων ὑλῆς τινὸς ἐξ αὐτομάτου περὶ τὴν Μύκονον ἐξαφθείσης οἱ μὲν Πάροι τῶν Δάτιν αὐτοῖς πυρεῖειν ὑπολαμότες ἐφεύσαντο τὰς ὁμολογίας καὶ τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τῷ Μιλτι- ἀδή παρέδοσαν. δὴ δὲν ἐτὶ καὶ ὑνὶ ἡμᾶς χρηθαί τῇ παρομία τοὺς ψευδομένους τὰς ὁμολογίας ἀναπαράξειν φάσκοντας.

Schol. Aristeides For the Four, Dindorf, probably partly depending on Ephoros

hypothesis Miliades
catatagontas δὲ ὑπὸ Διαμενίδων ὅτι Νάξου ἥ Πάρου (ἅμω γὰρ λέγεται) διωμεῖς ἐλείν κατεχομένην ὑπὸ Περσῶν οὐκ ἐβούλησι, ἐκδιδάνεισα μὲν ἀποθανίσει τεσσαράκοντα δὲ τάλαντα διημώθη ἡ ἐξέτισε Κίμων. τέθηκε δὲ μετὰ δῶο ἵππα τῆς μάχης, ὡς οἱ πλείους ψηφίζωνται ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ.
177,2
μετά τὰ κατὰ Μαραθώνα ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Παρίους ὁ Μιλτιάδης, ἡ ὦτι συνέπραξαν τῷ Πέρσῃ ἢ ὦτι ἀπέστησαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ νῆσος εὔπελης. ταύτην πολιορκοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἐπέμφηκε πέλος ἐξ ἀφαινοῦς, καὶ ἔτρωσεν αὐτὸν τὸν μηρῶν. ὁ δὲ νυμίας τῆς Δήμητρος εἶναι τὸ πέλος (ἡν γὰρ πλῆσιον τοῦ τείχους βωμός αὐτῆς) καὶ τὸ ἱεῦν φοβηθεὶς ἀνεχόρησε.

232,2
καταδουλούθαι τὰς νῆσους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἔξελθον εἰς Πάρον πρῶτην, καὶ παρελθὼν τὸ ἱερόν, μεμολύσμενος αἰματιῶν πολεμίων· οἱ μὲν φασίν ὡς βέλει ἐβλήθη, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους κατηρέχθη. κατεαγέεις οὖν τὸν μηρὸν ὑπεστρέψας ἀπράκτος.

244,3
Μιλτιάδης δὲ Νάξου ἢ Πάρου δυνάμενος ἐλεῖν ἐπεὶ πρὸς τὸν μηρὸν ἐξ ἀφαινοῦς ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ δείσας μὴ ἁρὰ ὑπὸ τῆς Δήμητρος τοῦτον ἐπέμφηκε (ὁν γὰρ πλῆσιον νεώς τῆς θεοῦ) ἐκείθεν ἀνεχόρησε. κατεφησάμενοι δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναίοι διὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον εἰσελθεῖν, ζητοῦντες αὐτὸν τόλματα τεταράκοντα.

Himerios 6.20
οὐπώ μὲν γὰρ ἐφθησαν τὴν ἀπόβασιν τῶν βαρβάρων πυθόμενοι, καὶ τὸν ἐνόπλιον ἔθεον· οὔπω δὲ τοῖς ἀποβάσις συνέμισαν, καὶ παραυτικὰ ἐτρέποντο.

59.2
δένζω δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ στρατιώτας ἐμοῖς, τὸν μὲν τῇ φύσει κάν τῆς γραφῆς μαχόμενον - δόξης γὰρ ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τῇ τέχνῃ πολεμοῦντί μάλλον ἔοικέναι ἡ τεθνεωτί Καλλίμαχος.
Iustinus 2.9.8-15

Igitur Athenienses audito Darei adventu auxilium a Lacedaemoniis, socia tum civitate, petiverunt, quos ubi viderunt quadridui teneri religione, non expectato, instructis decem milibus civium et Plataeensibus auxiliaribus mille adversus sescenta milia hostium in campis Marathoniis in proelium egrediantur. Miliadiess et dux belli erat et auctor non expectandi auxili: quem tanta fiducia ceperat, ut plus praevidid in celeritate quam in sociis ducet. Magna igitur in pugnam euntibus animorum alacritas fuit, adeo ut, cum mille passus inter duas acies essent, citato cursu ante iactum sagittarum ad hostem venirent ... Victi Persae in naves confugerunt, ex quibus multae suppressae, multae captae sunt. In eo proelio tanta virtus singularum fuit, ut, cuius laus prima esset, difficile iudicium videretur. Inter ceteros tamen Themistoclis adulescentis gloria eruit, in quo iam indoles futurae imperatoriae dignitatis apparuit.

2.12.12
Namque Athenienses post pugnam Marathoniam praemonente Themistocle, victoriam illam de Persis non finem, sed causam maioris belli fore, CC naves fabricaverunt.


Είτα Αθηναίων οὐτώ γυνωσκόντων τὰ ναυτικὰ, πρῶτον εἰσηγεῖτο τὴν τέχνην, καὶ μελετῶν πρὸς θάλασσαν ἐπείσαι, καὶ νεμομένων Αθηναίων εἰκῆ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἡ χρῆματα, διαπάνυν ἀλογον εἰς τὴν τῶν νεῶν μετέθηκε χρείας, καὶ τρία κάλλιστα διὰ μίαν εἰσηγήσατο τέχνην· ἐξ ὃν Ἀθηναίοι κρατοῦσι τῶν νήσων καὶ τῶν Αἰγιαντῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς κατεστρέφετο, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης συγκατεσκεύαζον, καὶ ναυτικὸν ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς Ἑλληνικόν καὶ βαρβαρικὸν πόλεμον, ἐκάτερον γένος τέχνη μιᾶ τῶν νεῶν παριστάμενον.
LESS COMMON SOURCES

Polemon

1.5
Καλλίμαχος μὲν ὡς πολέμαρχον ἀνάγκη τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦγεν εἰς Μαραθώνα καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἀμύνασθαι τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπόβασιν. Κυναίγειρος δὲ ὑπ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ τόλμης, ἐθελοῦσις, ἔτει καὶ νέος ὡν κομιδή, σχεδὸν καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἡλικίας, μετέσχε τῆς ἔξοδου, ἐρωτή δόξης καὶ μεγάλων ἔργων ὑρεγόμενος.

1.21
ἔτι δὲ, Καλλίμαχος ἐν τοῖσ πρῶτοις ἡ μέσοις τῆς μάχης ἀπέθανεν οὐκ ἀντισχῶν τοῖσ πλείοσιν ἐργοῖς καὶ τόνωσιν, Κυναίγειρος δὲ μέχρι τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἦρκεσε φυγῆς, ὡστε ὁ μὲν ἐν μέρει τῆς μάχης ἐξητάσθη μόνον, ὁ δὲ πάντα τὸν πόλεμον διὰ τέλους ἐπολήμησεν.

1.28
ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐν γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ μεμαχημέθα, ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐν γῇ μόνῳ καὶ ὑμεῖς μὲν ἀπεμάχεσθε μόνον τοῖσ βαρβάροις, ἡμεῖς δὲ φυγεῖν αὐτοὺς ποιούσε πολιοῦσιν ὑπ’ ἀφιστάμεθα αὐτῶν.

1.49
ἄλλ’ ὁ Λισχύλε παῖ, τὸν λόγον μοι σὺ ποίησον καὶ συγκόσμησον τὰς Μαραθώνος μάχας τῷ πατρί.

2.2
Καλλιμάχος γὰρ πατήρ ὃν παῦσαι ἄλλου πρέπω μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ βήματος ἐστάναι. ζῶν μὲν οὖν Καλλιμάχος ζῶντος Κυναίγειρο [πολέμαρχος] ἦν.

2.5-8
ἀπέβαινε μὲν εἰς Μαραθώνα ὁ Δαρείου στόλος μετὰ τὰς εἴς Λιγαίαν τῶν νῆσων ἀρπαγάς, τῇ δὲ Ἀττικῇ βοηθεῖν ἔδει
LESS COMMON SOURCES

2.23 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπαντας εἰς Μαραθώνα ἦγε συνθήματι, ὁ δὲ ἐδέχετο· ὁ μὲν ἐκέλευς, ὁ δὲ ἐπείθετο.

2.28 ὅλως δὲ τὰ μὲν Κυναίγειρον Καλλίμαχος παρεσκεύασεν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Καλλιμάχου μάχης προτέρας γενομένης κατα- πλαγέντες οἱ βάρβαροι τὰ νότα δεξιάσεις παρείχον τοῖς αὐτῶς ἐπιφερομένους ῥαδίαν τὴν διώξιν· τὰ δὲ Κυναι- γείρον δεύτερα καὶ τελευταία πεπραγμένα τῶν Καλλι- μάχου λαμπρῶν ἀριστείαν αἰτεὶ ὡστε καὶ τοῦτο τὸν λόγον τῷ βατέρῳ παρασχεῖν.

2.40 Καλλιμάχου μὲν ὡς ἡ τόλμη καὶ μάχη τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, νυκήσας τὸν βασιλέως στρατὸν καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν αὐτοὶς ἀβατὸν εἶναι· Κυναίγειρος δὲ καὶ φεύγοντας ἦμιν τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀνείρηκε καὶ κατείχεν ἐν τῷ χώρᾳ τοὺς πολε- μίους καὶ μάχης ἐπραπτεν ἀρχὰς δευτέρας.
LESS COMMON SOURCES

2.49

τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων πολεμάρχων δειλίαν ἐντιθεμένων τῇ πλήθει ἡ τοῦτον ψῆφος προσεγενομένη τὴν ὁλὴν συμβολὴν ἐποίησε καὶ ὅπως δεὶ ἀπομάχεσθαι καὶ τολμᾶν ἐκύρωσεν ὅστε παντὸς ἄν καὶ μόνος καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ κατορθώματος αἵτιος νομίζοιτο.

Suda s.v. χωρίς ἵππεῖς

Δάτιδος ἐμβαλόντος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, τοὺς Ἰωάνας φασίν ἀναχωρήσαντος αὐτῶν ἀνελθόντας ἐπὶ τὰ δένδρα σημαίνειν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὥς εἶν χωρίς οἱ ἵππεῖς, καὶ Μιλτιάδην συνεύρετα τὴν ἀποχώρησιν αὐτῶν συμβαλεῖν οὕτω καὶ νικῆσαι.

s.v. Ἰππίας 2

οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι, συμβουλεύσαντες ἑνὸς, ἦσαν γὰρ δέκα, περιμένειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, Μιλτιάδου δὲ παραινοῦντος ἐξιέναι καὶ Καλλιμάχου, ἐξῆλθον αὐτοὶ μὲν ὄντες β. Πλαταίας ἔχοντες ἁ. καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ φασὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐνίκησαν.

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no one could understand what the oracle meant, Themistokles convinced the people that Apollo’s advice was that they should take to their ships with all their possessions; for that was what the god meant by a wooden wall. Having adopted that plan, they added to the fleet already mentioned an equal number of triremes, and transported all their movable property either to Salamis or to Troizen.

Themistokles’ praetorship looks uncommonly like his archonship in 493/2, bill A being carried in the same year when according to Thukydides 1.93.3 he initiated the fortifications of Piraeus.¹⁴ (Nepos only reports on the fortification of Piraeus and Athens in ch. 6, when he is passing from Themistokles in war to Themistokles in peace. So also Diodoros, and the two authors are better discussed together below.) Nepos’ Themistokles used the ships for the purpose they had been built for, surprisingly a campaign against Korkyra and the pirates, not a preemptive war with Aigina and other islands that had given earth and water to the Persian king. In Milt. 7.1, however, Nepos has it that after Marathon, the Athenians entrusted Miltiades with 70 ships, ‘in order to make war on the islands that had given help to the barbarians. While holding that command he compelled many of the islands to return to their allegiance (ad officium redire coegit), but with some he had to resort to force.’ Before being compelled to give help to the expedition of Datis, the islands had accordingly been in alliance with Athens. This means that Themistokles, with the new fleet resulting from his naval bill A, had forced under Athenian supremacy islands that had succumbed to the Persians, in a war that made the Athenians ‘not only rich, but highly skilled also in naval warfare.’ By no means had he waged war against Korkyra and the pirates. Later on Themistokles, upon his interpretation of Apollo’s Wooden Wall oracle, by bill B expanded the fleet by another 100 ships, to be used not against other Greeks this time but against the Persians themselves.¹⁵